mirror of
https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo.git
synced 2024-08-28 13:31:30 +02:00
update golang.org/x/crypto vendor to use acme v2 (#9056)
This commit is contained in:
parent
108bed2023
commit
05f6eccf27
52 changed files with 3430 additions and 2943 deletions
2
go.mod
2
go.mod
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@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ require (
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github.com/urfave/cli v1.20.0
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github.com/willf/bitset v0.0.0-20180426185212-8ce1146b8621 // indirect
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github.com/yohcop/openid-go v0.0.0-20160914080427-2c050d2dae53
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golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20190927123631-a832865fa7ad
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golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20191117063200-497ca9f6d64f
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golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20191101175033-0deb6923b6d9
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golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.0.0-20190604053449-0f29369cfe45
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golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20190910064555-bbd175535a8b
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2
go.sum
2
go.sum
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@ -583,6 +583,8 @@ golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20190617133340-57b3e21c3d56/go.mod h1:yigFU9vqHzYiE8U
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golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20190701094942-4def268fd1a4/go.mod h1:yigFU9vqHzYiE8UmvKecakEJjdnWj3jj499lnFckfCI=
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golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20190927123631-a832865fa7ad h1:5E5raQxcv+6CZ11RrBYQe5WRbUIWpScjh0kvHZkZIrQ=
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golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20190927123631-a832865fa7ad/go.mod h1:yigFU9vqHzYiE8UmvKecakEJjdnWj3jj499lnFckfCI=
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golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20191117063200-497ca9f6d64f h1:kz4KIr+xcPUsI3VMoqWfPMvtnJ6MGfiVwsWSVzphMO4=
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golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20191117063200-497ca9f6d64f/go.mod h1:LzIPMQfyMNhhGPhUkYOs5KpL4U8rLKemX1yGLhDgUto=
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golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20190121172915-509febef88a4/go.mod h1:CJ0aWSM057203Lf6IL+f9T1iT9GByDxfZKAQTCR3kQA=
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golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20190510132918-efd6b22b2522/go.mod h1:ZjyILWgesfNpC6sMxTJOJm9Kp84zZh5NQWvqDGG3Qr8=
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golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20190731235908-ec7cb31e5a56/go.mod h1:JhuoJpWY28nO4Vef9tZUw9qufEGTyX1+7lmHxV5q5G4=
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168
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/acme.go
generated
vendored
168
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/acme.go
generated
vendored
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@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
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// Package acme provides an implementation of the
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// Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) spec.
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// The intial implementation was based on ACME draft-02 and
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// is now being extended to comply with RFC8555.
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// is now being extended to comply with RFC 8555.
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// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-acme-acme-02
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// and https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555 for details.
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//
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@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ import (
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const (
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// LetsEncryptURL is the Directory endpoint of Let's Encrypt CA.
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LetsEncryptURL = "https://acme-v01.api.letsencrypt.org/directory"
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LetsEncryptURL = "https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/directory"
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// ALPNProto is the ALPN protocol name used by a CA server when validating
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// tls-alpn-01 challenges.
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@ -60,7 +60,10 @@ var idPeACMEIdentifierV1 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 1, 30, 1}
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const (
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maxChainLen = 5 // max depth and breadth of a certificate chain
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maxCertSize = 1 << 20 // max size of a certificate, in bytes
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maxCertSize = 1 << 20 // max size of a certificate, in DER bytes
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// Used for decoding certs from application/pem-certificate-chain response,
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// the default when in RFC mode.
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maxCertChainSize = maxCertSize * maxChainLen
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// Max number of collected nonces kept in memory.
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// Expect usual peak of 1 or 2.
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@ -139,8 +142,7 @@ type Client struct {
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func (c *Client) accountKID(ctx context.Context) keyID {
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c.cacheMu.Lock()
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defer c.cacheMu.Unlock()
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if c.dir.OrderURL == "" {
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// Assume legacy CA.
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if !c.dir.rfcCompliant() {
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return noKeyID
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}
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if c.kid != noKeyID {
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@ -233,6 +235,9 @@ func (c *Client) directoryURL() string {
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}
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// CreateCert requests a new certificate using the Certificate Signing Request csr encoded in DER format.
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// It is incompatible with RFC 8555. Callers should use CreateOrderCert when interfacing
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// with an RFC-compliant CA.
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//
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// The exp argument indicates the desired certificate validity duration. CA may issue a certificate
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// with a different duration.
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// If the bundle argument is true, the returned value will also contain the CA (issuer) certificate chain.
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@ -284,12 +289,22 @@ func (c *Client) CreateCert(ctx context.Context, csr []byte, exp time.Duration,
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// It retries the request until the certificate is successfully retrieved,
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// context is cancelled by the caller or an error response is received.
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//
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// The returned value will also contain the CA (issuer) certificate if the bundle argument is true.
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// If the bundle argument is true, the returned value also contains the CA (issuer)
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// certificate chain.
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//
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// FetchCert returns an error if the CA's response or chain was unreasonably large.
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// Callers are encouraged to parse the returned value to ensure the certificate is valid
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// and has expected features.
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func (c *Client) FetchCert(ctx context.Context, url string, bundle bool) ([][]byte, error) {
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dir, err := c.Discover(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if dir.rfcCompliant() {
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return c.fetchCertRFC(ctx, url, bundle)
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}
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// Legacy non-authenticated GET request.
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res, err := c.get(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK))
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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@ -304,10 +319,15 @@ func (c *Client) FetchCert(ctx context.Context, url string, bundle bool) ([][]by
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// For instance, the key pair of the certificate may be authorized.
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// If the key is nil, c.Key is used instead.
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func (c *Client) RevokeCert(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, cert []byte, reason CRLReasonCode) error {
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if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil {
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dir, err := c.Discover(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if dir.rfcCompliant() {
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return c.revokeCertRFC(ctx, key, cert, reason)
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}
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// Legacy CA.
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body := &struct {
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Resource string `json:"resource"`
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Cert string `json:"certificate"`
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@ -317,7 +337,7 @@ func (c *Client) RevokeCert(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, cert []byte,
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Cert: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(cert),
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Reason: int(reason),
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}
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res, err := c.post(ctx, key, c.dir.RevokeURL, body, wantStatus(http.StatusOK))
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res, err := c.post(ctx, key, dir.RevokeURL, body, wantStatus(http.StatusOK))
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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@ -337,7 +357,7 @@ func AcceptTOS(tosURL string) bool { return true }
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// Register calls prompt with a TOS URL provided by the CA. Prompt should report
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// whether the caller agrees to the terms. To always accept the terms, the caller can use AcceptTOS.
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//
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// When interfacing with RFC compliant CA, non-RFC8555 compliant fields of acct are ignored
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// When interfacing with an RFC-compliant CA, non-RFC 8555 fields of acct are ignored
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// and prompt is called if Directory's Terms field is non-zero.
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// Also see Error's Instance field for when a CA requires already registered accounts to agree
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// to an updated Terms of Service.
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@ -346,9 +366,7 @@ func (c *Client) Register(ctx context.Context, acct *Account, prompt func(tosURL
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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// RFC8555 compliant account registration.
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if dir.OrderURL != "" {
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if dir.rfcCompliant() {
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return c.registerRFC(ctx, acct, prompt)
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}
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@ -370,16 +388,14 @@ func (c *Client) Register(ctx context.Context, acct *Account, prompt func(tosURL
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// GetReg retrieves an existing account associated with c.Key.
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//
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// The url argument is an Account URI used with pre-RFC8555 CAs.
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// It is ignored when interfacing with an RFC compliant CA.
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// The url argument is an Account URI used with pre-RFC 8555 CAs.
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// It is ignored when interfacing with an RFC-compliant CA.
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func (c *Client) GetReg(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Account, error) {
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dir, err := c.Discover(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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// Assume RFC8555 compliant CA.
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if dir.OrderURL != "" {
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if dir.rfcCompliant() {
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return c.getRegRFC(ctx)
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}
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@ -395,16 +411,14 @@ func (c *Client) GetReg(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Account, error) {
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// UpdateReg updates an existing registration.
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// It returns an updated account copy. The provided account is not modified.
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//
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// When interfacing with RFC compliant CAs, a.URI is ignored and the account URL
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// When interfacing with RFC-compliant CAs, a.URI is ignored and the account URL
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// associated with c.Key is used instead.
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func (c *Client) UpdateReg(ctx context.Context, acct *Account) (*Account, error) {
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dir, err := c.Discover(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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// Assume RFC8555 compliant CA.
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if dir.OrderURL != "" {
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if dir.rfcCompliant() {
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return c.updateRegRFC(ctx, acct)
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}
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@ -418,13 +432,21 @@ func (c *Client) UpdateReg(ctx context.Context, acct *Account) (*Account, error)
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return a, nil
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}
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// Authorize performs the initial step in an authorization flow.
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// Authorize performs the initial step in the pre-authorization flow,
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// as opposed to order-based flow.
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// The caller will then need to choose from and perform a set of returned
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// challenges using c.Accept in order to successfully complete authorization.
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//
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// Once complete, the caller can use AuthorizeOrder which the CA
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// should provision with the already satisfied authorization.
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// For pre-RFC CAs, the caller can proceed directly to requesting a certificate
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// using CreateCert method.
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//
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// If an authorization has been previously granted, the CA may return
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// a valid authorization (Authorization.Status is StatusValid). If so, the caller
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// need not fulfill any challenge and can proceed to requesting a certificate.
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// a valid authorization which has its Status field set to StatusValid.
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//
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// More about pre-authorization can be found at
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// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555#section-7.4.1.
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func (c *Client) Authorize(ctx context.Context, domain string) (*Authorization, error) {
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return c.authorize(ctx, "dns", domain)
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}
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@ -476,7 +498,17 @@ func (c *Client) authorize(ctx context.Context, typ, val string) (*Authorization
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// If a caller needs to poll an authorization until its status is final,
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// see the WaitAuthorization method.
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func (c *Client) GetAuthorization(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Authorization, error) {
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res, err := c.get(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK, http.StatusAccepted))
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dir, err := c.Discover(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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var res *http.Response
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if dir.rfcCompliant() {
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res, err = c.postAsGet(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK))
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} else {
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res, err = c.get(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK, http.StatusAccepted))
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}
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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@ -493,8 +525,8 @@ func (c *Client) GetAuthorization(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Authorizati
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// The url argument is an Authorization.URI value.
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//
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// If successful, the caller will be required to obtain a new authorization
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// using the Authorize method before being able to request a new certificate
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// for the domain associated with the authorization.
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// using the Authorize or AuthorizeOrder methods before being able to request
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// a new certificate for the domain associated with the authorization.
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//
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// It does not revoke existing certificates.
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func (c *Client) RevokeAuthorization(ctx context.Context, url string) error {
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@ -528,8 +560,18 @@ func (c *Client) RevokeAuthorization(ctx context.Context, url string) error {
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// In all other cases WaitAuthorization returns an error.
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// If the Status is StatusInvalid, the returned error is of type *AuthorizationError.
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func (c *Client) WaitAuthorization(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Authorization, error) {
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// Required for c.accountKID() when in RFC mode.
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dir, err := c.Discover(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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getfn := c.postAsGet
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if !dir.rfcCompliant() {
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getfn = c.get
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}
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for {
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res, err := c.get(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK, http.StatusAccepted))
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res, err := getfn(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK, http.StatusAccepted))
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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@ -572,10 +614,21 @@ func (c *Client) WaitAuthorization(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Authorizat
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//
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// A client typically polls a challenge status using this method.
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func (c *Client) GetChallenge(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Challenge, error) {
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res, err := c.get(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK, http.StatusAccepted))
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// Required for c.accountKID() when in RFC mode.
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dir, err := c.Discover(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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getfn := c.postAsGet
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if !dir.rfcCompliant() {
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getfn = c.get
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}
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res, err := getfn(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK, http.StatusAccepted))
|
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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defer res.Body.Close()
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v := wireChallenge{URI: url}
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if err := json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&v); err != nil {
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|
@ -590,23 +643,26 @@ func (c *Client) GetChallenge(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Challenge, erro
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// The server will then perform the validation asynchronously.
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func (c *Client) Accept(ctx context.Context, chal *Challenge) (*Challenge, error) {
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// Required for c.accountKID() when in RFC mode.
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if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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auth, err := keyAuth(c.Key.Public(), chal.Token)
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dir, err := c.Discover(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
|
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}
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|
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req := struct {
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Resource string `json:"resource"`
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Type string `json:"type"`
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Auth string `json:"keyAuthorization"`
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}{
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Resource: "challenge",
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Type: chal.Type,
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Auth: auth,
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var req interface{} = json.RawMessage("{}") // RFC-compliant CA
|
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if !dir.rfcCompliant() {
|
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auth, err := keyAuth(c.Key.Public(), chal.Token)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
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return nil, err
|
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}
|
||||
req = struct {
|
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Resource string `json:"resource"`
|
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Type string `json:"type"`
|
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Auth string `json:"keyAuthorization"`
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}{
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Resource: "challenge",
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Type: chal.Type,
|
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Auth: auth,
|
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}
|
||||
}
|
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res, err := c.post(ctx, nil, chal.URI, req, wantStatus(
|
||||
http.StatusOK, // according to the spec
|
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|
@ -658,21 +714,8 @@ func (c *Client) HTTP01ChallengePath(token string) string {
|
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}
|
||||
|
||||
// TLSSNI01ChallengeCert creates a certificate for TLS-SNI-01 challenge response.
|
||||
// Servers can present the certificate to validate the challenge and prove control
|
||||
// over a domain name.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The implementation is incomplete in that the returned value is a single certificate,
|
||||
// computed only for Z0 of the key authorization. ACME CAs are expected to update
|
||||
// their implementations to use the newer version, TLS-SNI-02.
|
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// For more details on TLS-SNI-01 see https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-acme-acme-01#section-7.3.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The token argument is a Challenge.Token value.
|
||||
// If a WithKey option is provided, its private part signs the returned cert,
|
||||
// and the public part is used to specify the signee.
|
||||
// If no WithKey option is provided, a new ECDSA key is generated using P-256 curve.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The returned certificate is valid for the next 24 hours and must be presented only when
|
||||
// the server name of the TLS ClientHello matches exactly the returned name value.
|
||||
// Deprecated: This challenge type is unused in both draft-02 and RFC versions of ACME spec.
|
||||
func (c *Client) TLSSNI01ChallengeCert(token string, opt ...CertOption) (cert tls.Certificate, name string, err error) {
|
||||
ka, err := keyAuth(c.Key.Public(), token)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
|
@ -689,17 +732,8 @@ func (c *Client) TLSSNI01ChallengeCert(token string, opt ...CertOption) (cert tl
|
|||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TLSSNI02ChallengeCert creates a certificate for TLS-SNI-02 challenge response.
|
||||
// Servers can present the certificate to validate the challenge and prove control
|
||||
// over a domain name. For more details on TLS-SNI-02 see
|
||||
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-acme-acme-03#section-7.3.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The token argument is a Challenge.Token value.
|
||||
// If a WithKey option is provided, its private part signs the returned cert,
|
||||
// and the public part is used to specify the signee.
|
||||
// If no WithKey option is provided, a new ECDSA key is generated using P-256 curve.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The returned certificate is valid for the next 24 hours and must be presented only when
|
||||
// the server name in the TLS ClientHello matches exactly the returned name value.
|
||||
// Deprecated: This challenge type is unused in both draft-02 and RFC versions of ACME spec.
|
||||
func (c *Client) TLSSNI02ChallengeCert(token string, opt ...CertOption) (cert tls.Certificate, name string, err error) {
|
||||
b := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token))
|
||||
h := hex.EncodeToString(b[:])
|
||||
|
@ -766,7 +800,7 @@ func (c *Client) TLSALPN01ChallengeCert(token, domain string, opt ...CertOption)
|
|||
return tlsChallengeCert([]string{domain}, newOpt)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// doReg sends all types of registration requests.
|
||||
// doReg sends all types of registration requests the old way (pre-RFC world).
|
||||
// The type of request is identified by typ argument, which is a "resource"
|
||||
// in the ACME spec terms.
|
||||
//
|
||||
|
|
274
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/autocert.go
generated
vendored
274
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/autocert.go
generated
vendored
|
@ -35,6 +35,9 @@ import (
|
|||
"golang.org/x/net/idna"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// DefaultACMEDirectory is the default ACME Directory URL used when the Manager's Client is nil.
|
||||
const DefaultACMEDirectory = "https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/directory"
|
||||
|
||||
// createCertRetryAfter is how much time to wait before removing a failed state
|
||||
// entry due to an unsuccessful createCert call.
|
||||
// This is a variable instead of a const for testing.
|
||||
|
@ -135,9 +138,10 @@ type Manager struct {
|
|||
// Client is used to perform low-level operations, such as account registration
|
||||
// and requesting new certificates.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// If Client is nil, a zero-value acme.Client is used with acme.LetsEncryptURL
|
||||
// as directory endpoint. If the Client.Key is nil, a new ECDSA P-256 key is
|
||||
// generated and, if Cache is not nil, stored in cache.
|
||||
// If Client is nil, a zero-value acme.Client is used with DefaultACMEDirectory
|
||||
// as the directory endpoint.
|
||||
// If the Client.Key is nil, a new ECDSA P-256 key is generated and,
|
||||
// if Cache is not nil, stored in cache.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Mutating the field after the first call of GetCertificate method will have no effect.
|
||||
Client *acme.Client
|
||||
|
@ -174,8 +178,8 @@ type Manager struct {
|
|||
renewalMu sync.Mutex
|
||||
renewal map[certKey]*domainRenewal
|
||||
|
||||
// tokensMu guards the rest of the fields: tryHTTP01, certTokens and httpTokens.
|
||||
tokensMu sync.RWMutex
|
||||
// challengeMu guards tryHTTP01, certTokens and httpTokens.
|
||||
challengeMu sync.RWMutex
|
||||
// tryHTTP01 indicates whether the Manager should try "http-01" challenge type
|
||||
// during the authorization flow.
|
||||
tryHTTP01 bool
|
||||
|
@ -188,6 +192,7 @@ type Manager struct {
|
|||
// and is keyed by the domain name which matches the ClientHello server name.
|
||||
// The entries are stored for the duration of the authorization flow.
|
||||
certTokens map[string]*tls.Certificate
|
||||
|
||||
// nowFunc, if not nil, returns the current time. This may be set for
|
||||
// testing purposes.
|
||||
nowFunc func() time.Time
|
||||
|
@ -267,8 +272,8 @@ func (m *Manager) GetCertificate(hello *tls.ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Certificate,
|
|||
|
||||
// Check whether this is a token cert requested for TLS-ALPN challenge.
|
||||
if wantsTokenCert(hello) {
|
||||
m.tokensMu.RLock()
|
||||
defer m.tokensMu.RUnlock()
|
||||
m.challengeMu.RLock()
|
||||
defer m.challengeMu.RUnlock()
|
||||
if cert := m.certTokens[name]; cert != nil {
|
||||
return cert, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -376,8 +381,8 @@ func supportsECDSA(hello *tls.ClientHelloInfo) bool {
|
|||
// If HTTPHandler is never called, the Manager will only use the "tls-alpn-01"
|
||||
// challenge for domain verification.
|
||||
func (m *Manager) HTTPHandler(fallback http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
||||
m.tokensMu.Lock()
|
||||
defer m.tokensMu.Unlock()
|
||||
m.challengeMu.Lock()
|
||||
defer m.challengeMu.Unlock()
|
||||
m.tryHTTP01 = true
|
||||
|
||||
if fallback == nil {
|
||||
|
@ -640,71 +645,64 @@ func (m *Manager) certState(ck certKey) (*certState, error) {
|
|||
// authorizedCert starts the domain ownership verification process and requests a new cert upon success.
|
||||
// The key argument is the certificate private key.
|
||||
func (m *Manager) authorizedCert(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, ck certKey) (der [][]byte, leaf *x509.Certificate, err error) {
|
||||
client, err := m.acmeClient(ctx)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if err := m.verify(ctx, client, ck.domain); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
csr, err := certRequest(key, ck.domain, m.ExtraExtensions)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
der, _, err = client.CreateCert(ctx, csr, 0, true)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
leaf, err = validCert(ck, der, key, m.now())
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return der, leaf, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// revokePendingAuthz revokes all authorizations idenfied by the elements of uri slice.
|
||||
// It ignores revocation errors.
|
||||
func (m *Manager) revokePendingAuthz(ctx context.Context, uri []string) {
|
||||
client, err := m.acmeClient(ctx)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return
|
||||
return nil, nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, u := range uri {
|
||||
client.RevokeAuthorization(ctx, u)
|
||||
dir, err := client.Discover(ctx)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var chain [][]byte
|
||||
switch {
|
||||
// Pre-RFC legacy CA.
|
||||
case dir.OrderURL == "":
|
||||
if err := m.verify(ctx, client, ck.domain); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
der, _, err := client.CreateCert(ctx, csr, 0, true)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
chain = der
|
||||
// RFC 8555 compliant CA.
|
||||
default:
|
||||
o, err := m.verifyRFC(ctx, client, ck.domain)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
der, _, err := client.CreateOrderCert(ctx, o.FinalizeURL, csr, true)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
chain = der
|
||||
}
|
||||
leaf, err = validCert(ck, chain, key, m.now())
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return chain, leaf, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// verify runs the identifier (domain) authorization flow
|
||||
// verify runs the identifier (domain) pre-authorization flow for legacy CAs
|
||||
// using each applicable ACME challenge type.
|
||||
func (m *Manager) verify(ctx context.Context, client *acme.Client, domain string) error {
|
||||
// The list of challenge types we'll try to fulfill
|
||||
// in this specific order.
|
||||
challengeTypes := []string{"tls-alpn-01"}
|
||||
m.tokensMu.RLock()
|
||||
if m.tryHTTP01 {
|
||||
challengeTypes = append(challengeTypes, "http-01")
|
||||
}
|
||||
m.tokensMu.RUnlock()
|
||||
|
||||
// Keep track of pending authzs and revoke the ones that did not validate.
|
||||
pendingAuthzs := make(map[string]bool)
|
||||
// Remove all hanging authorizations to reduce rate limit quotas
|
||||
// after we're done.
|
||||
var authzURLs []string
|
||||
defer func() {
|
||||
var uri []string
|
||||
for k, pending := range pendingAuthzs {
|
||||
if pending {
|
||||
uri = append(uri, k)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(uri) > 0 {
|
||||
// Use "detached" background context.
|
||||
// The revocations need not happen in the current verification flow.
|
||||
go m.revokePendingAuthz(context.Background(), uri)
|
||||
}
|
||||
go m.deactivatePendingAuthz(authzURLs)
|
||||
}()
|
||||
|
||||
// errs accumulates challenge failure errors, printed if all fail
|
||||
errs := make(map[*acme.Challenge]error)
|
||||
challengeTypes := m.supportedChallengeTypes()
|
||||
var nextTyp int // challengeType index of the next challenge type to try
|
||||
for {
|
||||
// Start domain authorization and get the challenge.
|
||||
|
@ -712,6 +710,7 @@ func (m *Manager) verify(ctx context.Context, client *acme.Client, domain string
|
|||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
authzURLs = append(authzURLs, authz.URI)
|
||||
// No point in accepting challenges if the authorization status
|
||||
// is in a final state.
|
||||
switch authz.Status {
|
||||
|
@ -721,8 +720,6 @@ func (m *Manager) verify(ctx context.Context, client *acme.Client, domain string
|
|||
return fmt.Errorf("acme/autocert: invalid authorization %q", authz.URI)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pendingAuthzs[authz.URI] = true
|
||||
|
||||
// Pick the next preferred challenge.
|
||||
var chal *acme.Challenge
|
||||
for chal == nil && nextTyp < len(challengeTypes) {
|
||||
|
@ -752,11 +749,126 @@ func (m *Manager) verify(ctx context.Context, client *acme.Client, domain string
|
|||
errs[chal] = err
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
delete(pendingAuthzs, authz.URI)
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// verifyRFC runs the identifier (domain) order-based authorization flow for RFC compliant CAs
|
||||
// using each applicable ACME challenge type.
|
||||
func (m *Manager) verifyRFC(ctx context.Context, client *acme.Client, domain string) (*acme.Order, error) {
|
||||
// Try each supported challenge type starting with a new order each time.
|
||||
// The nextTyp index of the next challenge type to try is shared across
|
||||
// all order authorizations: if we've tried a challenge type once and it didn't work,
|
||||
// it will most likely not work on another order's authorization either.
|
||||
challengeTypes := m.supportedChallengeTypes()
|
||||
nextTyp := 0 // challengeTypes index
|
||||
AuthorizeOrderLoop:
|
||||
for {
|
||||
o, err := client.AuthorizeOrder(ctx, acme.DomainIDs(domain))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Remove all hanging authorizations to reduce rate limit quotas
|
||||
// after we're done.
|
||||
defer func(urls []string) {
|
||||
go m.deactivatePendingAuthz(urls)
|
||||
}(o.AuthzURLs)
|
||||
|
||||
// Check if there's actually anything we need to do.
|
||||
switch o.Status {
|
||||
case acme.StatusReady:
|
||||
// Already authorized.
|
||||
return o, nil
|
||||
case acme.StatusPending:
|
||||
// Continue normal Order-based flow.
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme/autocert: invalid new order status %q; order URL: %q", o.Status, o.URI)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Satisfy all pending authorizations.
|
||||
for _, zurl := range o.AuthzURLs {
|
||||
z, err := client.GetAuthorization(ctx, zurl)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if z.Status != acme.StatusPending {
|
||||
// We are interested only in pending authorizations.
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Pick the next preferred challenge.
|
||||
var chal *acme.Challenge
|
||||
for chal == nil && nextTyp < len(challengeTypes) {
|
||||
chal = pickChallenge(challengeTypes[nextTyp], z.Challenges)
|
||||
nextTyp++
|
||||
}
|
||||
if chal == nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme/autocert: unable to satisfy %q for domain %q: no viable challenge type found", z.URI, domain)
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Respond to the challenge and wait for validation result.
|
||||
cleanup, err := m.fulfill(ctx, client, chal, domain)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
continue AuthorizeOrderLoop
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer cleanup()
|
||||
if _, err := client.Accept(ctx, chal); err != nil {
|
||||
continue AuthorizeOrderLoop
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, err := client.WaitAuthorization(ctx, z.URI); err != nil {
|
||||
continue AuthorizeOrderLoop
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// All authorizations are satisfied.
|
||||
// Wait for the CA to update the order status.
|
||||
o, err = client.WaitOrder(ctx, o.URI)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
continue AuthorizeOrderLoop
|
||||
}
|
||||
return o, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func pickChallenge(typ string, chal []*acme.Challenge) *acme.Challenge {
|
||||
for _, c := range chal {
|
||||
if c.Type == typ {
|
||||
return c
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (m *Manager) supportedChallengeTypes() []string {
|
||||
m.challengeMu.RLock()
|
||||
defer m.challengeMu.RUnlock()
|
||||
typ := []string{"tls-alpn-01"}
|
||||
if m.tryHTTP01 {
|
||||
typ = append(typ, "http-01")
|
||||
}
|
||||
return typ
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// deactivatePendingAuthz relinquishes all authorizations identified by the elements
|
||||
// of the provided uri slice which are in "pending" state.
|
||||
// It ignores revocation errors.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// deactivatePendingAuthz takes no context argument and instead runs with its own
|
||||
// "detached" context because deactivations are done in a goroutine separate from
|
||||
// that of the main issuance or renewal flow.
|
||||
func (m *Manager) deactivatePendingAuthz(uri []string) {
|
||||
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Minute)
|
||||
defer cancel()
|
||||
client, err := m.acmeClient(ctx)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, u := range uri {
|
||||
z, err := client.GetAuthorization(ctx, u)
|
||||
if err == nil && z.Status == acme.StatusPending {
|
||||
client.RevokeAuthorization(ctx, u)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// fulfill provisions a response to the challenge chal.
|
||||
// The cleanup is non-nil only if provisioning succeeded.
|
||||
func (m *Manager) fulfill(ctx context.Context, client *acme.Client, chal *acme.Challenge, domain string) (cleanup func(), err error) {
|
||||
|
@ -780,20 +892,11 @@ func (m *Manager) fulfill(ctx context.Context, client *acme.Client, chal *acme.C
|
|||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme/autocert: unknown challenge type %q", chal.Type)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func pickChallenge(typ string, chal []*acme.Challenge) *acme.Challenge {
|
||||
for _, c := range chal {
|
||||
if c.Type == typ {
|
||||
return c
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// putCertToken stores the token certificate with the specified name
|
||||
// in both m.certTokens map and m.Cache.
|
||||
func (m *Manager) putCertToken(ctx context.Context, name string, cert *tls.Certificate) {
|
||||
m.tokensMu.Lock()
|
||||
defer m.tokensMu.Unlock()
|
||||
m.challengeMu.Lock()
|
||||
defer m.challengeMu.Unlock()
|
||||
if m.certTokens == nil {
|
||||
m.certTokens = make(map[string]*tls.Certificate)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -804,8 +907,8 @@ func (m *Manager) putCertToken(ctx context.Context, name string, cert *tls.Certi
|
|||
// deleteCertToken removes the token certificate with the specified name
|
||||
// from both m.certTokens map and m.Cache.
|
||||
func (m *Manager) deleteCertToken(name string) {
|
||||
m.tokensMu.Lock()
|
||||
defer m.tokensMu.Unlock()
|
||||
m.challengeMu.Lock()
|
||||
defer m.challengeMu.Unlock()
|
||||
delete(m.certTokens, name)
|
||||
if m.Cache != nil {
|
||||
ck := certKey{domain: name, isToken: true}
|
||||
|
@ -816,8 +919,8 @@ func (m *Manager) deleteCertToken(name string) {
|
|||
// httpToken retrieves an existing http-01 token value from an in-memory map
|
||||
// or the optional cache.
|
||||
func (m *Manager) httpToken(ctx context.Context, tokenPath string) ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
m.tokensMu.RLock()
|
||||
defer m.tokensMu.RUnlock()
|
||||
m.challengeMu.RLock()
|
||||
defer m.challengeMu.RUnlock()
|
||||
if v, ok := m.httpTokens[tokenPath]; ok {
|
||||
return v, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -832,8 +935,8 @@ func (m *Manager) httpToken(ctx context.Context, tokenPath string) ([]byte, erro
|
|||
//
|
||||
// It ignores any error returned from Cache.Put.
|
||||
func (m *Manager) putHTTPToken(ctx context.Context, tokenPath, val string) {
|
||||
m.tokensMu.Lock()
|
||||
defer m.tokensMu.Unlock()
|
||||
m.challengeMu.Lock()
|
||||
defer m.challengeMu.Unlock()
|
||||
if m.httpTokens == nil {
|
||||
m.httpTokens = make(map[string][]byte)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -849,8 +952,8 @@ func (m *Manager) putHTTPToken(ctx context.Context, tokenPath, val string) {
|
|||
//
|
||||
// If m.Cache is non-nil, it blocks until Cache.Delete returns without a timeout.
|
||||
func (m *Manager) deleteHTTPToken(tokenPath string) {
|
||||
m.tokensMu.Lock()
|
||||
defer m.tokensMu.Unlock()
|
||||
m.challengeMu.Lock()
|
||||
defer m.challengeMu.Unlock()
|
||||
delete(m.httpTokens, tokenPath)
|
||||
if m.Cache != nil {
|
||||
m.Cache.Delete(context.Background(), httpTokenCacheKey(tokenPath))
|
||||
|
@ -949,7 +1052,7 @@ func (m *Manager) acmeClient(ctx context.Context) (*acme.Client, error) {
|
|||
|
||||
client := m.Client
|
||||
if client == nil {
|
||||
client = &acme.Client{DirectoryURL: acme.LetsEncryptURL}
|
||||
client = &acme.Client{DirectoryURL: DefaultACMEDirectory}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if client.Key == nil {
|
||||
var err error
|
||||
|
@ -967,14 +1070,23 @@ func (m *Manager) acmeClient(ctx context.Context) (*acme.Client, error) {
|
|||
}
|
||||
a := &acme.Account{Contact: contact}
|
||||
_, err := client.Register(ctx, a, m.Prompt)
|
||||
if ae, ok := err.(*acme.Error); err == nil || ok && ae.StatusCode == http.StatusConflict {
|
||||
// conflict indicates the key is already registered
|
||||
if err == nil || isAccountAlreadyExist(err) {
|
||||
m.client = client
|
||||
err = nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
return m.client, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// isAccountAlreadyExist reports whether the err, as returned from acme.Client.Register,
|
||||
// indicates the account has already been registered.
|
||||
func isAccountAlreadyExist(err error) bool {
|
||||
if err == acme.ErrAccountAlreadyExists {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
ae, ok := err.(*acme.Error)
|
||||
return ok && ae.StatusCode == http.StatusConflict
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (m *Manager) hostPolicy() HostPolicy {
|
||||
if m.HostPolicy != nil {
|
||||
return m.HostPolicy
|
||||
|
|
10
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/http.go
generated
vendored
10
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/http.go
generated
vendored
|
@ -155,6 +155,14 @@ func (c *Client) get(ctx context.Context, url string, ok resOkay) (*http.Respons
|
|||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// postAsGet is POST-as-GET, a replacement for GET in RFC8555
|
||||
// as described in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555#section-6.3.
|
||||
// It makes a POST request in KID form with zero JWS payload.
|
||||
// See nopayload doc comments in jws.go.
|
||||
func (c *Client) postAsGet(ctx context.Context, url string, ok resOkay) (*http.Response, error) {
|
||||
return c.post(ctx, nil, url, noPayload, ok)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// post issues a signed POST request in JWS format using the provided key
|
||||
// to the specified URL. If key is nil, c.Key is used instead.
|
||||
// It returns a non-error value only when ok reports true.
|
||||
|
@ -200,7 +208,7 @@ func (c *Client) post(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, url string, body i
|
|||
// If key argument is nil and c.accountKID returns a non-zero keyID,
|
||||
// the request is sent in KID form. Otherwise, JWK form is used.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// In practice, when interfacing with RFC compliant CAs most requests are sent in KID form
|
||||
// In practice, when interfacing with RFC-compliant CAs most requests are sent in KID form
|
||||
// and JWK is used only when KID is unavailable: new account endpoint and certificate
|
||||
// revocation requests authenticated by a cert key.
|
||||
// See jwsEncodeJSON for other details.
|
||||
|
|
17
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/jws.go
generated
vendored
17
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/jws.go
generated
vendored
|
@ -24,6 +24,12 @@ type keyID string
|
|||
// See jwsEncodeJSON for details.
|
||||
const noKeyID = keyID("")
|
||||
|
||||
// noPayload indicates jwsEncodeJSON will encode zero-length octet string
|
||||
// in a JWS request. This is called POST-as-GET in RFC 8555 and is used to make
|
||||
// authenticated GET requests via POSTing with an empty payload.
|
||||
// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555#section-6.3 for more details.
|
||||
const noPayload = ""
|
||||
|
||||
// jwsEncodeJSON signs claimset using provided key and a nonce.
|
||||
// The result is serialized in JSON format containing either kid or jwk
|
||||
// fields based on the provided keyID value.
|
||||
|
@ -50,11 +56,14 @@ func jwsEncodeJSON(claimset interface{}, key crypto.Signer, kid keyID, nonce, ur
|
|||
phead = fmt.Sprintf(`{"alg":%q,"kid":%q,"nonce":%q,"url":%q}`, alg, kid, nonce, url)
|
||||
}
|
||||
phead = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(phead))
|
||||
cs, err := json.Marshal(claimset)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
var payload string
|
||||
if claimset != noPayload {
|
||||
cs, err := json.Marshal(claimset)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
payload = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(cs)
|
||||
}
|
||||
payload := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(cs)
|
||||
hash := sha.New()
|
||||
hash.Write([]byte(phead + "." + payload))
|
||||
sig, err := jwsSign(key, sha, hash.Sum(nil))
|
||||
|
|
280
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/rfc8555.go
generated
vendored
280
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/rfc8555.go
generated
vendored
|
@ -6,16 +6,23 @@ package acme
|
|||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"crypto"
|
||||
"encoding/base64"
|
||||
"encoding/json"
|
||||
"encoding/pem"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"io"
|
||||
"io/ioutil"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// DeactivateReg permanently disables an existing account associated with c.Key.
|
||||
// A deactivated account can no longer request certificate issuance or access
|
||||
// resources related to the account, such as orders or authorizations.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// It works only with RFC8555 compliant CAs.
|
||||
// It only works with CAs implementing RFC 8555.
|
||||
func (c *Client) DeactivateReg(ctx context.Context) error {
|
||||
url := string(c.accountKID(ctx))
|
||||
if url == "" {
|
||||
|
@ -30,7 +37,7 @@ func (c *Client) DeactivateReg(ctx context.Context) error {
|
|||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// registerRFC is quivalent to c.Register but for RFC-compliant CAs.
|
||||
// registerRFC is quivalent to c.Register but for CAs implementing RFC 8555.
|
||||
// It expects c.Discover to have already been called.
|
||||
// TODO: Implement externalAccountBinding.
|
||||
func (c *Client) registerRFC(ctx context.Context, acct *Account, prompt func(tosURL string) bool) (*Account, error) {
|
||||
|
@ -68,7 +75,7 @@ func (c *Client) registerRFC(ctx context.Context, acct *Account, prompt func(tos
|
|||
return a, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// updateGegRFC is equivalent to c.UpdateReg but for RFC-compliant CAs.
|
||||
// updateGegRFC is equivalent to c.UpdateReg but for CAs implementing RFC 8555.
|
||||
// It expects c.Discover to have already been called.
|
||||
func (c *Client) updateRegRFC(ctx context.Context, a *Account) (*Account, error) {
|
||||
url := string(c.accountKID(ctx))
|
||||
|
@ -88,7 +95,7 @@ func (c *Client) updateRegRFC(ctx context.Context, a *Account) (*Account, error)
|
|||
return responseAccount(res)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// getGegRFC is equivalent to c.GetReg but for RFC-compliant CAs.
|
||||
// getGegRFC is equivalent to c.GetReg but for CAs implementing RFC 8555.
|
||||
// It expects c.Discover to have already been called.
|
||||
func (c *Client) getRegRFC(ctx context.Context) (*Account, error) {
|
||||
req := json.RawMessage(`{"onlyReturnExisting": true}`)
|
||||
|
@ -111,7 +118,7 @@ func responseAccount(res *http.Response) (*Account, error) {
|
|||
Orders string
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&v); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: invalid response: %v", err)
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: invalid account response: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return &Account{
|
||||
URI: res.Header.Get("Location"),
|
||||
|
@ -120,3 +127,266 @@ func responseAccount(res *http.Response) (*Account, error) {
|
|||
OrdersURL: v.Orders,
|
||||
}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AuthorizeOrder initiates the order-based application for certificate issuance,
|
||||
// as opposed to pre-authorization in Authorize.
|
||||
// It is only supported by CAs implementing RFC 8555.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The caller then needs to fetch each authorization with GetAuthorization,
|
||||
// identify those with StatusPending status and fulfill a challenge using Accept.
|
||||
// Once all authorizations are satisfied, the caller will typically want to poll
|
||||
// order status using WaitOrder until it's in StatusReady state.
|
||||
// To finalize the order and obtain a certificate, the caller submits a CSR with CreateOrderCert.
|
||||
func (c *Client) AuthorizeOrder(ctx context.Context, id []AuthzID, opt ...OrderOption) (*Order, error) {
|
||||
dir, err := c.Discover(ctx)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
req := struct {
|
||||
Identifiers []wireAuthzID `json:"identifiers"`
|
||||
NotBefore string `json:"notBefore,omitempty"`
|
||||
NotAfter string `json:"notAfter,omitempty"`
|
||||
}{}
|
||||
for _, v := range id {
|
||||
req.Identifiers = append(req.Identifiers, wireAuthzID{
|
||||
Type: v.Type,
|
||||
Value: v.Value,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, o := range opt {
|
||||
switch o := o.(type) {
|
||||
case orderNotBeforeOpt:
|
||||
req.NotBefore = time.Time(o).Format(time.RFC3339)
|
||||
case orderNotAfterOpt:
|
||||
req.NotAfter = time.Time(o).Format(time.RFC3339)
|
||||
default:
|
||||
// Package's fault if we let this happen.
|
||||
panic(fmt.Sprintf("unsupported order option type %T", o))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
res, err := c.post(ctx, nil, dir.OrderURL, req, wantStatus(http.StatusCreated))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer res.Body.Close()
|
||||
return responseOrder(res)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// GetOrder retrives an order identified by the given URL.
|
||||
// For orders created with AuthorizeOrder, the url value is Order.URI.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// If a caller needs to poll an order until its status is final,
|
||||
// see the WaitOrder method.
|
||||
func (c *Client) GetOrder(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Order, error) {
|
||||
if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
res, err := c.postAsGet(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer res.Body.Close()
|
||||
return responseOrder(res)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// WaitOrder polls an order from the given URL until it is in one of the final states,
|
||||
// StatusReady, StatusValid or StatusInvalid, the CA responded with a non-retryable error
|
||||
// or the context is done.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// It returns a non-nil Order only if its Status is StatusReady or StatusValid.
|
||||
// In all other cases WaitOrder returns an error.
|
||||
// If the Status is StatusInvalid, the returned error is of type *OrderError.
|
||||
func (c *Client) WaitOrder(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Order, error) {
|
||||
if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
for {
|
||||
res, err := c.postAsGet(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
o, err := responseOrder(res)
|
||||
res.Body.Close()
|
||||
switch {
|
||||
case err != nil:
|
||||
// Skip and retry.
|
||||
case o.Status == StatusInvalid:
|
||||
return nil, &OrderError{OrderURL: o.URI, Status: o.Status}
|
||||
case o.Status == StatusReady || o.Status == StatusValid:
|
||||
return o, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
d := retryAfter(res.Header.Get("Retry-After"))
|
||||
if d == 0 {
|
||||
// Default retry-after.
|
||||
// Same reasoning as in WaitAuthorization.
|
||||
d = time.Second
|
||||
}
|
||||
t := time.NewTimer(d)
|
||||
select {
|
||||
case <-ctx.Done():
|
||||
t.Stop()
|
||||
return nil, ctx.Err()
|
||||
case <-t.C:
|
||||
// Retry.
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func responseOrder(res *http.Response) (*Order, error) {
|
||||
var v struct {
|
||||
Status string
|
||||
Expires time.Time
|
||||
Identifiers []wireAuthzID
|
||||
NotBefore time.Time
|
||||
NotAfter time.Time
|
||||
Error *wireError
|
||||
Authorizations []string
|
||||
Finalize string
|
||||
Certificate string
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&v); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: error reading order: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
o := &Order{
|
||||
URI: res.Header.Get("Location"),
|
||||
Status: v.Status,
|
||||
Expires: v.Expires,
|
||||
NotBefore: v.NotBefore,
|
||||
NotAfter: v.NotAfter,
|
||||
AuthzURLs: v.Authorizations,
|
||||
FinalizeURL: v.Finalize,
|
||||
CertURL: v.Certificate,
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, id := range v.Identifiers {
|
||||
o.Identifiers = append(o.Identifiers, AuthzID{Type: id.Type, Value: id.Value})
|
||||
}
|
||||
if v.Error != nil {
|
||||
o.Error = v.Error.error(nil /* headers */)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return o, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// CreateOrderCert submits the CSR (Certificate Signing Request) to a CA at the specified URL.
|
||||
// The URL is the FinalizeURL field of an Order created with AuthorizeOrder.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// If the bundle argument is true, the returned value also contain the CA (issuer)
|
||||
// certificate chain. Otherwise, only a leaf certificate is returned.
|
||||
// The returned URL can be used to re-fetch the certificate using FetchCert.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// This method is only supported by CAs implementing RFC 8555. See CreateCert for pre-RFC CAs.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// CreateOrderCert returns an error if the CA's response is unreasonably large.
|
||||
// Callers are encouraged to parse the returned value to ensure the certificate is valid and has the expected features.
|
||||
func (c *Client) CreateOrderCert(ctx context.Context, url string, csr []byte, bundle bool) (der [][]byte, certURL string, err error) {
|
||||
if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil { // required by c.accountKID
|
||||
return nil, "", err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// RFC describes this as "finalize order" request.
|
||||
req := struct {
|
||||
CSR string `json:"csr"`
|
||||
}{
|
||||
CSR: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(csr),
|
||||
}
|
||||
res, err := c.post(ctx, nil, url, req, wantStatus(http.StatusOK))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, "", err
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer res.Body.Close()
|
||||
o, err := responseOrder(res)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, "", err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Wait for CA to issue the cert if they haven't.
|
||||
if o.Status != StatusValid {
|
||||
o, err = c.WaitOrder(ctx, o.URI)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, "", err
|
||||
}
|
||||
// The only acceptable status post finalize and WaitOrder is "valid".
|
||||
if o.Status != StatusValid {
|
||||
return nil, "", &OrderError{OrderURL: o.URI, Status: o.Status}
|
||||
}
|
||||
crt, err := c.fetchCertRFC(ctx, o.CertURL, bundle)
|
||||
return crt, o.CertURL, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// fetchCertRFC downloads issued certificate from the given URL.
|
||||
// It expects the CA to respond with PEM-encoded certificate chain.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The URL argument is the CertURL field of Order.
|
||||
func (c *Client) fetchCertRFC(ctx context.Context, url string, bundle bool) ([][]byte, error) {
|
||||
res, err := c.postAsGet(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer res.Body.Close()
|
||||
|
||||
// Get all the bytes up to a sane maximum.
|
||||
// Account very roughly for base64 overhead.
|
||||
const max = maxCertChainSize + maxCertChainSize/33
|
||||
b, err := ioutil.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(res.Body, max+1))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: fetch cert response stream: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(b) > max {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("acme: certificate chain is too big")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Decode PEM chain.
|
||||
var chain [][]byte
|
||||
for {
|
||||
var p *pem.Block
|
||||
p, b = pem.Decode(b)
|
||||
if p == nil {
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
if p.Type != "CERTIFICATE" {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: invalid PEM cert type %q", p.Type)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
chain = append(chain, p.Bytes)
|
||||
if !bundle {
|
||||
return chain, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(chain) > maxChainLen {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("acme: certificate chain is too long")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(chain) == 0 {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("acme: certificate chain is empty")
|
||||
}
|
||||
return chain, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// sends a cert revocation request in either JWK form when key is non-nil or KID form otherwise.
|
||||
func (c *Client) revokeCertRFC(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, cert []byte, reason CRLReasonCode) error {
|
||||
req := &struct {
|
||||
Cert string `json:"certificate"`
|
||||
Reason int `json:"reason"`
|
||||
}{
|
||||
Cert: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(cert),
|
||||
Reason: int(reason),
|
||||
}
|
||||
res, err := c.post(ctx, key, c.dir.RevokeURL, req, wantStatus(http.StatusOK))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
if isAlreadyRevoked(err) {
|
||||
// Assume it is not an error to revoke an already revoked cert.
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer res.Body.Close()
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func isAlreadyRevoked(err error) bool {
|
||||
e, ok := err.(*Error)
|
||||
return ok && e.ProblemType == "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:alreadyRevoked"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
240
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/types.go
generated
vendored
240
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/types.go
generated
vendored
|
@ -14,12 +14,15 @@ import (
|
|||
"time"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// ACME server response statuses used to describe Authorization and Challenge states.
|
||||
// ACME status values of Account, Order, Authorization and Challenge objects.
|
||||
// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555#section-7.1.6 for details.
|
||||
const (
|
||||
StatusDeactivated = "deactivated"
|
||||
StatusExpired = "expired"
|
||||
StatusInvalid = "invalid"
|
||||
StatusPending = "pending"
|
||||
StatusProcessing = "processing"
|
||||
StatusReady = "ready"
|
||||
StatusRevoked = "revoked"
|
||||
StatusUnknown = "unknown"
|
||||
StatusValid = "valid"
|
||||
|
@ -102,6 +105,21 @@ func (a *AuthorizationError) Error() string {
|
|||
return fmt.Sprintf("acme: authorization error for %s: %s", a.Identifier, strings.Join(e, "; "))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// OrderError is returned from Client's order related methods.
|
||||
// It indicates the order is unusable and the clients should start over with
|
||||
// AuthorizeOrder.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The clients can still fetch the order object from CA using GetOrder
|
||||
// to inspect its state.
|
||||
type OrderError struct {
|
||||
OrderURL string
|
||||
Status string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (oe *OrderError) Error() string {
|
||||
return fmt.Sprintf("acme: order %s status: %s", oe.OrderURL, oe.Status)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// RateLimit reports whether err represents a rate limit error and
|
||||
// any Retry-After duration returned by the server.
|
||||
//
|
||||
|
@ -124,11 +142,11 @@ func RateLimit(err error) (time.Duration, bool) {
|
|||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Account is a user account. It is associated with a private key.
|
||||
// Non-RFC8555 fields are empty when interfacing with a compliant CA.
|
||||
// Non-RFC 8555 fields are empty when interfacing with a compliant CA.
|
||||
type Account struct {
|
||||
// URI is the account unique ID, which is also a URL used to retrieve
|
||||
// account data from the CA.
|
||||
// When interfacing with RFC8555-compliant CAs, URI is the "kid" field
|
||||
// When interfacing with RFC 8555-compliant CAs, URI is the "kid" field
|
||||
// value in JWS signed requests.
|
||||
URI string
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -138,7 +156,7 @@ type Account struct {
|
|||
Contact []string
|
||||
|
||||
// Status indicates current account status as returned by the CA.
|
||||
// Possible values are "valid", "deactivated", and "revoked".
|
||||
// Possible values are StatusValid, StatusDeactivated, and StatusRevoked.
|
||||
Status string
|
||||
|
||||
// OrdersURL is a URL from which a list of orders submitted by this account
|
||||
|
@ -149,32 +167,32 @@ type Account struct {
|
|||
// A value not matching CurrentTerms indicates that the user hasn't agreed
|
||||
// to the actual Terms of Service of the CA.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// It is non-RFC8555 compliant. Package users can store the ToS they agree to
|
||||
// It is non-RFC 8555 compliant. Package users can store the ToS they agree to
|
||||
// during Client's Register call in the prompt callback function.
|
||||
AgreedTerms string
|
||||
|
||||
// Actual terms of a CA.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// It is non-RFC8555 compliant. Use Directory's Terms field.
|
||||
// It is non-RFC 8555 compliant. Use Directory's Terms field.
|
||||
// When a CA updates their terms and requires an account agreement,
|
||||
// a URL at which instructions to do so is available in Error's Instance field.
|
||||
CurrentTerms string
|
||||
|
||||
// Authz is the authorization URL used to initiate a new authz flow.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// It is non-RFC8555 compliant. Use Directory's AuthzURL or OrderURL.
|
||||
// It is non-RFC 8555 compliant. Use Directory's AuthzURL or OrderURL.
|
||||
Authz string
|
||||
|
||||
// Authorizations is a URI from which a list of authorizations
|
||||
// granted to this account can be fetched via a GET request.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// It is non-RFC8555 compliant and is obsoleted by OrdersURL.
|
||||
// It is non-RFC 8555 compliant and is obsoleted by OrdersURL.
|
||||
Authorizations string
|
||||
|
||||
// Certificates is a URI from which a list of certificates
|
||||
// issued for this account can be fetched via a GET request.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// It is non-RFC8555 compliant and is obsoleted by OrdersURL.
|
||||
// It is non-RFC 8555 compliant and is obsoleted by OrdersURL.
|
||||
Certificates string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -185,11 +203,11 @@ type Directory struct {
|
|||
NonceURL string
|
||||
|
||||
// RegURL is an account endpoint URL, allowing for creating new accounts.
|
||||
// Pre-RFC8555 CAs also allow modifying existing accounts at this URL.
|
||||
// Pre-RFC 8555 CAs also allow modifying existing accounts at this URL.
|
||||
RegURL string
|
||||
|
||||
// OrderURL is used to initiate the certificate issuance flow
|
||||
// as described in RFC8555.
|
||||
// as described in RFC 8555.
|
||||
OrderURL string
|
||||
|
||||
// AuthzURL is used to initiate identifier pre-authorization flow.
|
||||
|
@ -197,7 +215,7 @@ type Directory struct {
|
|||
AuthzURL string
|
||||
|
||||
// CertURL is a new certificate issuance endpoint URL.
|
||||
// It is non-RFC8555 compliant and is obsoleted by OrderURL.
|
||||
// It is non-RFC 8555 compliant and is obsoleted by OrderURL.
|
||||
CertURL string
|
||||
|
||||
// RevokeURL is used to initiate a certificate revocation flow.
|
||||
|
@ -223,42 +241,120 @@ type Directory struct {
|
|||
ExternalAccountRequired bool
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Challenge encodes a returned CA challenge.
|
||||
// Its Error field may be non-nil if the challenge is part of an Authorization
|
||||
// with StatusInvalid.
|
||||
type Challenge struct {
|
||||
// Type is the challenge type, e.g. "http-01", "tls-sni-02", "dns-01".
|
||||
Type string
|
||||
// rfcCompliant reports whether the ACME server implements RFC 8555.
|
||||
// Note that some servers may have incomplete RFC implementation
|
||||
// even if the returned value is true.
|
||||
// If rfcCompliant reports false, the server most likely implements draft-02.
|
||||
func (d *Directory) rfcCompliant() bool {
|
||||
return d.OrderURL != ""
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// URI is where a challenge response can be posted to.
|
||||
// Order represents a client's request for a certificate.
|
||||
// It tracks the request flow progress through to issuance.
|
||||
type Order struct {
|
||||
// URI uniquely identifies an order.
|
||||
URI string
|
||||
|
||||
// Token is a random value that uniquely identifies the challenge.
|
||||
Token string
|
||||
|
||||
// Status identifies the status of this challenge.
|
||||
// Status represents the current status of the order.
|
||||
// It indicates which action the client should take.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Possible values are StatusPending, StatusReady, StatusProcessing, StatusValid and StatusInvalid.
|
||||
// Pending means the CA does not believe that the client has fulfilled the requirements.
|
||||
// Ready indicates that the client has fulfilled all the requirements and can submit a CSR
|
||||
// to obtain a certificate. This is done with Client's CreateOrderCert.
|
||||
// Processing means the certificate is being issued.
|
||||
// Valid indicates the CA has issued the certificate. It can be downloaded
|
||||
// from the Order's CertURL. This is done with Client's FetchCert.
|
||||
// Invalid means the certificate will not be issued. Users should consider this order
|
||||
// abandoned.
|
||||
Status string
|
||||
|
||||
// Error indicates the reason for an authorization failure
|
||||
// when this challenge was used.
|
||||
// The type of a non-nil value is *Error.
|
||||
Error error
|
||||
// Expires is the timestamp after which CA considers this order invalid.
|
||||
Expires time.Time
|
||||
|
||||
// Identifiers contains all identifier objects which the order pertains to.
|
||||
Identifiers []AuthzID
|
||||
|
||||
// NotBefore is the requested value of the notBefore field in the certificate.
|
||||
NotBefore time.Time
|
||||
|
||||
// NotAfter is the requested value of the notAfter field in the certificate.
|
||||
NotAfter time.Time
|
||||
|
||||
// AuthzURLs represents authorizations to complete before a certificate
|
||||
// for identifiers specified in the order can be issued.
|
||||
// It also contains unexpired authorizations that the client has completed
|
||||
// in the past.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Authorization objects can be fetched using Client's GetAuthorization method.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The required authorizations are dictated by CA policies.
|
||||
// There may not be a 1:1 relationship between the identifiers and required authorizations.
|
||||
// Required authorizations can be identified by their StatusPending status.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// For orders in the StatusValid or StatusInvalid state these are the authorizations
|
||||
// which were completed.
|
||||
AuthzURLs []string
|
||||
|
||||
// FinalizeURL is the endpoint at which a CSR is submitted to obtain a certificate
|
||||
// once all the authorizations are satisfied.
|
||||
FinalizeURL string
|
||||
|
||||
// CertURL points to the certificate that has been issued in response to this order.
|
||||
CertURL string
|
||||
|
||||
// The error that occurred while processing the order as received from a CA, if any.
|
||||
Error *Error
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// OrderOption allows customizing Client.AuthorizeOrder call.
|
||||
type OrderOption interface {
|
||||
privateOrderOpt()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// WithOrderNotBefore sets order's NotBefore field.
|
||||
func WithOrderNotBefore(t time.Time) OrderOption {
|
||||
return orderNotBeforeOpt(t)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// WithOrderNotAfter sets order's NotAfter field.
|
||||
func WithOrderNotAfter(t time.Time) OrderOption {
|
||||
return orderNotAfterOpt(t)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type orderNotBeforeOpt time.Time
|
||||
|
||||
func (orderNotBeforeOpt) privateOrderOpt() {}
|
||||
|
||||
type orderNotAfterOpt time.Time
|
||||
|
||||
func (orderNotAfterOpt) privateOrderOpt() {}
|
||||
|
||||
// Authorization encodes an authorization response.
|
||||
type Authorization struct {
|
||||
// URI uniquely identifies a authorization.
|
||||
URI string
|
||||
|
||||
// Status identifies the status of an authorization.
|
||||
// Status is the current status of an authorization.
|
||||
// Possible values are StatusPending, StatusValid, StatusInvalid, StatusDeactivated,
|
||||
// StatusExpired and StatusRevoked.
|
||||
Status string
|
||||
|
||||
// Identifier is what the account is authorized to represent.
|
||||
Identifier AuthzID
|
||||
|
||||
// The timestamp after which the CA considers the authorization invalid.
|
||||
Expires time.Time
|
||||
|
||||
// Wildcard is true for authorizations of a wildcard domain name.
|
||||
Wildcard bool
|
||||
|
||||
// Challenges that the client needs to fulfill in order to prove possession
|
||||
// of the identifier (for pending authorizations).
|
||||
// For final authorizations, the challenges that were used.
|
||||
// For valid authorizations, the challenge that was validated.
|
||||
// For invalid authorizations, the challenge that was attempted and failed.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// RFC 8555 compatible CAs require users to fuflfill only one of the challenges.
|
||||
Challenges []*Challenge
|
||||
|
||||
// A collection of sets of challenges, each of which would be sufficient
|
||||
|
@ -266,24 +362,51 @@ type Authorization struct {
|
|||
// Clients must complete a set of challenges that covers at least one set.
|
||||
// Challenges are identified by their indices in the challenges array.
|
||||
// If this field is empty, the client needs to complete all challenges.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// This field is unused in RFC 8555.
|
||||
Combinations [][]int
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AuthzID is an identifier that an account is authorized to represent.
|
||||
type AuthzID struct {
|
||||
Type string // The type of identifier, e.g. "dns".
|
||||
Type string // The type of identifier, "dns" or "ip".
|
||||
Value string // The identifier itself, e.g. "example.org".
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// DomainIDs creates a slice of AuthzID with "dns" identifier type.
|
||||
func DomainIDs(names ...string) []AuthzID {
|
||||
a := make([]AuthzID, len(names))
|
||||
for i, v := range names {
|
||||
a[i] = AuthzID{Type: "dns", Value: v}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return a
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// IPIDs creates a slice of AuthzID with "ip" identifier type.
|
||||
// Each element of addr is textual form of an address as defined
|
||||
// in RFC1123 Section 2.1 for IPv4 and in RFC5952 Section 4 for IPv6.
|
||||
func IPIDs(addr ...string) []AuthzID {
|
||||
a := make([]AuthzID, len(addr))
|
||||
for i, v := range addr {
|
||||
a[i] = AuthzID{Type: "ip", Value: v}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return a
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// wireAuthzID is ACME JSON representation of authorization identifier objects.
|
||||
type wireAuthzID struct {
|
||||
Type string `json:"type"`
|
||||
Value string `json:"value"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// wireAuthz is ACME JSON representation of Authorization objects.
|
||||
type wireAuthz struct {
|
||||
Identifier wireAuthzID
|
||||
Status string
|
||||
Expires time.Time
|
||||
Wildcard bool
|
||||
Challenges []wireChallenge
|
||||
Combinations [][]int
|
||||
Identifier struct {
|
||||
Type string
|
||||
Value string
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (z *wireAuthz) authorization(uri string) *Authorization {
|
||||
|
@ -291,8 +414,10 @@ func (z *wireAuthz) authorization(uri string) *Authorization {
|
|||
URI: uri,
|
||||
Status: z.Status,
|
||||
Identifier: AuthzID{Type: z.Identifier.Type, Value: z.Identifier.Value},
|
||||
Combinations: z.Combinations, // shallow copy
|
||||
Expires: z.Expires,
|
||||
Wildcard: z.Wildcard,
|
||||
Challenges: make([]*Challenge, len(z.Challenges)),
|
||||
Combinations: z.Combinations, // shallow copy
|
||||
}
|
||||
for i, v := range z.Challenges {
|
||||
a.Challenges[i] = v.challenge()
|
||||
|
@ -313,22 +438,55 @@ func (z *wireAuthz) error(uri string) *AuthorizationError {
|
|||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Challenge encodes a returned CA challenge.
|
||||
// Its Error field may be non-nil if the challenge is part of an Authorization
|
||||
// with StatusInvalid.
|
||||
type Challenge struct {
|
||||
// Type is the challenge type, e.g. "http-01", "tls-alpn-01", "dns-01".
|
||||
Type string
|
||||
|
||||
// URI is where a challenge response can be posted to.
|
||||
URI string
|
||||
|
||||
// Token is a random value that uniquely identifies the challenge.
|
||||
Token string
|
||||
|
||||
// Status identifies the status of this challenge.
|
||||
// In RFC 8555, possible values are StatusPending, StatusProcessing, StatusValid,
|
||||
// and StatusInvalid.
|
||||
Status string
|
||||
|
||||
// Validated is the time at which the CA validated this challenge.
|
||||
// Always zero value in pre-RFC 8555.
|
||||
Validated time.Time
|
||||
|
||||
// Error indicates the reason for an authorization failure
|
||||
// when this challenge was used.
|
||||
// The type of a non-nil value is *Error.
|
||||
Error error
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// wireChallenge is ACME JSON challenge representation.
|
||||
type wireChallenge struct {
|
||||
URI string `json:"uri"`
|
||||
Type string
|
||||
Token string
|
||||
Status string
|
||||
Error *wireError
|
||||
URL string `json:"url"` // RFC
|
||||
URI string `json:"uri"` // pre-RFC
|
||||
Type string
|
||||
Token string
|
||||
Status string
|
||||
Validated time.Time
|
||||
Error *wireError
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *wireChallenge) challenge() *Challenge {
|
||||
v := &Challenge{
|
||||
URI: c.URI,
|
||||
URI: c.URL,
|
||||
Type: c.Type,
|
||||
Token: c.Token,
|
||||
Status: c.Status,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if v.URI == "" {
|
||||
v.URI = c.URI // c.URL was empty; use legacy
|
||||
}
|
||||
if v.Status == "" {
|
||||
v.Status = StatusPending
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
17
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_arm64.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
17
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_arm64.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
|
@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
|
|||
// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
// +build go1.11
|
||||
// +build !gccgo,!appengine
|
||||
|
||||
package chacha20
|
||||
|
||||
const bufSize = 256
|
||||
|
||||
//go:noescape
|
||||
func xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src []byte, key *[8]uint32, nonce *[3]uint32, counter *uint32)
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *Cipher) xorKeyStreamBlocks(dst, src []byte) {
|
||||
xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src, &c.key, &c.nonce, &c.counter)
|
||||
}
|
364
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_generic.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
364
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_generic.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
|
@ -0,0 +1,364 @@
|
|||
// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
// Package chacha20 implements the ChaCha20 and XChaCha20 encryption algorithms
|
||||
// as specified in RFC 8439 and draft-irtf-cfrg-xchacha-01.
|
||||
package chacha20
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"crypto/cipher"
|
||||
"encoding/binary"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"math/bits"
|
||||
|
||||
"golang.org/x/crypto/internal/subtle"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
// KeySize is the size of the key used by this cipher, in bytes.
|
||||
KeySize = 32
|
||||
|
||||
// NonceSize is the size of the nonce used with the standard variant of this
|
||||
// cipher, in bytes.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Note that this is too short to be safely generated at random if the same
|
||||
// key is reused more than 2³² times.
|
||||
NonceSize = 12
|
||||
|
||||
// NonceSizeX is the size of the nonce used with the XChaCha20 variant of
|
||||
// this cipher, in bytes.
|
||||
NonceSizeX = 24
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Cipher is a stateful instance of ChaCha20 or XChaCha20 using a particular key
|
||||
// and nonce. A *Cipher implements the cipher.Stream interface.
|
||||
type Cipher struct {
|
||||
// The ChaCha20 state is 16 words: 4 constant, 8 of key, 1 of counter
|
||||
// (incremented after each block), and 3 of nonce.
|
||||
key [8]uint32
|
||||
counter uint32
|
||||
nonce [3]uint32
|
||||
|
||||
// The last len bytes of buf are leftover key stream bytes from the previous
|
||||
// XORKeyStream invocation. The size of buf depends on how many blocks are
|
||||
// computed at a time.
|
||||
buf [bufSize]byte
|
||||
len int
|
||||
|
||||
// The counter-independent results of the first round are cached after they
|
||||
// are computed the first time.
|
||||
precompDone bool
|
||||
p1, p5, p9, p13 uint32
|
||||
p2, p6, p10, p14 uint32
|
||||
p3, p7, p11, p15 uint32
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var _ cipher.Stream = (*Cipher)(nil)
|
||||
|
||||
// NewUnauthenticatedCipher creates a new ChaCha20 stream cipher with the given
|
||||
// 32 bytes key and a 12 or 24 bytes nonce. If a nonce of 24 bytes is provided,
|
||||
// the XChaCha20 construction will be used. It returns an error if key or nonce
|
||||
// have any other length.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Note that ChaCha20, like all stream ciphers, is not authenticated and allows
|
||||
// attackers to silently tamper with the plaintext. For this reason, it is more
|
||||
// appropriate as a building block than as a standalone encryption mechanism.
|
||||
// Instead, consider using package golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305.
|
||||
func NewUnauthenticatedCipher(key, nonce []byte) (*Cipher, error) {
|
||||
// This function is split into a wrapper so that the Cipher allocation will
|
||||
// be inlined, and depending on how the caller uses the return value, won't
|
||||
// escape to the heap.
|
||||
c := &Cipher{}
|
||||
return newUnauthenticatedCipher(c, key, nonce)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func newUnauthenticatedCipher(c *Cipher, key, nonce []byte) (*Cipher, error) {
|
||||
if len(key) != KeySize {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("chacha20: wrong key size")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(nonce) == NonceSizeX {
|
||||
// XChaCha20 uses the ChaCha20 core to mix 16 bytes of the nonce into a
|
||||
// derived key, allowing it to operate on a nonce of 24 bytes. See
|
||||
// draft-irtf-cfrg-xchacha-01, Section 2.3.
|
||||
key, _ = HChaCha20(key, nonce[0:16])
|
||||
cNonce := make([]byte, NonceSize)
|
||||
copy(cNonce[4:12], nonce[16:24])
|
||||
nonce = cNonce
|
||||
} else if len(nonce) != NonceSize {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("chacha20: wrong nonce size")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
c.key = [8]uint32{
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[0:4]),
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[4:8]),
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[8:12]),
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[12:16]),
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[16:20]),
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[20:24]),
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[24:28]),
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[28:32]),
|
||||
}
|
||||
c.nonce = [3]uint32{
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[0:4]),
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[4:8]),
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[8:12]),
|
||||
}
|
||||
return c, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The constant first 4 words of the ChaCha20 state.
|
||||
const (
|
||||
j0 uint32 = 0x61707865 // expa
|
||||
j1 uint32 = 0x3320646e // nd 3
|
||||
j2 uint32 = 0x79622d32 // 2-by
|
||||
j3 uint32 = 0x6b206574 // te k
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
const blockSize = 64
|
||||
|
||||
// quarterRound is the core of ChaCha20. It shuffles the bits of 4 state words.
|
||||
// It's executed 4 times for each of the 20 ChaCha20 rounds, operating on all 16
|
||||
// words each round, in columnar or diagonal groups of 4 at a time.
|
||||
func quarterRound(a, b, c, d uint32) (uint32, uint32, uint32, uint32) {
|
||||
a += b
|
||||
d ^= a
|
||||
d = bits.RotateLeft32(d, 16)
|
||||
c += d
|
||||
b ^= c
|
||||
b = bits.RotateLeft32(b, 12)
|
||||
a += b
|
||||
d ^= a
|
||||
d = bits.RotateLeft32(d, 8)
|
||||
c += d
|
||||
b ^= c
|
||||
b = bits.RotateLeft32(b, 7)
|
||||
return a, b, c, d
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// XORKeyStream XORs each byte in the given slice with a byte from the
|
||||
// cipher's key stream. Dst and src must overlap entirely or not at all.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// If len(dst) < len(src), XORKeyStream will panic. It is acceptable
|
||||
// to pass a dst bigger than src, and in that case, XORKeyStream will
|
||||
// only update dst[:len(src)] and will not touch the rest of dst.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Multiple calls to XORKeyStream behave as if the concatenation of
|
||||
// the src buffers was passed in a single run. That is, Cipher
|
||||
// maintains state and does not reset at each XORKeyStream call.
|
||||
func (s *Cipher) XORKeyStream(dst, src []byte) {
|
||||
if len(src) == 0 {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(dst) < len(src) {
|
||||
panic("chacha20: output smaller than input")
|
||||
}
|
||||
dst = dst[:len(src)]
|
||||
if subtle.InexactOverlap(dst, src) {
|
||||
panic("chacha20: invalid buffer overlap")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// First, drain any remaining key stream from a previous XORKeyStream.
|
||||
if s.len != 0 {
|
||||
keyStream := s.buf[bufSize-s.len:]
|
||||
if len(src) < len(keyStream) {
|
||||
keyStream = keyStream[:len(src)]
|
||||
}
|
||||
_ = src[len(keyStream)-1] // bounds check elimination hint
|
||||
for i, b := range keyStream {
|
||||
dst[i] = src[i] ^ b
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.len -= len(keyStream)
|
||||
src = src[len(keyStream):]
|
||||
dst = dst[len(keyStream):]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const blocksPerBuf = bufSize / blockSize
|
||||
numBufs := (uint64(len(src)) + bufSize - 1) / bufSize
|
||||
if uint64(s.counter)+numBufs*blocksPerBuf >= 1<<32 {
|
||||
panic("chacha20: counter overflow")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// xorKeyStreamBlocks implementations expect input lengths that are a
|
||||
// multiple of bufSize. Platform-specific ones process multiple blocks at a
|
||||
// time, so have bufSizes that are a multiple of blockSize.
|
||||
|
||||
rem := len(src) % bufSize
|
||||
full := len(src) - rem
|
||||
|
||||
if full > 0 {
|
||||
s.xorKeyStreamBlocks(dst[:full], src[:full])
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// If we have a partial (multi-)block, pad it for xorKeyStreamBlocks, and
|
||||
// keep the leftover keystream for the next XORKeyStream invocation.
|
||||
if rem > 0 {
|
||||
s.buf = [bufSize]byte{}
|
||||
copy(s.buf[:], src[full:])
|
||||
s.xorKeyStreamBlocks(s.buf[:], s.buf[:])
|
||||
s.len = bufSize - copy(dst[full:], s.buf[:])
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Cipher) xorKeyStreamBlocksGeneric(dst, src []byte) {
|
||||
if len(dst) != len(src) || len(dst)%blockSize != 0 {
|
||||
panic("chacha20: internal error: wrong dst and/or src length")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// To generate each block of key stream, the initial cipher state
|
||||
// (represented below) is passed through 20 rounds of shuffling,
|
||||
// alternatively applying quarterRounds by columns (like 1, 5, 9, 13)
|
||||
// or by diagonals (like 1, 6, 11, 12).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// 0:cccccccc 1:cccccccc 2:cccccccc 3:cccccccc
|
||||
// 4:kkkkkkkk 5:kkkkkkkk 6:kkkkkkkk 7:kkkkkkkk
|
||||
// 8:kkkkkkkk 9:kkkkkkkk 10:kkkkkkkk 11:kkkkkkkk
|
||||
// 12:bbbbbbbb 13:nnnnnnnn 14:nnnnnnnn 15:nnnnnnnn
|
||||
//
|
||||
// c=constant k=key b=blockcount n=nonce
|
||||
var (
|
||||
c0, c1, c2, c3 = j0, j1, j2, j3
|
||||
c4, c5, c6, c7 = s.key[0], s.key[1], s.key[2], s.key[3]
|
||||
c8, c9, c10, c11 = s.key[4], s.key[5], s.key[6], s.key[7]
|
||||
_, c13, c14, c15 = s.counter, s.nonce[0], s.nonce[1], s.nonce[2]
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Three quarters of the first round don't depend on the counter, so we can
|
||||
// calculate them here, and reuse them for multiple blocks in the loop, and
|
||||
// for future XORKeyStream invocations.
|
||||
if !s.precompDone {
|
||||
s.p1, s.p5, s.p9, s.p13 = quarterRound(c1, c5, c9, c13)
|
||||
s.p2, s.p6, s.p10, s.p14 = quarterRound(c2, c6, c10, c14)
|
||||
s.p3, s.p7, s.p11, s.p15 = quarterRound(c3, c7, c11, c15)
|
||||
s.precompDone = true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for i := 0; i < len(src); i += blockSize {
|
||||
// The remainder of the first column round.
|
||||
fcr0, fcr4, fcr8, fcr12 := quarterRound(c0, c4, c8, s.counter)
|
||||
|
||||
// The second diagonal round.
|
||||
x0, x5, x10, x15 := quarterRound(fcr0, s.p5, s.p10, s.p15)
|
||||
x1, x6, x11, x12 := quarterRound(s.p1, s.p6, s.p11, fcr12)
|
||||
x2, x7, x8, x13 := quarterRound(s.p2, s.p7, fcr8, s.p13)
|
||||
x3, x4, x9, x14 := quarterRound(s.p3, fcr4, s.p9, s.p14)
|
||||
|
||||
// The remaining 18 rounds.
|
||||
for i := 0; i < 9; i++ {
|
||||
// Column round.
|
||||
x0, x4, x8, x12 = quarterRound(x0, x4, x8, x12)
|
||||
x1, x5, x9, x13 = quarterRound(x1, x5, x9, x13)
|
||||
x2, x6, x10, x14 = quarterRound(x2, x6, x10, x14)
|
||||
x3, x7, x11, x15 = quarterRound(x3, x7, x11, x15)
|
||||
|
||||
// Diagonal round.
|
||||
x0, x5, x10, x15 = quarterRound(x0, x5, x10, x15)
|
||||
x1, x6, x11, x12 = quarterRound(x1, x6, x11, x12)
|
||||
x2, x7, x8, x13 = quarterRound(x2, x7, x8, x13)
|
||||
x3, x4, x9, x14 = quarterRound(x3, x4, x9, x14)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Finally, add back the initial state to generate the key stream.
|
||||
x0 += c0
|
||||
x1 += c1
|
||||
x2 += c2
|
||||
x3 += c3
|
||||
x4 += c4
|
||||
x5 += c5
|
||||
x6 += c6
|
||||
x7 += c7
|
||||
x8 += c8
|
||||
x9 += c9
|
||||
x10 += c10
|
||||
x11 += c11
|
||||
x12 += s.counter
|
||||
x13 += c13
|
||||
x14 += c14
|
||||
x15 += c15
|
||||
|
||||
s.counter += 1
|
||||
if s.counter == 0 {
|
||||
panic("chacha20: internal error: counter overflow")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
in, out := src[i:], dst[i:]
|
||||
in, out = in[:blockSize], out[:blockSize] // bounds check elimination hint
|
||||
|
||||
// XOR the key stream with the source and write out the result.
|
||||
xor(out[0:], in[0:], x0)
|
||||
xor(out[4:], in[4:], x1)
|
||||
xor(out[8:], in[8:], x2)
|
||||
xor(out[12:], in[12:], x3)
|
||||
xor(out[16:], in[16:], x4)
|
||||
xor(out[20:], in[20:], x5)
|
||||
xor(out[24:], in[24:], x6)
|
||||
xor(out[28:], in[28:], x7)
|
||||
xor(out[32:], in[32:], x8)
|
||||
xor(out[36:], in[36:], x9)
|
||||
xor(out[40:], in[40:], x10)
|
||||
xor(out[44:], in[44:], x11)
|
||||
xor(out[48:], in[48:], x12)
|
||||
xor(out[52:], in[52:], x13)
|
||||
xor(out[56:], in[56:], x14)
|
||||
xor(out[60:], in[60:], x15)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// HChaCha20 uses the ChaCha20 core to generate a derived key from a 32 bytes
|
||||
// key and a 16 bytes nonce. It returns an error if key or nonce have any other
|
||||
// length. It is used as part of the XChaCha20 construction.
|
||||
func HChaCha20(key, nonce []byte) ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
// This function is split into a wrapper so that the slice allocation will
|
||||
// be inlined, and depending on how the caller uses the return value, won't
|
||||
// escape to the heap.
|
||||
out := make([]byte, 32)
|
||||
return hChaCha20(out, key, nonce)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func hChaCha20(out, key, nonce []byte) ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
if len(key) != KeySize {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("chacha20: wrong HChaCha20 key size")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(nonce) != 16 {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("chacha20: wrong HChaCha20 nonce size")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
x0, x1, x2, x3 := j0, j1, j2, j3
|
||||
x4 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[0:4])
|
||||
x5 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[4:8])
|
||||
x6 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[8:12])
|
||||
x7 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[12:16])
|
||||
x8 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[16:20])
|
||||
x9 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[20:24])
|
||||
x10 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[24:28])
|
||||
x11 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[28:32])
|
||||
x12 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[0:4])
|
||||
x13 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[4:8])
|
||||
x14 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[8:12])
|
||||
x15 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[12:16])
|
||||
|
||||
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
|
||||
// Diagonal round.
|
||||
x0, x4, x8, x12 = quarterRound(x0, x4, x8, x12)
|
||||
x1, x5, x9, x13 = quarterRound(x1, x5, x9, x13)
|
||||
x2, x6, x10, x14 = quarterRound(x2, x6, x10, x14)
|
||||
x3, x7, x11, x15 = quarterRound(x3, x7, x11, x15)
|
||||
|
||||
// Column round.
|
||||
x0, x5, x10, x15 = quarterRound(x0, x5, x10, x15)
|
||||
x1, x6, x11, x12 = quarterRound(x1, x6, x11, x12)
|
||||
x2, x7, x8, x13 = quarterRound(x2, x7, x8, x13)
|
||||
x3, x4, x9, x14 = quarterRound(x3, x4, x9, x14)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
_ = out[31] // bounds check elimination hint
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[0:4], x0)
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[4:8], x1)
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[8:12], x2)
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[12:16], x3)
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[16:20], x12)
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[20:24], x13)
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[24:28], x14)
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[28:32], x15)
|
||||
return out, nil
|
||||
}
|
13
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_noasm.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
13
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_noasm.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
|
@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
|
|||
// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
// +build !arm64,!s390x,!ppc64le arm64,!go1.11 gccgo appengine
|
||||
|
||||
package chacha20
|
||||
|
||||
const bufSize = blockSize
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Cipher) xorKeyStreamBlocks(dst, src []byte) {
|
||||
s.xorKeyStreamBlocksGeneric(dst, src)
|
||||
}
|
16
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_ppc64le.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
16
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_ppc64le.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
|
@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
|
|||
// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
// +build !gccgo,!appengine
|
||||
|
||||
package chacha20
|
||||
|
||||
const bufSize = 256
|
||||
|
||||
//go:noescape
|
||||
func chaCha20_ctr32_vsx(out, inp *byte, len int, key *[8]uint32, counter *uint32)
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *Cipher) xorKeyStreamBlocks(dst, src []byte) {
|
||||
chaCha20_ctr32_vsx(&dst[0], &src[0], len(src), &c.key, &c.counter)
|
||||
}
|
449
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_ppc64le.s
generated
vendored
Normal file
449
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_ppc64le.s
generated
vendored
Normal file
|
@ -0,0 +1,449 @@
|
|||
// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
// Based on CRYPTOGAMS code with the following comment:
|
||||
// # ====================================================================
|
||||
// # Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
|
||||
// # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
|
||||
// # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
|
||||
// # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
|
||||
// # ====================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
// Code for the perl script that generates the ppc64 assembler
|
||||
// can be found in the cryptogams repository at the link below. It is based on
|
||||
// the original from openssl.
|
||||
|
||||
// https://github.com/dot-asm/cryptogams/commit/a60f5b50ed908e91
|
||||
|
||||
// The differences in this and the original implementation are
|
||||
// due to the calling conventions and initialization of constants.
|
||||
|
||||
// +build !gccgo,!appengine
|
||||
|
||||
#include "textflag.h"
|
||||
|
||||
#define OUT R3
|
||||
#define INP R4
|
||||
#define LEN R5
|
||||
#define KEY R6
|
||||
#define CNT R7
|
||||
#define TMP R15
|
||||
|
||||
#define CONSTBASE R16
|
||||
#define BLOCKS R17
|
||||
|
||||
DATA consts<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x3320646e61707865
|
||||
DATA consts<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x6b20657479622d32
|
||||
DATA consts<>+0x10(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000001
|
||||
DATA consts<>+0x18(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000000
|
||||
DATA consts<>+0x20(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000004
|
||||
DATA consts<>+0x28(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000000
|
||||
DATA consts<>+0x30(SB)/8, $0x0a0b08090e0f0c0d
|
||||
DATA consts<>+0x38(SB)/8, $0x0203000106070405
|
||||
DATA consts<>+0x40(SB)/8, $0x090a0b080d0e0f0c
|
||||
DATA consts<>+0x48(SB)/8, $0x0102030005060704
|
||||
DATA consts<>+0x50(SB)/8, $0x6170786561707865
|
||||
DATA consts<>+0x58(SB)/8, $0x6170786561707865
|
||||
DATA consts<>+0x60(SB)/8, $0x3320646e3320646e
|
||||
DATA consts<>+0x68(SB)/8, $0x3320646e3320646e
|
||||
DATA consts<>+0x70(SB)/8, $0x79622d3279622d32
|
||||
DATA consts<>+0x78(SB)/8, $0x79622d3279622d32
|
||||
DATA consts<>+0x80(SB)/8, $0x6b2065746b206574
|
||||
DATA consts<>+0x88(SB)/8, $0x6b2065746b206574
|
||||
DATA consts<>+0x90(SB)/8, $0x0000000100000000
|
||||
DATA consts<>+0x98(SB)/8, $0x0000000300000002
|
||||
GLOBL consts<>(SB), RODATA, $0xa0
|
||||
|
||||
//func chaCha20_ctr32_vsx(out, inp *byte, len int, key *[8]uint32, counter *uint32)
|
||||
TEXT ·chaCha20_ctr32_vsx(SB),NOSPLIT,$64-40
|
||||
MOVD out+0(FP), OUT
|
||||
MOVD inp+8(FP), INP
|
||||
MOVD len+16(FP), LEN
|
||||
MOVD key+24(FP), KEY
|
||||
MOVD counter+32(FP), CNT
|
||||
|
||||
// Addressing for constants
|
||||
MOVD $consts<>+0x00(SB), CONSTBASE
|
||||
MOVD $16, R8
|
||||
MOVD $32, R9
|
||||
MOVD $48, R10
|
||||
MOVD $64, R11
|
||||
SRD $6, LEN, BLOCKS
|
||||
// V16
|
||||
LXVW4X (CONSTBASE)(R0), VS48
|
||||
ADD $80,CONSTBASE
|
||||
|
||||
// Load key into V17,V18
|
||||
LXVW4X (KEY)(R0), VS49
|
||||
LXVW4X (KEY)(R8), VS50
|
||||
|
||||
// Load CNT, NONCE into V19
|
||||
LXVW4X (CNT)(R0), VS51
|
||||
|
||||
// Clear V27
|
||||
VXOR V27, V27, V27
|
||||
|
||||
// V28
|
||||
LXVW4X (CONSTBASE)(R11), VS60
|
||||
|
||||
// splat slot from V19 -> V26
|
||||
VSPLTW $0, V19, V26
|
||||
|
||||
VSLDOI $4, V19, V27, V19
|
||||
VSLDOI $12, V27, V19, V19
|
||||
|
||||
VADDUWM V26, V28, V26
|
||||
|
||||
MOVD $10, R14
|
||||
MOVD R14, CTR
|
||||
|
||||
loop_outer_vsx:
|
||||
// V0, V1, V2, V3
|
||||
LXVW4X (R0)(CONSTBASE), VS32
|
||||
LXVW4X (R8)(CONSTBASE), VS33
|
||||
LXVW4X (R9)(CONSTBASE), VS34
|
||||
LXVW4X (R10)(CONSTBASE), VS35
|
||||
|
||||
// splat values from V17, V18 into V4-V11
|
||||
VSPLTW $0, V17, V4
|
||||
VSPLTW $1, V17, V5
|
||||
VSPLTW $2, V17, V6
|
||||
VSPLTW $3, V17, V7
|
||||
VSPLTW $0, V18, V8
|
||||
VSPLTW $1, V18, V9
|
||||
VSPLTW $2, V18, V10
|
||||
VSPLTW $3, V18, V11
|
||||
|
||||
// VOR
|
||||
VOR V26, V26, V12
|
||||
|
||||
// splat values from V19 -> V13, V14, V15
|
||||
VSPLTW $1, V19, V13
|
||||
VSPLTW $2, V19, V14
|
||||
VSPLTW $3, V19, V15
|
||||
|
||||
// splat const values
|
||||
VSPLTISW $-16, V27
|
||||
VSPLTISW $12, V28
|
||||
VSPLTISW $8, V29
|
||||
VSPLTISW $7, V30
|
||||
|
||||
loop_vsx:
|
||||
VADDUWM V0, V4, V0
|
||||
VADDUWM V1, V5, V1
|
||||
VADDUWM V2, V6, V2
|
||||
VADDUWM V3, V7, V3
|
||||
|
||||
VXOR V12, V0, V12
|
||||
VXOR V13, V1, V13
|
||||
VXOR V14, V2, V14
|
||||
VXOR V15, V3, V15
|
||||
|
||||
VRLW V12, V27, V12
|
||||
VRLW V13, V27, V13
|
||||
VRLW V14, V27, V14
|
||||
VRLW V15, V27, V15
|
||||
|
||||
VADDUWM V8, V12, V8
|
||||
VADDUWM V9, V13, V9
|
||||
VADDUWM V10, V14, V10
|
||||
VADDUWM V11, V15, V11
|
||||
|
||||
VXOR V4, V8, V4
|
||||
VXOR V5, V9, V5
|
||||
VXOR V6, V10, V6
|
||||
VXOR V7, V11, V7
|
||||
|
||||
VRLW V4, V28, V4
|
||||
VRLW V5, V28, V5
|
||||
VRLW V6, V28, V6
|
||||
VRLW V7, V28, V7
|
||||
|
||||
VADDUWM V0, V4, V0
|
||||
VADDUWM V1, V5, V1
|
||||
VADDUWM V2, V6, V2
|
||||
VADDUWM V3, V7, V3
|
||||
|
||||
VXOR V12, V0, V12
|
||||
VXOR V13, V1, V13
|
||||
VXOR V14, V2, V14
|
||||
VXOR V15, V3, V15
|
||||
|
||||
VRLW V12, V29, V12
|
||||
VRLW V13, V29, V13
|
||||
VRLW V14, V29, V14
|
||||
VRLW V15, V29, V15
|
||||
|
||||
VADDUWM V8, V12, V8
|
||||
VADDUWM V9, V13, V9
|
||||
VADDUWM V10, V14, V10
|
||||
VADDUWM V11, V15, V11
|
||||
|
||||
VXOR V4, V8, V4
|
||||
VXOR V5, V9, V5
|
||||
VXOR V6, V10, V6
|
||||
VXOR V7, V11, V7
|
||||
|
||||
VRLW V4, V30, V4
|
||||
VRLW V5, V30, V5
|
||||
VRLW V6, V30, V6
|
||||
VRLW V7, V30, V7
|
||||
|
||||
VADDUWM V0, V5, V0
|
||||
VADDUWM V1, V6, V1
|
||||
VADDUWM V2, V7, V2
|
||||
VADDUWM V3, V4, V3
|
||||
|
||||
VXOR V15, V0, V15
|
||||
VXOR V12, V1, V12
|
||||
VXOR V13, V2, V13
|
||||
VXOR V14, V3, V14
|
||||
|
||||
VRLW V15, V27, V15
|
||||
VRLW V12, V27, V12
|
||||
VRLW V13, V27, V13
|
||||
VRLW V14, V27, V14
|
||||
|
||||
VADDUWM V10, V15, V10
|
||||
VADDUWM V11, V12, V11
|
||||
VADDUWM V8, V13, V8
|
||||
VADDUWM V9, V14, V9
|
||||
|
||||
VXOR V5, V10, V5
|
||||
VXOR V6, V11, V6
|
||||
VXOR V7, V8, V7
|
||||
VXOR V4, V9, V4
|
||||
|
||||
VRLW V5, V28, V5
|
||||
VRLW V6, V28, V6
|
||||
VRLW V7, V28, V7
|
||||
VRLW V4, V28, V4
|
||||
|
||||
VADDUWM V0, V5, V0
|
||||
VADDUWM V1, V6, V1
|
||||
VADDUWM V2, V7, V2
|
||||
VADDUWM V3, V4, V3
|
||||
|
||||
VXOR V15, V0, V15
|
||||
VXOR V12, V1, V12
|
||||
VXOR V13, V2, V13
|
||||
VXOR V14, V3, V14
|
||||
|
||||
VRLW V15, V29, V15
|
||||
VRLW V12, V29, V12
|
||||
VRLW V13, V29, V13
|
||||
VRLW V14, V29, V14
|
||||
|
||||
VADDUWM V10, V15, V10
|
||||
VADDUWM V11, V12, V11
|
||||
VADDUWM V8, V13, V8
|
||||
VADDUWM V9, V14, V9
|
||||
|
||||
VXOR V5, V10, V5
|
||||
VXOR V6, V11, V6
|
||||
VXOR V7, V8, V7
|
||||
VXOR V4, V9, V4
|
||||
|
||||
VRLW V5, V30, V5
|
||||
VRLW V6, V30, V6
|
||||
VRLW V7, V30, V7
|
||||
VRLW V4, V30, V4
|
||||
BC 16, LT, loop_vsx
|
||||
|
||||
VADDUWM V12, V26, V12
|
||||
|
||||
WORD $0x13600F8C // VMRGEW V0, V1, V27
|
||||
WORD $0x13821F8C // VMRGEW V2, V3, V28
|
||||
|
||||
WORD $0x10000E8C // VMRGOW V0, V1, V0
|
||||
WORD $0x10421E8C // VMRGOW V2, V3, V2
|
||||
|
||||
WORD $0x13A42F8C // VMRGEW V4, V5, V29
|
||||
WORD $0x13C63F8C // VMRGEW V6, V7, V30
|
||||
|
||||
XXPERMDI VS32, VS34, $0, VS33
|
||||
XXPERMDI VS32, VS34, $3, VS35
|
||||
XXPERMDI VS59, VS60, $0, VS32
|
||||
XXPERMDI VS59, VS60, $3, VS34
|
||||
|
||||
WORD $0x10842E8C // VMRGOW V4, V5, V4
|
||||
WORD $0x10C63E8C // VMRGOW V6, V7, V6
|
||||
|
||||
WORD $0x13684F8C // VMRGEW V8, V9, V27
|
||||
WORD $0x138A5F8C // VMRGEW V10, V11, V28
|
||||
|
||||
XXPERMDI VS36, VS38, $0, VS37
|
||||
XXPERMDI VS36, VS38, $3, VS39
|
||||
XXPERMDI VS61, VS62, $0, VS36
|
||||
XXPERMDI VS61, VS62, $3, VS38
|
||||
|
||||
WORD $0x11084E8C // VMRGOW V8, V9, V8
|
||||
WORD $0x114A5E8C // VMRGOW V10, V11, V10
|
||||
|
||||
WORD $0x13AC6F8C // VMRGEW V12, V13, V29
|
||||
WORD $0x13CE7F8C // VMRGEW V14, V15, V30
|
||||
|
||||
XXPERMDI VS40, VS42, $0, VS41
|
||||
XXPERMDI VS40, VS42, $3, VS43
|
||||
XXPERMDI VS59, VS60, $0, VS40
|
||||
XXPERMDI VS59, VS60, $3, VS42
|
||||
|
||||
WORD $0x118C6E8C // VMRGOW V12, V13, V12
|
||||
WORD $0x11CE7E8C // VMRGOW V14, V15, V14
|
||||
|
||||
VSPLTISW $4, V27
|
||||
VADDUWM V26, V27, V26
|
||||
|
||||
XXPERMDI VS44, VS46, $0, VS45
|
||||
XXPERMDI VS44, VS46, $3, VS47
|
||||
XXPERMDI VS61, VS62, $0, VS44
|
||||
XXPERMDI VS61, VS62, $3, VS46
|
||||
|
||||
VADDUWM V0, V16, V0
|
||||
VADDUWM V4, V17, V4
|
||||
VADDUWM V8, V18, V8
|
||||
VADDUWM V12, V19, V12
|
||||
|
||||
CMPU LEN, $64
|
||||
BLT tail_vsx
|
||||
|
||||
// Bottom of loop
|
||||
LXVW4X (INP)(R0), VS59
|
||||
LXVW4X (INP)(R8), VS60
|
||||
LXVW4X (INP)(R9), VS61
|
||||
LXVW4X (INP)(R10), VS62
|
||||
|
||||
VXOR V27, V0, V27
|
||||
VXOR V28, V4, V28
|
||||
VXOR V29, V8, V29
|
||||
VXOR V30, V12, V30
|
||||
|
||||
STXVW4X VS59, (OUT)(R0)
|
||||
STXVW4X VS60, (OUT)(R8)
|
||||
ADD $64, INP
|
||||
STXVW4X VS61, (OUT)(R9)
|
||||
ADD $-64, LEN
|
||||
STXVW4X VS62, (OUT)(R10)
|
||||
ADD $64, OUT
|
||||
BEQ done_vsx
|
||||
|
||||
VADDUWM V1, V16, V0
|
||||
VADDUWM V5, V17, V4
|
||||
VADDUWM V9, V18, V8
|
||||
VADDUWM V13, V19, V12
|
||||
|
||||
CMPU LEN, $64
|
||||
BLT tail_vsx
|
||||
|
||||
LXVW4X (INP)(R0), VS59
|
||||
LXVW4X (INP)(R8), VS60
|
||||
LXVW4X (INP)(R9), VS61
|
||||
LXVW4X (INP)(R10), VS62
|
||||
VXOR V27, V0, V27
|
||||
|
||||
VXOR V28, V4, V28
|
||||
VXOR V29, V8, V29
|
||||
VXOR V30, V12, V30
|
||||
|
||||
STXVW4X VS59, (OUT)(R0)
|
||||
STXVW4X VS60, (OUT)(R8)
|
||||
ADD $64, INP
|
||||
STXVW4X VS61, (OUT)(R9)
|
||||
ADD $-64, LEN
|
||||
STXVW4X VS62, (OUT)(V10)
|
||||
ADD $64, OUT
|
||||
BEQ done_vsx
|
||||
|
||||
VADDUWM V2, V16, V0
|
||||
VADDUWM V6, V17, V4
|
||||
VADDUWM V10, V18, V8
|
||||
VADDUWM V14, V19, V12
|
||||
|
||||
CMPU LEN, $64
|
||||
BLT tail_vsx
|
||||
|
||||
LXVW4X (INP)(R0), VS59
|
||||
LXVW4X (INP)(R8), VS60
|
||||
LXVW4X (INP)(R9), VS61
|
||||
LXVW4X (INP)(R10), VS62
|
||||
|
||||
VXOR V27, V0, V27
|
||||
VXOR V28, V4, V28
|
||||
VXOR V29, V8, V29
|
||||
VXOR V30, V12, V30
|
||||
|
||||
STXVW4X VS59, (OUT)(R0)
|
||||
STXVW4X VS60, (OUT)(R8)
|
||||
ADD $64, INP
|
||||
STXVW4X VS61, (OUT)(R9)
|
||||
ADD $-64, LEN
|
||||
STXVW4X VS62, (OUT)(R10)
|
||||
ADD $64, OUT
|
||||
BEQ done_vsx
|
||||
|
||||
VADDUWM V3, V16, V0
|
||||
VADDUWM V7, V17, V4
|
||||
VADDUWM V11, V18, V8
|
||||
VADDUWM V15, V19, V12
|
||||
|
||||
CMPU LEN, $64
|
||||
BLT tail_vsx
|
||||
|
||||
LXVW4X (INP)(R0), VS59
|
||||
LXVW4X (INP)(R8), VS60
|
||||
LXVW4X (INP)(R9), VS61
|
||||
LXVW4X (INP)(R10), VS62
|
||||
|
||||
VXOR V27, V0, V27
|
||||
VXOR V28, V4, V28
|
||||
VXOR V29, V8, V29
|
||||
VXOR V30, V12, V30
|
||||
|
||||
STXVW4X VS59, (OUT)(R0)
|
||||
STXVW4X VS60, (OUT)(R8)
|
||||
ADD $64, INP
|
||||
STXVW4X VS61, (OUT)(R9)
|
||||
ADD $-64, LEN
|
||||
STXVW4X VS62, (OUT)(R10)
|
||||
ADD $64, OUT
|
||||
|
||||
MOVD $10, R14
|
||||
MOVD R14, CTR
|
||||
BNE loop_outer_vsx
|
||||
|
||||
done_vsx:
|
||||
// Increment counter by number of 64 byte blocks
|
||||
MOVD (CNT), R14
|
||||
ADD BLOCKS, R14
|
||||
MOVD R14, (CNT)
|
||||
RET
|
||||
|
||||
tail_vsx:
|
||||
ADD $32, R1, R11
|
||||
MOVD LEN, CTR
|
||||
|
||||
// Save values on stack to copy from
|
||||
STXVW4X VS32, (R11)(R0)
|
||||
STXVW4X VS36, (R11)(R8)
|
||||
STXVW4X VS40, (R11)(R9)
|
||||
STXVW4X VS44, (R11)(R10)
|
||||
ADD $-1, R11, R12
|
||||
ADD $-1, INP
|
||||
ADD $-1, OUT
|
||||
|
||||
looptail_vsx:
|
||||
// Copying the result to OUT
|
||||
// in bytes.
|
||||
MOVBZU 1(R12), KEY
|
||||
MOVBZU 1(INP), TMP
|
||||
XOR KEY, TMP, KEY
|
||||
MOVBU KEY, 1(OUT)
|
||||
BC 16, LT, looptail_vsx
|
||||
|
||||
// Clear the stack values
|
||||
STXVW4X VS48, (R11)(R0)
|
||||
STXVW4X VS48, (R11)(R8)
|
||||
STXVW4X VS48, (R11)(R9)
|
||||
STXVW4X VS48, (R11)(R10)
|
||||
BR done_vsx
|
26
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_s390x.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
26
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_s390x.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
|
@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
|
|||
// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
// +build !gccgo,!appengine
|
||||
|
||||
package chacha20
|
||||
|
||||
import "golang.org/x/sys/cpu"
|
||||
|
||||
var haveAsm = cpu.S390X.HasVX
|
||||
|
||||
const bufSize = 256
|
||||
|
||||
// xorKeyStreamVX is an assembly implementation of XORKeyStream. It must only
|
||||
// be called when the vector facility is available. Implementation in asm_s390x.s.
|
||||
//go:noescape
|
||||
func xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src []byte, key *[8]uint32, nonce *[3]uint32, counter *uint32)
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *Cipher) xorKeyStreamBlocks(dst, src []byte) {
|
||||
if cpu.S390X.HasVX {
|
||||
xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src, &c.key, &c.nonce, &c.counter)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
c.xorKeyStreamBlocksGeneric(dst, src)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
|
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
|||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
// +build s390x,!gccgo,!appengine
|
||||
// +build !gccgo,!appengine
|
||||
|
||||
#include "go_asm.h"
|
||||
#include "textflag.h"
|
||||
|
@ -24,15 +24,6 @@ DATA ·constants<>+0x14(SB)/4, $0x3320646e
|
|||
DATA ·constants<>+0x18(SB)/4, $0x79622d32
|
||||
DATA ·constants<>+0x1c(SB)/4, $0x6b206574
|
||||
|
||||
// EXRL targets:
|
||||
TEXT ·mvcSrcToBuf(SB), NOFRAME|NOSPLIT, $0
|
||||
MVC $1, (R1), (R8)
|
||||
RET
|
||||
|
||||
TEXT ·mvcBufToDst(SB), NOFRAME|NOSPLIT, $0
|
||||
MVC $1, (R8), (R9)
|
||||
RET
|
||||
|
||||
#define BSWAP V5
|
||||
#define J0 V6
|
||||
#define KEY0 V7
|
||||
|
@ -144,7 +135,7 @@ TEXT ·mvcBufToDst(SB), NOFRAME|NOSPLIT, $0
|
|||
VMRHF v, w, c \ // c = {a[2], b[2], c[2], d[2]}
|
||||
VMRLF v, w, d // d = {a[3], b[3], c[3], d[3]}
|
||||
|
||||
// func xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src []byte, key *[8]uint32, nonce *[3]uint32, counter *uint32, buf *[256]byte, len *int)
|
||||
// func xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src []byte, key *[8]uint32, nonce *[3]uint32, counter *uint32)
|
||||
TEXT ·xorKeyStreamVX(SB), NOSPLIT, $0
|
||||
MOVD $·constants<>(SB), R1
|
||||
MOVD dst+0(FP), R2 // R2=&dst[0]
|
||||
|
@ -152,25 +143,10 @@ TEXT ·xorKeyStreamVX(SB), NOSPLIT, $0
|
|||
MOVD key+48(FP), R5 // R5=key
|
||||
MOVD nonce+56(FP), R6 // R6=nonce
|
||||
MOVD counter+64(FP), R7 // R7=counter
|
||||
MOVD buf+72(FP), R8 // R8=buf
|
||||
MOVD len+80(FP), R9 // R9=len
|
||||
|
||||
// load BSWAP and J0
|
||||
VLM (R1), BSWAP, J0
|
||||
|
||||
// set up tail buffer
|
||||
ADD $-1, R4, R12
|
||||
MOVBZ R12, R12
|
||||
CMPUBEQ R12, $255, aligned
|
||||
MOVD R4, R1
|
||||
AND $~255, R1
|
||||
MOVD $(R3)(R1*1), R1
|
||||
EXRL $·mvcSrcToBuf(SB), R12
|
||||
MOVD $255, R0
|
||||
SUB R12, R0
|
||||
MOVD R0, (R9) // update len
|
||||
|
||||
aligned:
|
||||
// setup
|
||||
MOVD $95, R0
|
||||
VLM (R5), KEY0, KEY1
|
||||
|
@ -217,9 +193,7 @@ loop:
|
|||
|
||||
// decrement length
|
||||
ADD $-256, R4
|
||||
BLT tail
|
||||
|
||||
continue:
|
||||
// rearrange vectors
|
||||
SHUFFLE(X0, X1, X2, X3, M0, M1, M2, M3)
|
||||
ADDV(J0, X0, X1, X2, X3)
|
||||
|
@ -245,16 +219,6 @@ continue:
|
|||
MOVD $256(R3), R3
|
||||
|
||||
CMPBNE R4, $0, chacha
|
||||
CMPUBEQ R12, $255, return
|
||||
EXRL $·mvcBufToDst(SB), R12 // len was updated during setup
|
||||
|
||||
return:
|
||||
VSTEF $0, CTR, (R7)
|
||||
RET
|
||||
|
||||
tail:
|
||||
MOVD R2, R9
|
||||
MOVD R8, R2
|
||||
MOVD R8, R3
|
||||
MOVD $0, R4
|
||||
JMP continue
|
|
@ -4,9 +4,7 @@
|
|||
|
||||
package chacha20
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"runtime"
|
||||
)
|
||||
import "runtime"
|
||||
|
||||
// Platforms that have fast unaligned 32-bit little endian accesses.
|
||||
const unaligned = runtime.GOARCH == "386" ||
|
8
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/const_amd64.h
generated
vendored
8
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/const_amd64.h
generated
vendored
|
@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
|
|||
// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
// This code was translated into a form compatible with 6a from the public
|
||||
// domain sources in SUPERCOP: https://bench.cr.yp.to/supercop.html
|
||||
|
||||
#define REDMASK51 0x0007FFFFFFFFFFFF
|
20
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/const_amd64.s
generated
vendored
20
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/const_amd64.s
generated
vendored
|
@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
|
|||
// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
// This code was translated into a form compatible with 6a from the public
|
||||
// domain sources in SUPERCOP: https://bench.cr.yp.to/supercop.html
|
||||
|
||||
// +build amd64,!gccgo,!appengine
|
||||
|
||||
// These constants cannot be encoded in non-MOVQ immediates.
|
||||
// We access them directly from memory instead.
|
||||
|
||||
DATA ·_121666_213(SB)/8, $996687872
|
||||
GLOBL ·_121666_213(SB), 8, $8
|
||||
|
||||
DATA ·_2P0(SB)/8, $0xFFFFFFFFFFFDA
|
||||
GLOBL ·_2P0(SB), 8, $8
|
||||
|
||||
DATA ·_2P1234(SB)/8, $0xFFFFFFFFFFFFE
|
||||
GLOBL ·_2P1234(SB), 8, $8
|
65
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/cswap_amd64.s
generated
vendored
65
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/cswap_amd64.s
generated
vendored
|
@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
|
|||
// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
// +build amd64,!gccgo,!appengine
|
||||
|
||||
// func cswap(inout *[4][5]uint64, v uint64)
|
||||
TEXT ·cswap(SB),7,$0
|
||||
MOVQ inout+0(FP),DI
|
||||
MOVQ v+8(FP),SI
|
||||
|
||||
SUBQ $1, SI
|
||||
NOTQ SI
|
||||
MOVQ SI, X15
|
||||
PSHUFD $0x44, X15, X15
|
||||
|
||||
MOVOU 0(DI), X0
|
||||
MOVOU 16(DI), X2
|
||||
MOVOU 32(DI), X4
|
||||
MOVOU 48(DI), X6
|
||||
MOVOU 64(DI), X8
|
||||
MOVOU 80(DI), X1
|
||||
MOVOU 96(DI), X3
|
||||
MOVOU 112(DI), X5
|
||||
MOVOU 128(DI), X7
|
||||
MOVOU 144(DI), X9
|
||||
|
||||
MOVO X1, X10
|
||||
MOVO X3, X11
|
||||
MOVO X5, X12
|
||||
MOVO X7, X13
|
||||
MOVO X9, X14
|
||||
|
||||
PXOR X0, X10
|
||||
PXOR X2, X11
|
||||
PXOR X4, X12
|
||||
PXOR X6, X13
|
||||
PXOR X8, X14
|
||||
PAND X15, X10
|
||||
PAND X15, X11
|
||||
PAND X15, X12
|
||||
PAND X15, X13
|
||||
PAND X15, X14
|
||||
PXOR X10, X0
|
||||
PXOR X10, X1
|
||||
PXOR X11, X2
|
||||
PXOR X11, X3
|
||||
PXOR X12, X4
|
||||
PXOR X12, X5
|
||||
PXOR X13, X6
|
||||
PXOR X13, X7
|
||||
PXOR X14, X8
|
||||
PXOR X14, X9
|
||||
|
||||
MOVOU X0, 0(DI)
|
||||
MOVOU X2, 16(DI)
|
||||
MOVOU X4, 32(DI)
|
||||
MOVOU X6, 48(DI)
|
||||
MOVOU X8, 64(DI)
|
||||
MOVOU X1, 80(DI)
|
||||
MOVOU X3, 96(DI)
|
||||
MOVOU X5, 112(DI)
|
||||
MOVOU X7, 128(DI)
|
||||
MOVOU X9, 144(DI)
|
||||
RET
|
897
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519.go
generated
vendored
897
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519.go
generated
vendored
|
@ -1,834 +1,95 @@
|
|||
// Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
// We have an implementation in amd64 assembly so this code is only run on
|
||||
// non-amd64 platforms. The amd64 assembly does not support gccgo.
|
||||
// +build !amd64 gccgo appengine
|
||||
|
||||
package curve25519
|
||||
// Package curve25519 provides an implementation of the X25519 function, which
|
||||
// performs scalar multiplication on the elliptic curve known as Curve25519.
|
||||
// See RFC 7748.
|
||||
package curve25519 // import "golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519"
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"encoding/binary"
|
||||
"crypto/subtle"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// This code is a port of the public domain, "ref10" implementation of
|
||||
// curve25519 from SUPERCOP 20130419 by D. J. Bernstein.
|
||||
// ScalarMult sets dst to the product scalar * point.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Deprecated: when provided a low-order point, ScalarMult will set dst to all
|
||||
// zeroes, irrespective of the scalar. Instead, use the X25519 function, which
|
||||
// will return an error.
|
||||
func ScalarMult(dst, scalar, point *[32]byte) {
|
||||
scalarMult(dst, scalar, point)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// fieldElement represents an element of the field GF(2^255 - 19). An element
|
||||
// t, entries t[0]...t[9], represents the integer t[0]+2^26 t[1]+2^51 t[2]+2^77
|
||||
// t[3]+2^102 t[4]+...+2^230 t[9]. Bounds on each t[i] vary depending on
|
||||
// context.
|
||||
type fieldElement [10]int32
|
||||
// ScalarBaseMult sets dst to the product scalar * base where base is the
|
||||
// standard generator.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// It is recommended to use the X25519 function with Basepoint instead, as
|
||||
// copying into fixed size arrays can lead to unexpected bugs.
|
||||
func ScalarBaseMult(dst, scalar *[32]byte) {
|
||||
ScalarMult(dst, scalar, &basePoint)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func feZero(fe *fieldElement) {
|
||||
for i := range fe {
|
||||
fe[i] = 0
|
||||
const (
|
||||
// ScalarSize is the size of the scalar input to X25519.
|
||||
ScalarSize = 32
|
||||
// PointSize is the size of the point input to X25519.
|
||||
PointSize = 32
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Basepoint is the canonical Curve25519 generator.
|
||||
var Basepoint []byte
|
||||
|
||||
var basePoint = [32]byte{9, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}
|
||||
|
||||
func init() { Basepoint = basePoint[:] }
|
||||
|
||||
func checkBasepoint() {
|
||||
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(Basepoint, []byte{
|
||||
0x09, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
||||
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
||||
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
||||
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
||||
}) != 1 {
|
||||
panic("curve25519: global Basepoint value was modified")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func feOne(fe *fieldElement) {
|
||||
feZero(fe)
|
||||
fe[0] = 1
|
||||
// X25519 returns the result of the scalar multiplication (scalar * point),
|
||||
// according to RFC 7748, Section 5. scalar, point and the return value are
|
||||
// slices of 32 bytes.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// scalar can be generated at random, for example with crypto/rand. point should
|
||||
// be either Basepoint or the output of another X25519 call.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// If point is Basepoint (but not if it's a different slice with the same
|
||||
// contents) a precomputed implementation might be used for performance.
|
||||
func X25519(scalar, point []byte) ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
// Outline the body of function, to let the allocation be inlined in the
|
||||
// caller, and possibly avoid escaping to the heap.
|
||||
var dst [32]byte
|
||||
return x25519(&dst, scalar, point)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func feAdd(dst, a, b *fieldElement) {
|
||||
for i := range dst {
|
||||
dst[i] = a[i] + b[i]
|
||||
func x25519(dst *[32]byte, scalar, point []byte) ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
var in [32]byte
|
||||
if l := len(scalar); l != 32 {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("bad scalar length: %d, expected %d", l, 32)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func feSub(dst, a, b *fieldElement) {
|
||||
for i := range dst {
|
||||
dst[i] = a[i] - b[i]
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func feCopy(dst, src *fieldElement) {
|
||||
for i := range dst {
|
||||
dst[i] = src[i]
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// feCSwap replaces (f,g) with (g,f) if b == 1; replaces (f,g) with (f,g) if b == 0.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Preconditions: b in {0,1}.
|
||||
func feCSwap(f, g *fieldElement, b int32) {
|
||||
b = -b
|
||||
for i := range f {
|
||||
t := b & (f[i] ^ g[i])
|
||||
f[i] ^= t
|
||||
g[i] ^= t
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// load3 reads a 24-bit, little-endian value from in.
|
||||
func load3(in []byte) int64 {
|
||||
var r int64
|
||||
r = int64(in[0])
|
||||
r |= int64(in[1]) << 8
|
||||
r |= int64(in[2]) << 16
|
||||
return r
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// load4 reads a 32-bit, little-endian value from in.
|
||||
func load4(in []byte) int64 {
|
||||
return int64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(in))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func feFromBytes(dst *fieldElement, src *[32]byte) {
|
||||
h0 := load4(src[:])
|
||||
h1 := load3(src[4:]) << 6
|
||||
h2 := load3(src[7:]) << 5
|
||||
h3 := load3(src[10:]) << 3
|
||||
h4 := load3(src[13:]) << 2
|
||||
h5 := load4(src[16:])
|
||||
h6 := load3(src[20:]) << 7
|
||||
h7 := load3(src[23:]) << 5
|
||||
h8 := load3(src[26:]) << 4
|
||||
h9 := (load3(src[29:]) & 0x7fffff) << 2
|
||||
|
||||
var carry [10]int64
|
||||
carry[9] = (h9 + 1<<24) >> 25
|
||||
h0 += carry[9] * 19
|
||||
h9 -= carry[9] << 25
|
||||
carry[1] = (h1 + 1<<24) >> 25
|
||||
h2 += carry[1]
|
||||
h1 -= carry[1] << 25
|
||||
carry[3] = (h3 + 1<<24) >> 25
|
||||
h4 += carry[3]
|
||||
h3 -= carry[3] << 25
|
||||
carry[5] = (h5 + 1<<24) >> 25
|
||||
h6 += carry[5]
|
||||
h5 -= carry[5] << 25
|
||||
carry[7] = (h7 + 1<<24) >> 25
|
||||
h8 += carry[7]
|
||||
h7 -= carry[7] << 25
|
||||
|
||||
carry[0] = (h0 + 1<<25) >> 26
|
||||
h1 += carry[0]
|
||||
h0 -= carry[0] << 26
|
||||
carry[2] = (h2 + 1<<25) >> 26
|
||||
h3 += carry[2]
|
||||
h2 -= carry[2] << 26
|
||||
carry[4] = (h4 + 1<<25) >> 26
|
||||
h5 += carry[4]
|
||||
h4 -= carry[4] << 26
|
||||
carry[6] = (h6 + 1<<25) >> 26
|
||||
h7 += carry[6]
|
||||
h6 -= carry[6] << 26
|
||||
carry[8] = (h8 + 1<<25) >> 26
|
||||
h9 += carry[8]
|
||||
h8 -= carry[8] << 26
|
||||
|
||||
dst[0] = int32(h0)
|
||||
dst[1] = int32(h1)
|
||||
dst[2] = int32(h2)
|
||||
dst[3] = int32(h3)
|
||||
dst[4] = int32(h4)
|
||||
dst[5] = int32(h5)
|
||||
dst[6] = int32(h6)
|
||||
dst[7] = int32(h7)
|
||||
dst[8] = int32(h8)
|
||||
dst[9] = int32(h9)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// feToBytes marshals h to s.
|
||||
// Preconditions:
|
||||
// |h| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Write p=2^255-19; q=floor(h/p).
|
||||
// Basic claim: q = floor(2^(-255)(h + 19 2^(-25)h9 + 2^(-1))).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Proof:
|
||||
// Have |h|<=p so |q|<=1 so |19^2 2^(-255) q|<1/4.
|
||||
// Also have |h-2^230 h9|<2^230 so |19 2^(-255)(h-2^230 h9)|<1/4.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Write y=2^(-1)-19^2 2^(-255)q-19 2^(-255)(h-2^230 h9).
|
||||
// Then 0<y<1.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Write r=h-pq.
|
||||
// Have 0<=r<=p-1=2^255-20.
|
||||
// Thus 0<=r+19(2^-255)r<r+19(2^-255)2^255<=2^255-1.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Write x=r+19(2^-255)r+y.
|
||||
// Then 0<x<2^255 so floor(2^(-255)x) = 0 so floor(q+2^(-255)x) = q.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Have q+2^(-255)x = 2^(-255)(h + 19 2^(-25) h9 + 2^(-1))
|
||||
// so floor(2^(-255)(h + 19 2^(-25) h9 + 2^(-1))) = q.
|
||||
func feToBytes(s *[32]byte, h *fieldElement) {
|
||||
var carry [10]int32
|
||||
|
||||
q := (19*h[9] + (1 << 24)) >> 25
|
||||
q = (h[0] + q) >> 26
|
||||
q = (h[1] + q) >> 25
|
||||
q = (h[2] + q) >> 26
|
||||
q = (h[3] + q) >> 25
|
||||
q = (h[4] + q) >> 26
|
||||
q = (h[5] + q) >> 25
|
||||
q = (h[6] + q) >> 26
|
||||
q = (h[7] + q) >> 25
|
||||
q = (h[8] + q) >> 26
|
||||
q = (h[9] + q) >> 25
|
||||
|
||||
// Goal: Output h-(2^255-19)q, which is between 0 and 2^255-20.
|
||||
h[0] += 19 * q
|
||||
// Goal: Output h-2^255 q, which is between 0 and 2^255-20.
|
||||
|
||||
carry[0] = h[0] >> 26
|
||||
h[1] += carry[0]
|
||||
h[0] -= carry[0] << 26
|
||||
carry[1] = h[1] >> 25
|
||||
h[2] += carry[1]
|
||||
h[1] -= carry[1] << 25
|
||||
carry[2] = h[2] >> 26
|
||||
h[3] += carry[2]
|
||||
h[2] -= carry[2] << 26
|
||||
carry[3] = h[3] >> 25
|
||||
h[4] += carry[3]
|
||||
h[3] -= carry[3] << 25
|
||||
carry[4] = h[4] >> 26
|
||||
h[5] += carry[4]
|
||||
h[4] -= carry[4] << 26
|
||||
carry[5] = h[5] >> 25
|
||||
h[6] += carry[5]
|
||||
h[5] -= carry[5] << 25
|
||||
carry[6] = h[6] >> 26
|
||||
h[7] += carry[6]
|
||||
h[6] -= carry[6] << 26
|
||||
carry[7] = h[7] >> 25
|
||||
h[8] += carry[7]
|
||||
h[7] -= carry[7] << 25
|
||||
carry[8] = h[8] >> 26
|
||||
h[9] += carry[8]
|
||||
h[8] -= carry[8] << 26
|
||||
carry[9] = h[9] >> 25
|
||||
h[9] -= carry[9] << 25
|
||||
// h10 = carry9
|
||||
|
||||
// Goal: Output h[0]+...+2^255 h10-2^255 q, which is between 0 and 2^255-20.
|
||||
// Have h[0]+...+2^230 h[9] between 0 and 2^255-1;
|
||||
// evidently 2^255 h10-2^255 q = 0.
|
||||
// Goal: Output h[0]+...+2^230 h[9].
|
||||
|
||||
s[0] = byte(h[0] >> 0)
|
||||
s[1] = byte(h[0] >> 8)
|
||||
s[2] = byte(h[0] >> 16)
|
||||
s[3] = byte((h[0] >> 24) | (h[1] << 2))
|
||||
s[4] = byte(h[1] >> 6)
|
||||
s[5] = byte(h[1] >> 14)
|
||||
s[6] = byte((h[1] >> 22) | (h[2] << 3))
|
||||
s[7] = byte(h[2] >> 5)
|
||||
s[8] = byte(h[2] >> 13)
|
||||
s[9] = byte((h[2] >> 21) | (h[3] << 5))
|
||||
s[10] = byte(h[3] >> 3)
|
||||
s[11] = byte(h[3] >> 11)
|
||||
s[12] = byte((h[3] >> 19) | (h[4] << 6))
|
||||
s[13] = byte(h[4] >> 2)
|
||||
s[14] = byte(h[4] >> 10)
|
||||
s[15] = byte(h[4] >> 18)
|
||||
s[16] = byte(h[5] >> 0)
|
||||
s[17] = byte(h[5] >> 8)
|
||||
s[18] = byte(h[5] >> 16)
|
||||
s[19] = byte((h[5] >> 24) | (h[6] << 1))
|
||||
s[20] = byte(h[6] >> 7)
|
||||
s[21] = byte(h[6] >> 15)
|
||||
s[22] = byte((h[6] >> 23) | (h[7] << 3))
|
||||
s[23] = byte(h[7] >> 5)
|
||||
s[24] = byte(h[7] >> 13)
|
||||
s[25] = byte((h[7] >> 21) | (h[8] << 4))
|
||||
s[26] = byte(h[8] >> 4)
|
||||
s[27] = byte(h[8] >> 12)
|
||||
s[28] = byte((h[8] >> 20) | (h[9] << 6))
|
||||
s[29] = byte(h[9] >> 2)
|
||||
s[30] = byte(h[9] >> 10)
|
||||
s[31] = byte(h[9] >> 18)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// feMul calculates h = f * g
|
||||
// Can overlap h with f or g.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Preconditions:
|
||||
// |f| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc.
|
||||
// |g| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Postconditions:
|
||||
// |h| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Notes on implementation strategy:
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Using schoolbook multiplication.
|
||||
// Karatsuba would save a little in some cost models.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Most multiplications by 2 and 19 are 32-bit precomputations;
|
||||
// cheaper than 64-bit postcomputations.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// There is one remaining multiplication by 19 in the carry chain;
|
||||
// one *19 precomputation can be merged into this,
|
||||
// but the resulting data flow is considerably less clean.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// There are 12 carries below.
|
||||
// 10 of them are 2-way parallelizable and vectorizable.
|
||||
// Can get away with 11 carries, but then data flow is much deeper.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// With tighter constraints on inputs can squeeze carries into int32.
|
||||
func feMul(h, f, g *fieldElement) {
|
||||
f0 := f[0]
|
||||
f1 := f[1]
|
||||
f2 := f[2]
|
||||
f3 := f[3]
|
||||
f4 := f[4]
|
||||
f5 := f[5]
|
||||
f6 := f[6]
|
||||
f7 := f[7]
|
||||
f8 := f[8]
|
||||
f9 := f[9]
|
||||
g0 := g[0]
|
||||
g1 := g[1]
|
||||
g2 := g[2]
|
||||
g3 := g[3]
|
||||
g4 := g[4]
|
||||
g5 := g[5]
|
||||
g6 := g[6]
|
||||
g7 := g[7]
|
||||
g8 := g[8]
|
||||
g9 := g[9]
|
||||
g1_19 := 19 * g1 // 1.4*2^29
|
||||
g2_19 := 19 * g2 // 1.4*2^30; still ok
|
||||
g3_19 := 19 * g3
|
||||
g4_19 := 19 * g4
|
||||
g5_19 := 19 * g5
|
||||
g6_19 := 19 * g6
|
||||
g7_19 := 19 * g7
|
||||
g8_19 := 19 * g8
|
||||
g9_19 := 19 * g9
|
||||
f1_2 := 2 * f1
|
||||
f3_2 := 2 * f3
|
||||
f5_2 := 2 * f5
|
||||
f7_2 := 2 * f7
|
||||
f9_2 := 2 * f9
|
||||
f0g0 := int64(f0) * int64(g0)
|
||||
f0g1 := int64(f0) * int64(g1)
|
||||
f0g2 := int64(f0) * int64(g2)
|
||||
f0g3 := int64(f0) * int64(g3)
|
||||
f0g4 := int64(f0) * int64(g4)
|
||||
f0g5 := int64(f0) * int64(g5)
|
||||
f0g6 := int64(f0) * int64(g6)
|
||||
f0g7 := int64(f0) * int64(g7)
|
||||
f0g8 := int64(f0) * int64(g8)
|
||||
f0g9 := int64(f0) * int64(g9)
|
||||
f1g0 := int64(f1) * int64(g0)
|
||||
f1g1_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(g1)
|
||||
f1g2 := int64(f1) * int64(g2)
|
||||
f1g3_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(g3)
|
||||
f1g4 := int64(f1) * int64(g4)
|
||||
f1g5_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(g5)
|
||||
f1g6 := int64(f1) * int64(g6)
|
||||
f1g7_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(g7)
|
||||
f1g8 := int64(f1) * int64(g8)
|
||||
f1g9_38 := int64(f1_2) * int64(g9_19)
|
||||
f2g0 := int64(f2) * int64(g0)
|
||||
f2g1 := int64(f2) * int64(g1)
|
||||
f2g2 := int64(f2) * int64(g2)
|
||||
f2g3 := int64(f2) * int64(g3)
|
||||
f2g4 := int64(f2) * int64(g4)
|
||||
f2g5 := int64(f2) * int64(g5)
|
||||
f2g6 := int64(f2) * int64(g6)
|
||||
f2g7 := int64(f2) * int64(g7)
|
||||
f2g8_19 := int64(f2) * int64(g8_19)
|
||||
f2g9_19 := int64(f2) * int64(g9_19)
|
||||
f3g0 := int64(f3) * int64(g0)
|
||||
f3g1_2 := int64(f3_2) * int64(g1)
|
||||
f3g2 := int64(f3) * int64(g2)
|
||||
f3g3_2 := int64(f3_2) * int64(g3)
|
||||
f3g4 := int64(f3) * int64(g4)
|
||||
f3g5_2 := int64(f3_2) * int64(g5)
|
||||
f3g6 := int64(f3) * int64(g6)
|
||||
f3g7_38 := int64(f3_2) * int64(g7_19)
|
||||
f3g8_19 := int64(f3) * int64(g8_19)
|
||||
f3g9_38 := int64(f3_2) * int64(g9_19)
|
||||
f4g0 := int64(f4) * int64(g0)
|
||||
f4g1 := int64(f4) * int64(g1)
|
||||
f4g2 := int64(f4) * int64(g2)
|
||||
f4g3 := int64(f4) * int64(g3)
|
||||
f4g4 := int64(f4) * int64(g4)
|
||||
f4g5 := int64(f4) * int64(g5)
|
||||
f4g6_19 := int64(f4) * int64(g6_19)
|
||||
f4g7_19 := int64(f4) * int64(g7_19)
|
||||
f4g8_19 := int64(f4) * int64(g8_19)
|
||||
f4g9_19 := int64(f4) * int64(g9_19)
|
||||
f5g0 := int64(f5) * int64(g0)
|
||||
f5g1_2 := int64(f5_2) * int64(g1)
|
||||
f5g2 := int64(f5) * int64(g2)
|
||||
f5g3_2 := int64(f5_2) * int64(g3)
|
||||
f5g4 := int64(f5) * int64(g4)
|
||||
f5g5_38 := int64(f5_2) * int64(g5_19)
|
||||
f5g6_19 := int64(f5) * int64(g6_19)
|
||||
f5g7_38 := int64(f5_2) * int64(g7_19)
|
||||
f5g8_19 := int64(f5) * int64(g8_19)
|
||||
f5g9_38 := int64(f5_2) * int64(g9_19)
|
||||
f6g0 := int64(f6) * int64(g0)
|
||||
f6g1 := int64(f6) * int64(g1)
|
||||
f6g2 := int64(f6) * int64(g2)
|
||||
f6g3 := int64(f6) * int64(g3)
|
||||
f6g4_19 := int64(f6) * int64(g4_19)
|
||||
f6g5_19 := int64(f6) * int64(g5_19)
|
||||
f6g6_19 := int64(f6) * int64(g6_19)
|
||||
f6g7_19 := int64(f6) * int64(g7_19)
|
||||
f6g8_19 := int64(f6) * int64(g8_19)
|
||||
f6g9_19 := int64(f6) * int64(g9_19)
|
||||
f7g0 := int64(f7) * int64(g0)
|
||||
f7g1_2 := int64(f7_2) * int64(g1)
|
||||
f7g2 := int64(f7) * int64(g2)
|
||||
f7g3_38 := int64(f7_2) * int64(g3_19)
|
||||
f7g4_19 := int64(f7) * int64(g4_19)
|
||||
f7g5_38 := int64(f7_2) * int64(g5_19)
|
||||
f7g6_19 := int64(f7) * int64(g6_19)
|
||||
f7g7_38 := int64(f7_2) * int64(g7_19)
|
||||
f7g8_19 := int64(f7) * int64(g8_19)
|
||||
f7g9_38 := int64(f7_2) * int64(g9_19)
|
||||
f8g0 := int64(f8) * int64(g0)
|
||||
f8g1 := int64(f8) * int64(g1)
|
||||
f8g2_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g2_19)
|
||||
f8g3_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g3_19)
|
||||
f8g4_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g4_19)
|
||||
f8g5_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g5_19)
|
||||
f8g6_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g6_19)
|
||||
f8g7_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g7_19)
|
||||
f8g8_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g8_19)
|
||||
f8g9_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g9_19)
|
||||
f9g0 := int64(f9) * int64(g0)
|
||||
f9g1_38 := int64(f9_2) * int64(g1_19)
|
||||
f9g2_19 := int64(f9) * int64(g2_19)
|
||||
f9g3_38 := int64(f9_2) * int64(g3_19)
|
||||
f9g4_19 := int64(f9) * int64(g4_19)
|
||||
f9g5_38 := int64(f9_2) * int64(g5_19)
|
||||
f9g6_19 := int64(f9) * int64(g6_19)
|
||||
f9g7_38 := int64(f9_2) * int64(g7_19)
|
||||
f9g8_19 := int64(f9) * int64(g8_19)
|
||||
f9g9_38 := int64(f9_2) * int64(g9_19)
|
||||
h0 := f0g0 + f1g9_38 + f2g8_19 + f3g7_38 + f4g6_19 + f5g5_38 + f6g4_19 + f7g3_38 + f8g2_19 + f9g1_38
|
||||
h1 := f0g1 + f1g0 + f2g9_19 + f3g8_19 + f4g7_19 + f5g6_19 + f6g5_19 + f7g4_19 + f8g3_19 + f9g2_19
|
||||
h2 := f0g2 + f1g1_2 + f2g0 + f3g9_38 + f4g8_19 + f5g7_38 + f6g6_19 + f7g5_38 + f8g4_19 + f9g3_38
|
||||
h3 := f0g3 + f1g2 + f2g1 + f3g0 + f4g9_19 + f5g8_19 + f6g7_19 + f7g6_19 + f8g5_19 + f9g4_19
|
||||
h4 := f0g4 + f1g3_2 + f2g2 + f3g1_2 + f4g0 + f5g9_38 + f6g8_19 + f7g7_38 + f8g6_19 + f9g5_38
|
||||
h5 := f0g5 + f1g4 + f2g3 + f3g2 + f4g1 + f5g0 + f6g9_19 + f7g8_19 + f8g7_19 + f9g6_19
|
||||
h6 := f0g6 + f1g5_2 + f2g4 + f3g3_2 + f4g2 + f5g1_2 + f6g0 + f7g9_38 + f8g8_19 + f9g7_38
|
||||
h7 := f0g7 + f1g6 + f2g5 + f3g4 + f4g3 + f5g2 + f6g1 + f7g0 + f8g9_19 + f9g8_19
|
||||
h8 := f0g8 + f1g7_2 + f2g6 + f3g5_2 + f4g4 + f5g3_2 + f6g2 + f7g1_2 + f8g0 + f9g9_38
|
||||
h9 := f0g9 + f1g8 + f2g7 + f3g6 + f4g5 + f5g4 + f6g3 + f7g2 + f8g1 + f9g0
|
||||
var carry [10]int64
|
||||
|
||||
// |h0| <= (1.1*1.1*2^52*(1+19+19+19+19)+1.1*1.1*2^50*(38+38+38+38+38))
|
||||
// i.e. |h0| <= 1.2*2^59; narrower ranges for h2, h4, h6, h8
|
||||
// |h1| <= (1.1*1.1*2^51*(1+1+19+19+19+19+19+19+19+19))
|
||||
// i.e. |h1| <= 1.5*2^58; narrower ranges for h3, h5, h7, h9
|
||||
|
||||
carry[0] = (h0 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
|
||||
h1 += carry[0]
|
||||
h0 -= carry[0] << 26
|
||||
carry[4] = (h4 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
|
||||
h5 += carry[4]
|
||||
h4 -= carry[4] << 26
|
||||
// |h0| <= 2^25
|
||||
// |h4| <= 2^25
|
||||
// |h1| <= 1.51*2^58
|
||||
// |h5| <= 1.51*2^58
|
||||
|
||||
carry[1] = (h1 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
|
||||
h2 += carry[1]
|
||||
h1 -= carry[1] << 25
|
||||
carry[5] = (h5 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
|
||||
h6 += carry[5]
|
||||
h5 -= carry[5] << 25
|
||||
// |h1| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32
|
||||
// |h5| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32
|
||||
// |h2| <= 1.21*2^59
|
||||
// |h6| <= 1.21*2^59
|
||||
|
||||
carry[2] = (h2 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
|
||||
h3 += carry[2]
|
||||
h2 -= carry[2] << 26
|
||||
carry[6] = (h6 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
|
||||
h7 += carry[6]
|
||||
h6 -= carry[6] << 26
|
||||
// |h2| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged
|
||||
// |h6| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged
|
||||
// |h3| <= 1.51*2^58
|
||||
// |h7| <= 1.51*2^58
|
||||
|
||||
carry[3] = (h3 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
|
||||
h4 += carry[3]
|
||||
h3 -= carry[3] << 25
|
||||
carry[7] = (h7 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
|
||||
h8 += carry[7]
|
||||
h7 -= carry[7] << 25
|
||||
// |h3| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 unchanged
|
||||
// |h7| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 unchanged
|
||||
// |h4| <= 1.52*2^33
|
||||
// |h8| <= 1.52*2^33
|
||||
|
||||
carry[4] = (h4 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
|
||||
h5 += carry[4]
|
||||
h4 -= carry[4] << 26
|
||||
carry[8] = (h8 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
|
||||
h9 += carry[8]
|
||||
h8 -= carry[8] << 26
|
||||
// |h4| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged
|
||||
// |h8| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged
|
||||
// |h5| <= 1.01*2^24
|
||||
// |h9| <= 1.51*2^58
|
||||
|
||||
carry[9] = (h9 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
|
||||
h0 += carry[9] * 19
|
||||
h9 -= carry[9] << 25
|
||||
// |h9| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 unchanged
|
||||
// |h0| <= 1.8*2^37
|
||||
|
||||
carry[0] = (h0 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
|
||||
h1 += carry[0]
|
||||
h0 -= carry[0] << 26
|
||||
// |h0| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged
|
||||
// |h1| <= 1.01*2^24
|
||||
|
||||
h[0] = int32(h0)
|
||||
h[1] = int32(h1)
|
||||
h[2] = int32(h2)
|
||||
h[3] = int32(h3)
|
||||
h[4] = int32(h4)
|
||||
h[5] = int32(h5)
|
||||
h[6] = int32(h6)
|
||||
h[7] = int32(h7)
|
||||
h[8] = int32(h8)
|
||||
h[9] = int32(h9)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// feSquare calculates h = f*f. Can overlap h with f.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Preconditions:
|
||||
// |f| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Postconditions:
|
||||
// |h| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc.
|
||||
func feSquare(h, f *fieldElement) {
|
||||
f0 := f[0]
|
||||
f1 := f[1]
|
||||
f2 := f[2]
|
||||
f3 := f[3]
|
||||
f4 := f[4]
|
||||
f5 := f[5]
|
||||
f6 := f[6]
|
||||
f7 := f[7]
|
||||
f8 := f[8]
|
||||
f9 := f[9]
|
||||
f0_2 := 2 * f0
|
||||
f1_2 := 2 * f1
|
||||
f2_2 := 2 * f2
|
||||
f3_2 := 2 * f3
|
||||
f4_2 := 2 * f4
|
||||
f5_2 := 2 * f5
|
||||
f6_2 := 2 * f6
|
||||
f7_2 := 2 * f7
|
||||
f5_38 := 38 * f5 // 1.31*2^30
|
||||
f6_19 := 19 * f6 // 1.31*2^30
|
||||
f7_38 := 38 * f7 // 1.31*2^30
|
||||
f8_19 := 19 * f8 // 1.31*2^30
|
||||
f9_38 := 38 * f9 // 1.31*2^30
|
||||
f0f0 := int64(f0) * int64(f0)
|
||||
f0f1_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f1)
|
||||
f0f2_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f2)
|
||||
f0f3_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f3)
|
||||
f0f4_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f4)
|
||||
f0f5_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f5)
|
||||
f0f6_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f6)
|
||||
f0f7_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f7)
|
||||
f0f8_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f8)
|
||||
f0f9_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f9)
|
||||
f1f1_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f1)
|
||||
f1f2_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f2)
|
||||
f1f3_4 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f3_2)
|
||||
f1f4_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f4)
|
||||
f1f5_4 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f5_2)
|
||||
f1f6_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f6)
|
||||
f1f7_4 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f7_2)
|
||||
f1f8_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f8)
|
||||
f1f9_76 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f9_38)
|
||||
f2f2 := int64(f2) * int64(f2)
|
||||
f2f3_2 := int64(f2_2) * int64(f3)
|
||||
f2f4_2 := int64(f2_2) * int64(f4)
|
||||
f2f5_2 := int64(f2_2) * int64(f5)
|
||||
f2f6_2 := int64(f2_2) * int64(f6)
|
||||
f2f7_2 := int64(f2_2) * int64(f7)
|
||||
f2f8_38 := int64(f2_2) * int64(f8_19)
|
||||
f2f9_38 := int64(f2) * int64(f9_38)
|
||||
f3f3_2 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f3)
|
||||
f3f4_2 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f4)
|
||||
f3f5_4 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f5_2)
|
||||
f3f6_2 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f6)
|
||||
f3f7_76 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f7_38)
|
||||
f3f8_38 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f8_19)
|
||||
f3f9_76 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f9_38)
|
||||
f4f4 := int64(f4) * int64(f4)
|
||||
f4f5_2 := int64(f4_2) * int64(f5)
|
||||
f4f6_38 := int64(f4_2) * int64(f6_19)
|
||||
f4f7_38 := int64(f4) * int64(f7_38)
|
||||
f4f8_38 := int64(f4_2) * int64(f8_19)
|
||||
f4f9_38 := int64(f4) * int64(f9_38)
|
||||
f5f5_38 := int64(f5) * int64(f5_38)
|
||||
f5f6_38 := int64(f5_2) * int64(f6_19)
|
||||
f5f7_76 := int64(f5_2) * int64(f7_38)
|
||||
f5f8_38 := int64(f5_2) * int64(f8_19)
|
||||
f5f9_76 := int64(f5_2) * int64(f9_38)
|
||||
f6f6_19 := int64(f6) * int64(f6_19)
|
||||
f6f7_38 := int64(f6) * int64(f7_38)
|
||||
f6f8_38 := int64(f6_2) * int64(f8_19)
|
||||
f6f9_38 := int64(f6) * int64(f9_38)
|
||||
f7f7_38 := int64(f7) * int64(f7_38)
|
||||
f7f8_38 := int64(f7_2) * int64(f8_19)
|
||||
f7f9_76 := int64(f7_2) * int64(f9_38)
|
||||
f8f8_19 := int64(f8) * int64(f8_19)
|
||||
f8f9_38 := int64(f8) * int64(f9_38)
|
||||
f9f9_38 := int64(f9) * int64(f9_38)
|
||||
h0 := f0f0 + f1f9_76 + f2f8_38 + f3f7_76 + f4f6_38 + f5f5_38
|
||||
h1 := f0f1_2 + f2f9_38 + f3f8_38 + f4f7_38 + f5f6_38
|
||||
h2 := f0f2_2 + f1f1_2 + f3f9_76 + f4f8_38 + f5f7_76 + f6f6_19
|
||||
h3 := f0f3_2 + f1f2_2 + f4f9_38 + f5f8_38 + f6f7_38
|
||||
h4 := f0f4_2 + f1f3_4 + f2f2 + f5f9_76 + f6f8_38 + f7f7_38
|
||||
h5 := f0f5_2 + f1f4_2 + f2f3_2 + f6f9_38 + f7f8_38
|
||||
h6 := f0f6_2 + f1f5_4 + f2f4_2 + f3f3_2 + f7f9_76 + f8f8_19
|
||||
h7 := f0f7_2 + f1f6_2 + f2f5_2 + f3f4_2 + f8f9_38
|
||||
h8 := f0f8_2 + f1f7_4 + f2f6_2 + f3f5_4 + f4f4 + f9f9_38
|
||||
h9 := f0f9_2 + f1f8_2 + f2f7_2 + f3f6_2 + f4f5_2
|
||||
var carry [10]int64
|
||||
|
||||
carry[0] = (h0 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
|
||||
h1 += carry[0]
|
||||
h0 -= carry[0] << 26
|
||||
carry[4] = (h4 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
|
||||
h5 += carry[4]
|
||||
h4 -= carry[4] << 26
|
||||
|
||||
carry[1] = (h1 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
|
||||
h2 += carry[1]
|
||||
h1 -= carry[1] << 25
|
||||
carry[5] = (h5 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
|
||||
h6 += carry[5]
|
||||
h5 -= carry[5] << 25
|
||||
|
||||
carry[2] = (h2 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
|
||||
h3 += carry[2]
|
||||
h2 -= carry[2] << 26
|
||||
carry[6] = (h6 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
|
||||
h7 += carry[6]
|
||||
h6 -= carry[6] << 26
|
||||
|
||||
carry[3] = (h3 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
|
||||
h4 += carry[3]
|
||||
h3 -= carry[3] << 25
|
||||
carry[7] = (h7 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
|
||||
h8 += carry[7]
|
||||
h7 -= carry[7] << 25
|
||||
|
||||
carry[4] = (h4 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
|
||||
h5 += carry[4]
|
||||
h4 -= carry[4] << 26
|
||||
carry[8] = (h8 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
|
||||
h9 += carry[8]
|
||||
h8 -= carry[8] << 26
|
||||
|
||||
carry[9] = (h9 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
|
||||
h0 += carry[9] * 19
|
||||
h9 -= carry[9] << 25
|
||||
|
||||
carry[0] = (h0 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
|
||||
h1 += carry[0]
|
||||
h0 -= carry[0] << 26
|
||||
|
||||
h[0] = int32(h0)
|
||||
h[1] = int32(h1)
|
||||
h[2] = int32(h2)
|
||||
h[3] = int32(h3)
|
||||
h[4] = int32(h4)
|
||||
h[5] = int32(h5)
|
||||
h[6] = int32(h6)
|
||||
h[7] = int32(h7)
|
||||
h[8] = int32(h8)
|
||||
h[9] = int32(h9)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// feMul121666 calculates h = f * 121666. Can overlap h with f.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Preconditions:
|
||||
// |f| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Postconditions:
|
||||
// |h| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc.
|
||||
func feMul121666(h, f *fieldElement) {
|
||||
h0 := int64(f[0]) * 121666
|
||||
h1 := int64(f[1]) * 121666
|
||||
h2 := int64(f[2]) * 121666
|
||||
h3 := int64(f[3]) * 121666
|
||||
h4 := int64(f[4]) * 121666
|
||||
h5 := int64(f[5]) * 121666
|
||||
h6 := int64(f[6]) * 121666
|
||||
h7 := int64(f[7]) * 121666
|
||||
h8 := int64(f[8]) * 121666
|
||||
h9 := int64(f[9]) * 121666
|
||||
var carry [10]int64
|
||||
|
||||
carry[9] = (h9 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
|
||||
h0 += carry[9] * 19
|
||||
h9 -= carry[9] << 25
|
||||
carry[1] = (h1 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
|
||||
h2 += carry[1]
|
||||
h1 -= carry[1] << 25
|
||||
carry[3] = (h3 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
|
||||
h4 += carry[3]
|
||||
h3 -= carry[3] << 25
|
||||
carry[5] = (h5 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
|
||||
h6 += carry[5]
|
||||
h5 -= carry[5] << 25
|
||||
carry[7] = (h7 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
|
||||
h8 += carry[7]
|
||||
h7 -= carry[7] << 25
|
||||
|
||||
carry[0] = (h0 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
|
||||
h1 += carry[0]
|
||||
h0 -= carry[0] << 26
|
||||
carry[2] = (h2 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
|
||||
h3 += carry[2]
|
||||
h2 -= carry[2] << 26
|
||||
carry[4] = (h4 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
|
||||
h5 += carry[4]
|
||||
h4 -= carry[4] << 26
|
||||
carry[6] = (h6 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
|
||||
h7 += carry[6]
|
||||
h6 -= carry[6] << 26
|
||||
carry[8] = (h8 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
|
||||
h9 += carry[8]
|
||||
h8 -= carry[8] << 26
|
||||
|
||||
h[0] = int32(h0)
|
||||
h[1] = int32(h1)
|
||||
h[2] = int32(h2)
|
||||
h[3] = int32(h3)
|
||||
h[4] = int32(h4)
|
||||
h[5] = int32(h5)
|
||||
h[6] = int32(h6)
|
||||
h[7] = int32(h7)
|
||||
h[8] = int32(h8)
|
||||
h[9] = int32(h9)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// feInvert sets out = z^-1.
|
||||
func feInvert(out, z *fieldElement) {
|
||||
var t0, t1, t2, t3 fieldElement
|
||||
var i int
|
||||
|
||||
feSquare(&t0, z)
|
||||
for i = 1; i < 1; i++ {
|
||||
feSquare(&t0, &t0)
|
||||
}
|
||||
feSquare(&t1, &t0)
|
||||
for i = 1; i < 2; i++ {
|
||||
feSquare(&t1, &t1)
|
||||
}
|
||||
feMul(&t1, z, &t1)
|
||||
feMul(&t0, &t0, &t1)
|
||||
feSquare(&t2, &t0)
|
||||
for i = 1; i < 1; i++ {
|
||||
feSquare(&t2, &t2)
|
||||
}
|
||||
feMul(&t1, &t1, &t2)
|
||||
feSquare(&t2, &t1)
|
||||
for i = 1; i < 5; i++ {
|
||||
feSquare(&t2, &t2)
|
||||
}
|
||||
feMul(&t1, &t2, &t1)
|
||||
feSquare(&t2, &t1)
|
||||
for i = 1; i < 10; i++ {
|
||||
feSquare(&t2, &t2)
|
||||
}
|
||||
feMul(&t2, &t2, &t1)
|
||||
feSquare(&t3, &t2)
|
||||
for i = 1; i < 20; i++ {
|
||||
feSquare(&t3, &t3)
|
||||
}
|
||||
feMul(&t2, &t3, &t2)
|
||||
feSquare(&t2, &t2)
|
||||
for i = 1; i < 10; i++ {
|
||||
feSquare(&t2, &t2)
|
||||
}
|
||||
feMul(&t1, &t2, &t1)
|
||||
feSquare(&t2, &t1)
|
||||
for i = 1; i < 50; i++ {
|
||||
feSquare(&t2, &t2)
|
||||
}
|
||||
feMul(&t2, &t2, &t1)
|
||||
feSquare(&t3, &t2)
|
||||
for i = 1; i < 100; i++ {
|
||||
feSquare(&t3, &t3)
|
||||
}
|
||||
feMul(&t2, &t3, &t2)
|
||||
feSquare(&t2, &t2)
|
||||
for i = 1; i < 50; i++ {
|
||||
feSquare(&t2, &t2)
|
||||
}
|
||||
feMul(&t1, &t2, &t1)
|
||||
feSquare(&t1, &t1)
|
||||
for i = 1; i < 5; i++ {
|
||||
feSquare(&t1, &t1)
|
||||
}
|
||||
feMul(out, &t1, &t0)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func scalarMult(out, in, base *[32]byte) {
|
||||
var e [32]byte
|
||||
|
||||
copy(e[:], in[:])
|
||||
e[0] &= 248
|
||||
e[31] &= 127
|
||||
e[31] |= 64
|
||||
|
||||
var x1, x2, z2, x3, z3, tmp0, tmp1 fieldElement
|
||||
feFromBytes(&x1, base)
|
||||
feOne(&x2)
|
||||
feCopy(&x3, &x1)
|
||||
feOne(&z3)
|
||||
|
||||
swap := int32(0)
|
||||
for pos := 254; pos >= 0; pos-- {
|
||||
b := e[pos/8] >> uint(pos&7)
|
||||
b &= 1
|
||||
swap ^= int32(b)
|
||||
feCSwap(&x2, &x3, swap)
|
||||
feCSwap(&z2, &z3, swap)
|
||||
swap = int32(b)
|
||||
|
||||
feSub(&tmp0, &x3, &z3)
|
||||
feSub(&tmp1, &x2, &z2)
|
||||
feAdd(&x2, &x2, &z2)
|
||||
feAdd(&z2, &x3, &z3)
|
||||
feMul(&z3, &tmp0, &x2)
|
||||
feMul(&z2, &z2, &tmp1)
|
||||
feSquare(&tmp0, &tmp1)
|
||||
feSquare(&tmp1, &x2)
|
||||
feAdd(&x3, &z3, &z2)
|
||||
feSub(&z2, &z3, &z2)
|
||||
feMul(&x2, &tmp1, &tmp0)
|
||||
feSub(&tmp1, &tmp1, &tmp0)
|
||||
feSquare(&z2, &z2)
|
||||
feMul121666(&z3, &tmp1)
|
||||
feSquare(&x3, &x3)
|
||||
feAdd(&tmp0, &tmp0, &z3)
|
||||
feMul(&z3, &x1, &z2)
|
||||
feMul(&z2, &tmp1, &tmp0)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
feCSwap(&x2, &x3, swap)
|
||||
feCSwap(&z2, &z3, swap)
|
||||
|
||||
feInvert(&z2, &z2)
|
||||
feMul(&x2, &x2, &z2)
|
||||
feToBytes(out, &x2)
|
||||
if l := len(point); l != 32 {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("bad point length: %d, expected %d", l, 32)
|
||||
}
|
||||
copy(in[:], scalar)
|
||||
if &point[0] == &Basepoint[0] {
|
||||
checkBasepoint()
|
||||
ScalarBaseMult(dst, &in)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
var base, zero [32]byte
|
||||
copy(base[:], point)
|
||||
ScalarMult(dst, &in, &base)
|
||||
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(dst[:], zero[:]) == 1 {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("bad input point: low order point")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return dst[:], nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
|||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
// +build amd64,!gccgo,!appengine
|
||||
// +build amd64,!gccgo,!appengine,!purego
|
||||
|
||||
package curve25519
|
||||
|
|
@ -5,9 +5,84 @@
|
|||
// This code was translated into a form compatible with 6a from the public
|
||||
// domain sources in SUPERCOP: https://bench.cr.yp.to/supercop.html
|
||||
|
||||
// +build amd64,!gccgo,!appengine
|
||||
// +build amd64,!gccgo,!appengine,!purego
|
||||
|
||||
#include "const_amd64.h"
|
||||
#define REDMASK51 0x0007FFFFFFFFFFFF
|
||||
|
||||
// These constants cannot be encoded in non-MOVQ immediates.
|
||||
// We access them directly from memory instead.
|
||||
|
||||
DATA ·_121666_213(SB)/8, $996687872
|
||||
GLOBL ·_121666_213(SB), 8, $8
|
||||
|
||||
DATA ·_2P0(SB)/8, $0xFFFFFFFFFFFDA
|
||||
GLOBL ·_2P0(SB), 8, $8
|
||||
|
||||
DATA ·_2P1234(SB)/8, $0xFFFFFFFFFFFFE
|
||||
GLOBL ·_2P1234(SB), 8, $8
|
||||
|
||||
// func freeze(inout *[5]uint64)
|
||||
TEXT ·freeze(SB),7,$0-8
|
||||
MOVQ inout+0(FP), DI
|
||||
|
||||
MOVQ 0(DI),SI
|
||||
MOVQ 8(DI),DX
|
||||
MOVQ 16(DI),CX
|
||||
MOVQ 24(DI),R8
|
||||
MOVQ 32(DI),R9
|
||||
MOVQ $REDMASK51,AX
|
||||
MOVQ AX,R10
|
||||
SUBQ $18,R10
|
||||
MOVQ $3,R11
|
||||
REDUCELOOP:
|
||||
MOVQ SI,R12
|
||||
SHRQ $51,R12
|
||||
ANDQ AX,SI
|
||||
ADDQ R12,DX
|
||||
MOVQ DX,R12
|
||||
SHRQ $51,R12
|
||||
ANDQ AX,DX
|
||||
ADDQ R12,CX
|
||||
MOVQ CX,R12
|
||||
SHRQ $51,R12
|
||||
ANDQ AX,CX
|
||||
ADDQ R12,R8
|
||||
MOVQ R8,R12
|
||||
SHRQ $51,R12
|
||||
ANDQ AX,R8
|
||||
ADDQ R12,R9
|
||||
MOVQ R9,R12
|
||||
SHRQ $51,R12
|
||||
ANDQ AX,R9
|
||||
IMUL3Q $19,R12,R12
|
||||
ADDQ R12,SI
|
||||
SUBQ $1,R11
|
||||
JA REDUCELOOP
|
||||
MOVQ $1,R12
|
||||
CMPQ R10,SI
|
||||
CMOVQLT R11,R12
|
||||
CMPQ AX,DX
|
||||
CMOVQNE R11,R12
|
||||
CMPQ AX,CX
|
||||
CMOVQNE R11,R12
|
||||
CMPQ AX,R8
|
||||
CMOVQNE R11,R12
|
||||
CMPQ AX,R9
|
||||
CMOVQNE R11,R12
|
||||
NEGQ R12
|
||||
ANDQ R12,AX
|
||||
ANDQ R12,R10
|
||||
SUBQ R10,SI
|
||||
SUBQ AX,DX
|
||||
SUBQ AX,CX
|
||||
SUBQ AX,R8
|
||||
SUBQ AX,R9
|
||||
MOVQ SI,0(DI)
|
||||
MOVQ DX,8(DI)
|
||||
MOVQ CX,16(DI)
|
||||
MOVQ R8,24(DI)
|
||||
MOVQ R9,32(DI)
|
||||
RET
|
||||
|
||||
// func ladderstep(inout *[5][5]uint64)
|
||||
TEXT ·ladderstep(SB),0,$296-8
|
||||
|
@ -1375,3 +1450,344 @@ TEXT ·ladderstep(SB),0,$296-8
|
|||
MOVQ AX,104(DI)
|
||||
MOVQ R10,112(DI)
|
||||
RET
|
||||
|
||||
// func cswap(inout *[4][5]uint64, v uint64)
|
||||
TEXT ·cswap(SB),7,$0
|
||||
MOVQ inout+0(FP),DI
|
||||
MOVQ v+8(FP),SI
|
||||
|
||||
SUBQ $1, SI
|
||||
NOTQ SI
|
||||
MOVQ SI, X15
|
||||
PSHUFD $0x44, X15, X15
|
||||
|
||||
MOVOU 0(DI), X0
|
||||
MOVOU 16(DI), X2
|
||||
MOVOU 32(DI), X4
|
||||
MOVOU 48(DI), X6
|
||||
MOVOU 64(DI), X8
|
||||
MOVOU 80(DI), X1
|
||||
MOVOU 96(DI), X3
|
||||
MOVOU 112(DI), X5
|
||||
MOVOU 128(DI), X7
|
||||
MOVOU 144(DI), X9
|
||||
|
||||
MOVO X1, X10
|
||||
MOVO X3, X11
|
||||
MOVO X5, X12
|
||||
MOVO X7, X13
|
||||
MOVO X9, X14
|
||||
|
||||
PXOR X0, X10
|
||||
PXOR X2, X11
|
||||
PXOR X4, X12
|
||||
PXOR X6, X13
|
||||
PXOR X8, X14
|
||||
PAND X15, X10
|
||||
PAND X15, X11
|
||||
PAND X15, X12
|
||||
PAND X15, X13
|
||||
PAND X15, X14
|
||||
PXOR X10, X0
|
||||
PXOR X10, X1
|
||||
PXOR X11, X2
|
||||
PXOR X11, X3
|
||||
PXOR X12, X4
|
||||
PXOR X12, X5
|
||||
PXOR X13, X6
|
||||
PXOR X13, X7
|
||||
PXOR X14, X8
|
||||
PXOR X14, X9
|
||||
|
||||
MOVOU X0, 0(DI)
|
||||
MOVOU X2, 16(DI)
|
||||
MOVOU X4, 32(DI)
|
||||
MOVOU X6, 48(DI)
|
||||
MOVOU X8, 64(DI)
|
||||
MOVOU X1, 80(DI)
|
||||
MOVOU X3, 96(DI)
|
||||
MOVOU X5, 112(DI)
|
||||
MOVOU X7, 128(DI)
|
||||
MOVOU X9, 144(DI)
|
||||
RET
|
||||
|
||||
// func mul(dest, a, b *[5]uint64)
|
||||
TEXT ·mul(SB),0,$16-24
|
||||
MOVQ dest+0(FP), DI
|
||||
MOVQ a+8(FP), SI
|
||||
MOVQ b+16(FP), DX
|
||||
|
||||
MOVQ DX,CX
|
||||
MOVQ 24(SI),DX
|
||||
IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX
|
||||
MOVQ AX,0(SP)
|
||||
MULQ 16(CX)
|
||||
MOVQ AX,R8
|
||||
MOVQ DX,R9
|
||||
MOVQ 32(SI),DX
|
||||
IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX
|
||||
MOVQ AX,8(SP)
|
||||
MULQ 8(CX)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R8
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R9
|
||||
MOVQ 0(SI),AX
|
||||
MULQ 0(CX)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R8
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R9
|
||||
MOVQ 0(SI),AX
|
||||
MULQ 8(CX)
|
||||
MOVQ AX,R10
|
||||
MOVQ DX,R11
|
||||
MOVQ 0(SI),AX
|
||||
MULQ 16(CX)
|
||||
MOVQ AX,R12
|
||||
MOVQ DX,R13
|
||||
MOVQ 0(SI),AX
|
||||
MULQ 24(CX)
|
||||
MOVQ AX,R14
|
||||
MOVQ DX,R15
|
||||
MOVQ 0(SI),AX
|
||||
MULQ 32(CX)
|
||||
MOVQ AX,BX
|
||||
MOVQ DX,BP
|
||||
MOVQ 8(SI),AX
|
||||
MULQ 0(CX)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R10
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R11
|
||||
MOVQ 8(SI),AX
|
||||
MULQ 8(CX)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R12
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R13
|
||||
MOVQ 8(SI),AX
|
||||
MULQ 16(CX)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R14
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R15
|
||||
MOVQ 8(SI),AX
|
||||
MULQ 24(CX)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,BX
|
||||
ADCQ DX,BP
|
||||
MOVQ 8(SI),DX
|
||||
IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX
|
||||
MULQ 32(CX)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R8
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R9
|
||||
MOVQ 16(SI),AX
|
||||
MULQ 0(CX)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R12
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R13
|
||||
MOVQ 16(SI),AX
|
||||
MULQ 8(CX)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R14
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R15
|
||||
MOVQ 16(SI),AX
|
||||
MULQ 16(CX)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,BX
|
||||
ADCQ DX,BP
|
||||
MOVQ 16(SI),DX
|
||||
IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX
|
||||
MULQ 24(CX)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R8
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R9
|
||||
MOVQ 16(SI),DX
|
||||
IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX
|
||||
MULQ 32(CX)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R10
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R11
|
||||
MOVQ 24(SI),AX
|
||||
MULQ 0(CX)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R14
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R15
|
||||
MOVQ 24(SI),AX
|
||||
MULQ 8(CX)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,BX
|
||||
ADCQ DX,BP
|
||||
MOVQ 0(SP),AX
|
||||
MULQ 24(CX)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R10
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R11
|
||||
MOVQ 0(SP),AX
|
||||
MULQ 32(CX)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R12
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R13
|
||||
MOVQ 32(SI),AX
|
||||
MULQ 0(CX)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,BX
|
||||
ADCQ DX,BP
|
||||
MOVQ 8(SP),AX
|
||||
MULQ 16(CX)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R10
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R11
|
||||
MOVQ 8(SP),AX
|
||||
MULQ 24(CX)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R12
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R13
|
||||
MOVQ 8(SP),AX
|
||||
MULQ 32(CX)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R14
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R15
|
||||
MOVQ $REDMASK51,SI
|
||||
SHLQ $13,R8,R9
|
||||
ANDQ SI,R8
|
||||
SHLQ $13,R10,R11
|
||||
ANDQ SI,R10
|
||||
ADDQ R9,R10
|
||||
SHLQ $13,R12,R13
|
||||
ANDQ SI,R12
|
||||
ADDQ R11,R12
|
||||
SHLQ $13,R14,R15
|
||||
ANDQ SI,R14
|
||||
ADDQ R13,R14
|
||||
SHLQ $13,BX,BP
|
||||
ANDQ SI,BX
|
||||
ADDQ R15,BX
|
||||
IMUL3Q $19,BP,DX
|
||||
ADDQ DX,R8
|
||||
MOVQ R8,DX
|
||||
SHRQ $51,DX
|
||||
ADDQ R10,DX
|
||||
MOVQ DX,CX
|
||||
SHRQ $51,DX
|
||||
ANDQ SI,R8
|
||||
ADDQ R12,DX
|
||||
MOVQ DX,R9
|
||||
SHRQ $51,DX
|
||||
ANDQ SI,CX
|
||||
ADDQ R14,DX
|
||||
MOVQ DX,AX
|
||||
SHRQ $51,DX
|
||||
ANDQ SI,R9
|
||||
ADDQ BX,DX
|
||||
MOVQ DX,R10
|
||||
SHRQ $51,DX
|
||||
ANDQ SI,AX
|
||||
IMUL3Q $19,DX,DX
|
||||
ADDQ DX,R8
|
||||
ANDQ SI,R10
|
||||
MOVQ R8,0(DI)
|
||||
MOVQ CX,8(DI)
|
||||
MOVQ R9,16(DI)
|
||||
MOVQ AX,24(DI)
|
||||
MOVQ R10,32(DI)
|
||||
RET
|
||||
|
||||
// func square(out, in *[5]uint64)
|
||||
TEXT ·square(SB),7,$0-16
|
||||
MOVQ out+0(FP), DI
|
||||
MOVQ in+8(FP), SI
|
||||
|
||||
MOVQ 0(SI),AX
|
||||
MULQ 0(SI)
|
||||
MOVQ AX,CX
|
||||
MOVQ DX,R8
|
||||
MOVQ 0(SI),AX
|
||||
SHLQ $1,AX
|
||||
MULQ 8(SI)
|
||||
MOVQ AX,R9
|
||||
MOVQ DX,R10
|
||||
MOVQ 0(SI),AX
|
||||
SHLQ $1,AX
|
||||
MULQ 16(SI)
|
||||
MOVQ AX,R11
|
||||
MOVQ DX,R12
|
||||
MOVQ 0(SI),AX
|
||||
SHLQ $1,AX
|
||||
MULQ 24(SI)
|
||||
MOVQ AX,R13
|
||||
MOVQ DX,R14
|
||||
MOVQ 0(SI),AX
|
||||
SHLQ $1,AX
|
||||
MULQ 32(SI)
|
||||
MOVQ AX,R15
|
||||
MOVQ DX,BX
|
||||
MOVQ 8(SI),AX
|
||||
MULQ 8(SI)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R11
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R12
|
||||
MOVQ 8(SI),AX
|
||||
SHLQ $1,AX
|
||||
MULQ 16(SI)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R13
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R14
|
||||
MOVQ 8(SI),AX
|
||||
SHLQ $1,AX
|
||||
MULQ 24(SI)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R15
|
||||
ADCQ DX,BX
|
||||
MOVQ 8(SI),DX
|
||||
IMUL3Q $38,DX,AX
|
||||
MULQ 32(SI)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,CX
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R8
|
||||
MOVQ 16(SI),AX
|
||||
MULQ 16(SI)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R15
|
||||
ADCQ DX,BX
|
||||
MOVQ 16(SI),DX
|
||||
IMUL3Q $38,DX,AX
|
||||
MULQ 24(SI)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,CX
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R8
|
||||
MOVQ 16(SI),DX
|
||||
IMUL3Q $38,DX,AX
|
||||
MULQ 32(SI)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R9
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R10
|
||||
MOVQ 24(SI),DX
|
||||
IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX
|
||||
MULQ 24(SI)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R9
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R10
|
||||
MOVQ 24(SI),DX
|
||||
IMUL3Q $38,DX,AX
|
||||
MULQ 32(SI)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R11
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R12
|
||||
MOVQ 32(SI),DX
|
||||
IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX
|
||||
MULQ 32(SI)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R13
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R14
|
||||
MOVQ $REDMASK51,SI
|
||||
SHLQ $13,CX,R8
|
||||
ANDQ SI,CX
|
||||
SHLQ $13,R9,R10
|
||||
ANDQ SI,R9
|
||||
ADDQ R8,R9
|
||||
SHLQ $13,R11,R12
|
||||
ANDQ SI,R11
|
||||
ADDQ R10,R11
|
||||
SHLQ $13,R13,R14
|
||||
ANDQ SI,R13
|
||||
ADDQ R12,R13
|
||||
SHLQ $13,R15,BX
|
||||
ANDQ SI,R15
|
||||
ADDQ R14,R15
|
||||
IMUL3Q $19,BX,DX
|
||||
ADDQ DX,CX
|
||||
MOVQ CX,DX
|
||||
SHRQ $51,DX
|
||||
ADDQ R9,DX
|
||||
ANDQ SI,CX
|
||||
MOVQ DX,R8
|
||||
SHRQ $51,DX
|
||||
ADDQ R11,DX
|
||||
ANDQ SI,R8
|
||||
MOVQ DX,R9
|
||||
SHRQ $51,DX
|
||||
ADDQ R13,DX
|
||||
ANDQ SI,R9
|
||||
MOVQ DX,AX
|
||||
SHRQ $51,DX
|
||||
ADDQ R15,DX
|
||||
ANDQ SI,AX
|
||||
MOVQ DX,R10
|
||||
SHRQ $51,DX
|
||||
IMUL3Q $19,DX,DX
|
||||
ADDQ DX,CX
|
||||
ANDQ SI,R10
|
||||
MOVQ CX,0(DI)
|
||||
MOVQ R8,8(DI)
|
||||
MOVQ R9,16(DI)
|
||||
MOVQ AX,24(DI)
|
||||
MOVQ R10,32(DI)
|
||||
RET
|
828
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_generic.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
828
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_generic.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
|
@ -0,0 +1,828 @@
|
|||
// Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
package curve25519
|
||||
|
||||
import "encoding/binary"
|
||||
|
||||
// This code is a port of the public domain, "ref10" implementation of
|
||||
// curve25519 from SUPERCOP 20130419 by D. J. Bernstein.
|
||||
|
||||
// fieldElement represents an element of the field GF(2^255 - 19). An element
|
||||
// t, entries t[0]...t[9], represents the integer t[0]+2^26 t[1]+2^51 t[2]+2^77
|
||||
// t[3]+2^102 t[4]+...+2^230 t[9]. Bounds on each t[i] vary depending on
|
||||
// context.
|
||||
type fieldElement [10]int32
|
||||
|
||||
func feZero(fe *fieldElement) {
|
||||
for i := range fe {
|
||||
fe[i] = 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func feOne(fe *fieldElement) {
|
||||
feZero(fe)
|
||||
fe[0] = 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func feAdd(dst, a, b *fieldElement) {
|
||||
for i := range dst {
|
||||
dst[i] = a[i] + b[i]
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func feSub(dst, a, b *fieldElement) {
|
||||
for i := range dst {
|
||||
dst[i] = a[i] - b[i]
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func feCopy(dst, src *fieldElement) {
|
||||
for i := range dst {
|
||||
dst[i] = src[i]
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// feCSwap replaces (f,g) with (g,f) if b == 1; replaces (f,g) with (f,g) if b == 0.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Preconditions: b in {0,1}.
|
||||
func feCSwap(f, g *fieldElement, b int32) {
|
||||
b = -b
|
||||
for i := range f {
|
||||
t := b & (f[i] ^ g[i])
|
||||
f[i] ^= t
|
||||
g[i] ^= t
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// load3 reads a 24-bit, little-endian value from in.
|
||||
func load3(in []byte) int64 {
|
||||
var r int64
|
||||
r = int64(in[0])
|
||||
r |= int64(in[1]) << 8
|
||||
r |= int64(in[2]) << 16
|
||||
return r
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// load4 reads a 32-bit, little-endian value from in.
|
||||
func load4(in []byte) int64 {
|
||||
return int64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(in))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func feFromBytes(dst *fieldElement, src *[32]byte) {
|
||||
h0 := load4(src[:])
|
||||
h1 := load3(src[4:]) << 6
|
||||
h2 := load3(src[7:]) << 5
|
||||
h3 := load3(src[10:]) << 3
|
||||
h4 := load3(src[13:]) << 2
|
||||
h5 := load4(src[16:])
|
||||
h6 := load3(src[20:]) << 7
|
||||
h7 := load3(src[23:]) << 5
|
||||
h8 := load3(src[26:]) << 4
|
||||
h9 := (load3(src[29:]) & 0x7fffff) << 2
|
||||
|
||||
var carry [10]int64
|
||||
carry[9] = (h9 + 1<<24) >> 25
|
||||
h0 += carry[9] * 19
|
||||
h9 -= carry[9] << 25
|
||||
carry[1] = (h1 + 1<<24) >> 25
|
||||
h2 += carry[1]
|
||||
h1 -= carry[1] << 25
|
||||
carry[3] = (h3 + 1<<24) >> 25
|
||||
h4 += carry[3]
|
||||
h3 -= carry[3] << 25
|
||||
carry[5] = (h5 + 1<<24) >> 25
|
||||
h6 += carry[5]
|
||||
h5 -= carry[5] << 25
|
||||
carry[7] = (h7 + 1<<24) >> 25
|
||||
h8 += carry[7]
|
||||
h7 -= carry[7] << 25
|
||||
|
||||
carry[0] = (h0 + 1<<25) >> 26
|
||||
h1 += carry[0]
|
||||
h0 -= carry[0] << 26
|
||||
carry[2] = (h2 + 1<<25) >> 26
|
||||
h3 += carry[2]
|
||||
h2 -= carry[2] << 26
|
||||
carry[4] = (h4 + 1<<25) >> 26
|
||||
h5 += carry[4]
|
||||
h4 -= carry[4] << 26
|
||||
carry[6] = (h6 + 1<<25) >> 26
|
||||
h7 += carry[6]
|
||||
h6 -= carry[6] << 26
|
||||
carry[8] = (h8 + 1<<25) >> 26
|
||||
h9 += carry[8]
|
||||
h8 -= carry[8] << 26
|
||||
|
||||
dst[0] = int32(h0)
|
||||
dst[1] = int32(h1)
|
||||
dst[2] = int32(h2)
|
||||
dst[3] = int32(h3)
|
||||
dst[4] = int32(h4)
|
||||
dst[5] = int32(h5)
|
||||
dst[6] = int32(h6)
|
||||
dst[7] = int32(h7)
|
||||
dst[8] = int32(h8)
|
||||
dst[9] = int32(h9)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// feToBytes marshals h to s.
|
||||
// Preconditions:
|
||||
// |h| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Write p=2^255-19; q=floor(h/p).
|
||||
// Basic claim: q = floor(2^(-255)(h + 19 2^(-25)h9 + 2^(-1))).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Proof:
|
||||
// Have |h|<=p so |q|<=1 so |19^2 2^(-255) q|<1/4.
|
||||
// Also have |h-2^230 h9|<2^230 so |19 2^(-255)(h-2^230 h9)|<1/4.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Write y=2^(-1)-19^2 2^(-255)q-19 2^(-255)(h-2^230 h9).
|
||||
// Then 0<y<1.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Write r=h-pq.
|
||||
// Have 0<=r<=p-1=2^255-20.
|
||||
// Thus 0<=r+19(2^-255)r<r+19(2^-255)2^255<=2^255-1.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Write x=r+19(2^-255)r+y.
|
||||
// Then 0<x<2^255 so floor(2^(-255)x) = 0 so floor(q+2^(-255)x) = q.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Have q+2^(-255)x = 2^(-255)(h + 19 2^(-25) h9 + 2^(-1))
|
||||
// so floor(2^(-255)(h + 19 2^(-25) h9 + 2^(-1))) = q.
|
||||
func feToBytes(s *[32]byte, h *fieldElement) {
|
||||
var carry [10]int32
|
||||
|
||||
q := (19*h[9] + (1 << 24)) >> 25
|
||||
q = (h[0] + q) >> 26
|
||||
q = (h[1] + q) >> 25
|
||||
q = (h[2] + q) >> 26
|
||||
q = (h[3] + q) >> 25
|
||||
q = (h[4] + q) >> 26
|
||||
q = (h[5] + q) >> 25
|
||||
q = (h[6] + q) >> 26
|
||||
q = (h[7] + q) >> 25
|
||||
q = (h[8] + q) >> 26
|
||||
q = (h[9] + q) >> 25
|
||||
|
||||
// Goal: Output h-(2^255-19)q, which is between 0 and 2^255-20.
|
||||
h[0] += 19 * q
|
||||
// Goal: Output h-2^255 q, which is between 0 and 2^255-20.
|
||||
|
||||
carry[0] = h[0] >> 26
|
||||
h[1] += carry[0]
|
||||
h[0] -= carry[0] << 26
|
||||
carry[1] = h[1] >> 25
|
||||
h[2] += carry[1]
|
||||
h[1] -= carry[1] << 25
|
||||
carry[2] = h[2] >> 26
|
||||
h[3] += carry[2]
|
||||
h[2] -= carry[2] << 26
|
||||
carry[3] = h[3] >> 25
|
||||
h[4] += carry[3]
|
||||
h[3] -= carry[3] << 25
|
||||
carry[4] = h[4] >> 26
|
||||
h[5] += carry[4]
|
||||
h[4] -= carry[4] << 26
|
||||
carry[5] = h[5] >> 25
|
||||
h[6] += carry[5]
|
||||
h[5] -= carry[5] << 25
|
||||
carry[6] = h[6] >> 26
|
||||
h[7] += carry[6]
|
||||
h[6] -= carry[6] << 26
|
||||
carry[7] = h[7] >> 25
|
||||
h[8] += carry[7]
|
||||
h[7] -= carry[7] << 25
|
||||
carry[8] = h[8] >> 26
|
||||
h[9] += carry[8]
|
||||
h[8] -= carry[8] << 26
|
||||
carry[9] = h[9] >> 25
|
||||
h[9] -= carry[9] << 25
|
||||
// h10 = carry9
|
||||
|
||||
// Goal: Output h[0]+...+2^255 h10-2^255 q, which is between 0 and 2^255-20.
|
||||
// Have h[0]+...+2^230 h[9] between 0 and 2^255-1;
|
||||
// evidently 2^255 h10-2^255 q = 0.
|
||||
// Goal: Output h[0]+...+2^230 h[9].
|
||||
|
||||
s[0] = byte(h[0] >> 0)
|
||||
s[1] = byte(h[0] >> 8)
|
||||
s[2] = byte(h[0] >> 16)
|
||||
s[3] = byte((h[0] >> 24) | (h[1] << 2))
|
||||
s[4] = byte(h[1] >> 6)
|
||||
s[5] = byte(h[1] >> 14)
|
||||
s[6] = byte((h[1] >> 22) | (h[2] << 3))
|
||||
s[7] = byte(h[2] >> 5)
|
||||
s[8] = byte(h[2] >> 13)
|
||||
s[9] = byte((h[2] >> 21) | (h[3] << 5))
|
||||
s[10] = byte(h[3] >> 3)
|
||||
s[11] = byte(h[3] >> 11)
|
||||
s[12] = byte((h[3] >> 19) | (h[4] << 6))
|
||||
s[13] = byte(h[4] >> 2)
|
||||
s[14] = byte(h[4] >> 10)
|
||||
s[15] = byte(h[4] >> 18)
|
||||
s[16] = byte(h[5] >> 0)
|
||||
s[17] = byte(h[5] >> 8)
|
||||
s[18] = byte(h[5] >> 16)
|
||||
s[19] = byte((h[5] >> 24) | (h[6] << 1))
|
||||
s[20] = byte(h[6] >> 7)
|
||||
s[21] = byte(h[6] >> 15)
|
||||
s[22] = byte((h[6] >> 23) | (h[7] << 3))
|
||||
s[23] = byte(h[7] >> 5)
|
||||
s[24] = byte(h[7] >> 13)
|
||||
s[25] = byte((h[7] >> 21) | (h[8] << 4))
|
||||
s[26] = byte(h[8] >> 4)
|
||||
s[27] = byte(h[8] >> 12)
|
||||
s[28] = byte((h[8] >> 20) | (h[9] << 6))
|
||||
s[29] = byte(h[9] >> 2)
|
||||
s[30] = byte(h[9] >> 10)
|
||||
s[31] = byte(h[9] >> 18)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// feMul calculates h = f * g
|
||||
// Can overlap h with f or g.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Preconditions:
|
||||
// |f| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc.
|
||||
// |g| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Postconditions:
|
||||
// |h| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Notes on implementation strategy:
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Using schoolbook multiplication.
|
||||
// Karatsuba would save a little in some cost models.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Most multiplications by 2 and 19 are 32-bit precomputations;
|
||||
// cheaper than 64-bit postcomputations.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// There is one remaining multiplication by 19 in the carry chain;
|
||||
// one *19 precomputation can be merged into this,
|
||||
// but the resulting data flow is considerably less clean.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// There are 12 carries below.
|
||||
// 10 of them are 2-way parallelizable and vectorizable.
|
||||
// Can get away with 11 carries, but then data flow is much deeper.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// With tighter constraints on inputs can squeeze carries into int32.
|
||||
func feMul(h, f, g *fieldElement) {
|
||||
f0 := f[0]
|
||||
f1 := f[1]
|
||||
f2 := f[2]
|
||||
f3 := f[3]
|
||||
f4 := f[4]
|
||||
f5 := f[5]
|
||||
f6 := f[6]
|
||||
f7 := f[7]
|
||||
f8 := f[8]
|
||||
f9 := f[9]
|
||||
g0 := g[0]
|
||||
g1 := g[1]
|
||||
g2 := g[2]
|
||||
g3 := g[3]
|
||||
g4 := g[4]
|
||||
g5 := g[5]
|
||||
g6 := g[6]
|
||||
g7 := g[7]
|
||||
g8 := g[8]
|
||||
g9 := g[9]
|
||||
g1_19 := 19 * g1 // 1.4*2^29
|
||||
g2_19 := 19 * g2 // 1.4*2^30; still ok
|
||||
g3_19 := 19 * g3
|
||||
g4_19 := 19 * g4
|
||||
g5_19 := 19 * g5
|
||||
g6_19 := 19 * g6
|
||||
g7_19 := 19 * g7
|
||||
g8_19 := 19 * g8
|
||||
g9_19 := 19 * g9
|
||||
f1_2 := 2 * f1
|
||||
f3_2 := 2 * f3
|
||||
f5_2 := 2 * f5
|
||||
f7_2 := 2 * f7
|
||||
f9_2 := 2 * f9
|
||||
f0g0 := int64(f0) * int64(g0)
|
||||
f0g1 := int64(f0) * int64(g1)
|
||||
f0g2 := int64(f0) * int64(g2)
|
||||
f0g3 := int64(f0) * int64(g3)
|
||||
f0g4 := int64(f0) * int64(g4)
|
||||
f0g5 := int64(f0) * int64(g5)
|
||||
f0g6 := int64(f0) * int64(g6)
|
||||
f0g7 := int64(f0) * int64(g7)
|
||||
f0g8 := int64(f0) * int64(g8)
|
||||
f0g9 := int64(f0) * int64(g9)
|
||||
f1g0 := int64(f1) * int64(g0)
|
||||
f1g1_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(g1)
|
||||
f1g2 := int64(f1) * int64(g2)
|
||||
f1g3_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(g3)
|
||||
f1g4 := int64(f1) * int64(g4)
|
||||
f1g5_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(g5)
|
||||
f1g6 := int64(f1) * int64(g6)
|
||||
f1g7_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(g7)
|
||||
f1g8 := int64(f1) * int64(g8)
|
||||
f1g9_38 := int64(f1_2) * int64(g9_19)
|
||||
f2g0 := int64(f2) * int64(g0)
|
||||
f2g1 := int64(f2) * int64(g1)
|
||||
f2g2 := int64(f2) * int64(g2)
|
||||
f2g3 := int64(f2) * int64(g3)
|
||||
f2g4 := int64(f2) * int64(g4)
|
||||
f2g5 := int64(f2) * int64(g5)
|
||||
f2g6 := int64(f2) * int64(g6)
|
||||
f2g7 := int64(f2) * int64(g7)
|
||||
f2g8_19 := int64(f2) * int64(g8_19)
|
||||
f2g9_19 := int64(f2) * int64(g9_19)
|
||||
f3g0 := int64(f3) * int64(g0)
|
||||
f3g1_2 := int64(f3_2) * int64(g1)
|
||||
f3g2 := int64(f3) * int64(g2)
|
||||
f3g3_2 := int64(f3_2) * int64(g3)
|
||||
f3g4 := int64(f3) * int64(g4)
|
||||
f3g5_2 := int64(f3_2) * int64(g5)
|
||||
f3g6 := int64(f3) * int64(g6)
|
||||
f3g7_38 := int64(f3_2) * int64(g7_19)
|
||||
f3g8_19 := int64(f3) * int64(g8_19)
|
||||
f3g9_38 := int64(f3_2) * int64(g9_19)
|
||||
f4g0 := int64(f4) * int64(g0)
|
||||
f4g1 := int64(f4) * int64(g1)
|
||||
f4g2 := int64(f4) * int64(g2)
|
||||
f4g3 := int64(f4) * int64(g3)
|
||||
f4g4 := int64(f4) * int64(g4)
|
||||
f4g5 := int64(f4) * int64(g5)
|
||||
f4g6_19 := int64(f4) * int64(g6_19)
|
||||
f4g7_19 := int64(f4) * int64(g7_19)
|
||||
f4g8_19 := int64(f4) * int64(g8_19)
|
||||
f4g9_19 := int64(f4) * int64(g9_19)
|
||||
f5g0 := int64(f5) * int64(g0)
|
||||
f5g1_2 := int64(f5_2) * int64(g1)
|
||||
f5g2 := int64(f5) * int64(g2)
|
||||
f5g3_2 := int64(f5_2) * int64(g3)
|
||||
f5g4 := int64(f5) * int64(g4)
|
||||
f5g5_38 := int64(f5_2) * int64(g5_19)
|
||||
f5g6_19 := int64(f5) * int64(g6_19)
|
||||
f5g7_38 := int64(f5_2) * int64(g7_19)
|
||||
f5g8_19 := int64(f5) * int64(g8_19)
|
||||
f5g9_38 := int64(f5_2) * int64(g9_19)
|
||||
f6g0 := int64(f6) * int64(g0)
|
||||
f6g1 := int64(f6) * int64(g1)
|
||||
f6g2 := int64(f6) * int64(g2)
|
||||
f6g3 := int64(f6) * int64(g3)
|
||||
f6g4_19 := int64(f6) * int64(g4_19)
|
||||
f6g5_19 := int64(f6) * int64(g5_19)
|
||||
f6g6_19 := int64(f6) * int64(g6_19)
|
||||
f6g7_19 := int64(f6) * int64(g7_19)
|
||||
f6g8_19 := int64(f6) * int64(g8_19)
|
||||
f6g9_19 := int64(f6) * int64(g9_19)
|
||||
f7g0 := int64(f7) * int64(g0)
|
||||
f7g1_2 := int64(f7_2) * int64(g1)
|
||||
f7g2 := int64(f7) * int64(g2)
|
||||
f7g3_38 := int64(f7_2) * int64(g3_19)
|
||||
f7g4_19 := int64(f7) * int64(g4_19)
|
||||
f7g5_38 := int64(f7_2) * int64(g5_19)
|
||||
f7g6_19 := int64(f7) * int64(g6_19)
|
||||
f7g7_38 := int64(f7_2) * int64(g7_19)
|
||||
f7g8_19 := int64(f7) * int64(g8_19)
|
||||
f7g9_38 := int64(f7_2) * int64(g9_19)
|
||||
f8g0 := int64(f8) * int64(g0)
|
||||
f8g1 := int64(f8) * int64(g1)
|
||||
f8g2_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g2_19)
|
||||
f8g3_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g3_19)
|
||||
f8g4_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g4_19)
|
||||
f8g5_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g5_19)
|
||||
f8g6_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g6_19)
|
||||
f8g7_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g7_19)
|
||||
f8g8_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g8_19)
|
||||
f8g9_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g9_19)
|
||||
f9g0 := int64(f9) * int64(g0)
|
||||
f9g1_38 := int64(f9_2) * int64(g1_19)
|
||||
f9g2_19 := int64(f9) * int64(g2_19)
|
||||
f9g3_38 := int64(f9_2) * int64(g3_19)
|
||||
f9g4_19 := int64(f9) * int64(g4_19)
|
||||
f9g5_38 := int64(f9_2) * int64(g5_19)
|
||||
f9g6_19 := int64(f9) * int64(g6_19)
|
||||
f9g7_38 := int64(f9_2) * int64(g7_19)
|
||||
f9g8_19 := int64(f9) * int64(g8_19)
|
||||
f9g9_38 := int64(f9_2) * int64(g9_19)
|
||||
h0 := f0g0 + f1g9_38 + f2g8_19 + f3g7_38 + f4g6_19 + f5g5_38 + f6g4_19 + f7g3_38 + f8g2_19 + f9g1_38
|
||||
h1 := f0g1 + f1g0 + f2g9_19 + f3g8_19 + f4g7_19 + f5g6_19 + f6g5_19 + f7g4_19 + f8g3_19 + f9g2_19
|
||||
h2 := f0g2 + f1g1_2 + f2g0 + f3g9_38 + f4g8_19 + f5g7_38 + f6g6_19 + f7g5_38 + f8g4_19 + f9g3_38
|
||||
h3 := f0g3 + f1g2 + f2g1 + f3g0 + f4g9_19 + f5g8_19 + f6g7_19 + f7g6_19 + f8g5_19 + f9g4_19
|
||||
h4 := f0g4 + f1g3_2 + f2g2 + f3g1_2 + f4g0 + f5g9_38 + f6g8_19 + f7g7_38 + f8g6_19 + f9g5_38
|
||||
h5 := f0g5 + f1g4 + f2g3 + f3g2 + f4g1 + f5g0 + f6g9_19 + f7g8_19 + f8g7_19 + f9g6_19
|
||||
h6 := f0g6 + f1g5_2 + f2g4 + f3g3_2 + f4g2 + f5g1_2 + f6g0 + f7g9_38 + f8g8_19 + f9g7_38
|
||||
h7 := f0g7 + f1g6 + f2g5 + f3g4 + f4g3 + f5g2 + f6g1 + f7g0 + f8g9_19 + f9g8_19
|
||||
h8 := f0g8 + f1g7_2 + f2g6 + f3g5_2 + f4g4 + f5g3_2 + f6g2 + f7g1_2 + f8g0 + f9g9_38
|
||||
h9 := f0g9 + f1g8 + f2g7 + f3g6 + f4g5 + f5g4 + f6g3 + f7g2 + f8g1 + f9g0
|
||||
var carry [10]int64
|
||||
|
||||
// |h0| <= (1.1*1.1*2^52*(1+19+19+19+19)+1.1*1.1*2^50*(38+38+38+38+38))
|
||||
// i.e. |h0| <= 1.2*2^59; narrower ranges for h2, h4, h6, h8
|
||||
// |h1| <= (1.1*1.1*2^51*(1+1+19+19+19+19+19+19+19+19))
|
||||
// i.e. |h1| <= 1.5*2^58; narrower ranges for h3, h5, h7, h9
|
||||
|
||||
carry[0] = (h0 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
|
||||
h1 += carry[0]
|
||||
h0 -= carry[0] << 26
|
||||
carry[4] = (h4 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
|
||||
h5 += carry[4]
|
||||
h4 -= carry[4] << 26
|
||||
// |h0| <= 2^25
|
||||
// |h4| <= 2^25
|
||||
// |h1| <= 1.51*2^58
|
||||
// |h5| <= 1.51*2^58
|
||||
|
||||
carry[1] = (h1 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
|
||||
h2 += carry[1]
|
||||
h1 -= carry[1] << 25
|
||||
carry[5] = (h5 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
|
||||
h6 += carry[5]
|
||||
h5 -= carry[5] << 25
|
||||
// |h1| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32
|
||||
// |h5| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32
|
||||
// |h2| <= 1.21*2^59
|
||||
// |h6| <= 1.21*2^59
|
||||
|
||||
carry[2] = (h2 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
|
||||
h3 += carry[2]
|
||||
h2 -= carry[2] << 26
|
||||
carry[6] = (h6 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
|
||||
h7 += carry[6]
|
||||
h6 -= carry[6] << 26
|
||||
// |h2| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged
|
||||
// |h6| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged
|
||||
// |h3| <= 1.51*2^58
|
||||
// |h7| <= 1.51*2^58
|
||||
|
||||
carry[3] = (h3 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
|
||||
h4 += carry[3]
|
||||
h3 -= carry[3] << 25
|
||||
carry[7] = (h7 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
|
||||
h8 += carry[7]
|
||||
h7 -= carry[7] << 25
|
||||
// |h3| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 unchanged
|
||||
// |h7| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 unchanged
|
||||
// |h4| <= 1.52*2^33
|
||||
// |h8| <= 1.52*2^33
|
||||
|
||||
carry[4] = (h4 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
|
||||
h5 += carry[4]
|
||||
h4 -= carry[4] << 26
|
||||
carry[8] = (h8 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
|
||||
h9 += carry[8]
|
||||
h8 -= carry[8] << 26
|
||||
// |h4| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged
|
||||
// |h8| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged
|
||||
// |h5| <= 1.01*2^24
|
||||
// |h9| <= 1.51*2^58
|
||||
|
||||
carry[9] = (h9 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
|
||||
h0 += carry[9] * 19
|
||||
h9 -= carry[9] << 25
|
||||
// |h9| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 unchanged
|
||||
// |h0| <= 1.8*2^37
|
||||
|
||||
carry[0] = (h0 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
|
||||
h1 += carry[0]
|
||||
h0 -= carry[0] << 26
|
||||
// |h0| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged
|
||||
// |h1| <= 1.01*2^24
|
||||
|
||||
h[0] = int32(h0)
|
||||
h[1] = int32(h1)
|
||||
h[2] = int32(h2)
|
||||
h[3] = int32(h3)
|
||||
h[4] = int32(h4)
|
||||
h[5] = int32(h5)
|
||||
h[6] = int32(h6)
|
||||
h[7] = int32(h7)
|
||||
h[8] = int32(h8)
|
||||
h[9] = int32(h9)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// feSquare calculates h = f*f. Can overlap h with f.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Preconditions:
|
||||
// |f| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Postconditions:
|
||||
// |h| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc.
|
||||
func feSquare(h, f *fieldElement) {
|
||||
f0 := f[0]
|
||||
f1 := f[1]
|
||||
f2 := f[2]
|
||||
f3 := f[3]
|
||||
f4 := f[4]
|
||||
f5 := f[5]
|
||||
f6 := f[6]
|
||||
f7 := f[7]
|
||||
f8 := f[8]
|
||||
f9 := f[9]
|
||||
f0_2 := 2 * f0
|
||||
f1_2 := 2 * f1
|
||||
f2_2 := 2 * f2
|
||||
f3_2 := 2 * f3
|
||||
f4_2 := 2 * f4
|
||||
f5_2 := 2 * f5
|
||||
f6_2 := 2 * f6
|
||||
f7_2 := 2 * f7
|
||||
f5_38 := 38 * f5 // 1.31*2^30
|
||||
f6_19 := 19 * f6 // 1.31*2^30
|
||||
f7_38 := 38 * f7 // 1.31*2^30
|
||||
f8_19 := 19 * f8 // 1.31*2^30
|
||||
f9_38 := 38 * f9 // 1.31*2^30
|
||||
f0f0 := int64(f0) * int64(f0)
|
||||
f0f1_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f1)
|
||||
f0f2_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f2)
|
||||
f0f3_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f3)
|
||||
f0f4_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f4)
|
||||
f0f5_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f5)
|
||||
f0f6_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f6)
|
||||
f0f7_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f7)
|
||||
f0f8_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f8)
|
||||
f0f9_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f9)
|
||||
f1f1_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f1)
|
||||
f1f2_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f2)
|
||||
f1f3_4 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f3_2)
|
||||
f1f4_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f4)
|
||||
f1f5_4 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f5_2)
|
||||
f1f6_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f6)
|
||||
f1f7_4 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f7_2)
|
||||
f1f8_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f8)
|
||||
f1f9_76 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f9_38)
|
||||
f2f2 := int64(f2) * int64(f2)
|
||||
f2f3_2 := int64(f2_2) * int64(f3)
|
||||
f2f4_2 := int64(f2_2) * int64(f4)
|
||||
f2f5_2 := int64(f2_2) * int64(f5)
|
||||
f2f6_2 := int64(f2_2) * int64(f6)
|
||||
f2f7_2 := int64(f2_2) * int64(f7)
|
||||
f2f8_38 := int64(f2_2) * int64(f8_19)
|
||||
f2f9_38 := int64(f2) * int64(f9_38)
|
||||
f3f3_2 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f3)
|
||||
f3f4_2 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f4)
|
||||
f3f5_4 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f5_2)
|
||||
f3f6_2 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f6)
|
||||
f3f7_76 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f7_38)
|
||||
f3f8_38 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f8_19)
|
||||
f3f9_76 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f9_38)
|
||||
f4f4 := int64(f4) * int64(f4)
|
||||
f4f5_2 := int64(f4_2) * int64(f5)
|
||||
f4f6_38 := int64(f4_2) * int64(f6_19)
|
||||
f4f7_38 := int64(f4) * int64(f7_38)
|
||||
f4f8_38 := int64(f4_2) * int64(f8_19)
|
||||
f4f9_38 := int64(f4) * int64(f9_38)
|
||||
f5f5_38 := int64(f5) * int64(f5_38)
|
||||
f5f6_38 := int64(f5_2) * int64(f6_19)
|
||||
f5f7_76 := int64(f5_2) * int64(f7_38)
|
||||
f5f8_38 := int64(f5_2) * int64(f8_19)
|
||||
f5f9_76 := int64(f5_2) * int64(f9_38)
|
||||
f6f6_19 := int64(f6) * int64(f6_19)
|
||||
f6f7_38 := int64(f6) * int64(f7_38)
|
||||
f6f8_38 := int64(f6_2) * int64(f8_19)
|
||||
f6f9_38 := int64(f6) * int64(f9_38)
|
||||
f7f7_38 := int64(f7) * int64(f7_38)
|
||||
f7f8_38 := int64(f7_2) * int64(f8_19)
|
||||
f7f9_76 := int64(f7_2) * int64(f9_38)
|
||||
f8f8_19 := int64(f8) * int64(f8_19)
|
||||
f8f9_38 := int64(f8) * int64(f9_38)
|
||||
f9f9_38 := int64(f9) * int64(f9_38)
|
||||
h0 := f0f0 + f1f9_76 + f2f8_38 + f3f7_76 + f4f6_38 + f5f5_38
|
||||
h1 := f0f1_2 + f2f9_38 + f3f8_38 + f4f7_38 + f5f6_38
|
||||
h2 := f0f2_2 + f1f1_2 + f3f9_76 + f4f8_38 + f5f7_76 + f6f6_19
|
||||
h3 := f0f3_2 + f1f2_2 + f4f9_38 + f5f8_38 + f6f7_38
|
||||
h4 := f0f4_2 + f1f3_4 + f2f2 + f5f9_76 + f6f8_38 + f7f7_38
|
||||
h5 := f0f5_2 + f1f4_2 + f2f3_2 + f6f9_38 + f7f8_38
|
||||
h6 := f0f6_2 + f1f5_4 + f2f4_2 + f3f3_2 + f7f9_76 + f8f8_19
|
||||
h7 := f0f7_2 + f1f6_2 + f2f5_2 + f3f4_2 + f8f9_38
|
||||
h8 := f0f8_2 + f1f7_4 + f2f6_2 + f3f5_4 + f4f4 + f9f9_38
|
||||
h9 := f0f9_2 + f1f8_2 + f2f7_2 + f3f6_2 + f4f5_2
|
||||
var carry [10]int64
|
||||
|
||||
carry[0] = (h0 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
|
||||
h1 += carry[0]
|
||||
h0 -= carry[0] << 26
|
||||
carry[4] = (h4 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
|
||||
h5 += carry[4]
|
||||
h4 -= carry[4] << 26
|
||||
|
||||
carry[1] = (h1 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
|
||||
h2 += carry[1]
|
||||
h1 -= carry[1] << 25
|
||||
carry[5] = (h5 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
|
||||
h6 += carry[5]
|
||||
h5 -= carry[5] << 25
|
||||
|
||||
carry[2] = (h2 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
|
||||
h3 += carry[2]
|
||||
h2 -= carry[2] << 26
|
||||
carry[6] = (h6 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
|
||||
h7 += carry[6]
|
||||
h6 -= carry[6] << 26
|
||||
|
||||
carry[3] = (h3 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
|
||||
h4 += carry[3]
|
||||
h3 -= carry[3] << 25
|
||||
carry[7] = (h7 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
|
||||
h8 += carry[7]
|
||||
h7 -= carry[7] << 25
|
||||
|
||||
carry[4] = (h4 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
|
||||
h5 += carry[4]
|
||||
h4 -= carry[4] << 26
|
||||
carry[8] = (h8 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
|
||||
h9 += carry[8]
|
||||
h8 -= carry[8] << 26
|
||||
|
||||
carry[9] = (h9 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
|
||||
h0 += carry[9] * 19
|
||||
h9 -= carry[9] << 25
|
||||
|
||||
carry[0] = (h0 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
|
||||
h1 += carry[0]
|
||||
h0 -= carry[0] << 26
|
||||
|
||||
h[0] = int32(h0)
|
||||
h[1] = int32(h1)
|
||||
h[2] = int32(h2)
|
||||
h[3] = int32(h3)
|
||||
h[4] = int32(h4)
|
||||
h[5] = int32(h5)
|
||||
h[6] = int32(h6)
|
||||
h[7] = int32(h7)
|
||||
h[8] = int32(h8)
|
||||
h[9] = int32(h9)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// feMul121666 calculates h = f * 121666. Can overlap h with f.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Preconditions:
|
||||
// |f| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Postconditions:
|
||||
// |h| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc.
|
||||
func feMul121666(h, f *fieldElement) {
|
||||
h0 := int64(f[0]) * 121666
|
||||
h1 := int64(f[1]) * 121666
|
||||
h2 := int64(f[2]) * 121666
|
||||
h3 := int64(f[3]) * 121666
|
||||
h4 := int64(f[4]) * 121666
|
||||
h5 := int64(f[5]) * 121666
|
||||
h6 := int64(f[6]) * 121666
|
||||
h7 := int64(f[7]) * 121666
|
||||
h8 := int64(f[8]) * 121666
|
||||
h9 := int64(f[9]) * 121666
|
||||
var carry [10]int64
|
||||
|
||||
carry[9] = (h9 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
|
||||
h0 += carry[9] * 19
|
||||
h9 -= carry[9] << 25
|
||||
carry[1] = (h1 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
|
||||
h2 += carry[1]
|
||||
h1 -= carry[1] << 25
|
||||
carry[3] = (h3 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
|
||||
h4 += carry[3]
|
||||
h3 -= carry[3] << 25
|
||||
carry[5] = (h5 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
|
||||
h6 += carry[5]
|
||||
h5 -= carry[5] << 25
|
||||
carry[7] = (h7 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
|
||||
h8 += carry[7]
|
||||
h7 -= carry[7] << 25
|
||||
|
||||
carry[0] = (h0 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
|
||||
h1 += carry[0]
|
||||
h0 -= carry[0] << 26
|
||||
carry[2] = (h2 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
|
||||
h3 += carry[2]
|
||||
h2 -= carry[2] << 26
|
||||
carry[4] = (h4 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
|
||||
h5 += carry[4]
|
||||
h4 -= carry[4] << 26
|
||||
carry[6] = (h6 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
|
||||
h7 += carry[6]
|
||||
h6 -= carry[6] << 26
|
||||
carry[8] = (h8 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
|
||||
h9 += carry[8]
|
||||
h8 -= carry[8] << 26
|
||||
|
||||
h[0] = int32(h0)
|
||||
h[1] = int32(h1)
|
||||
h[2] = int32(h2)
|
||||
h[3] = int32(h3)
|
||||
h[4] = int32(h4)
|
||||
h[5] = int32(h5)
|
||||
h[6] = int32(h6)
|
||||
h[7] = int32(h7)
|
||||
h[8] = int32(h8)
|
||||
h[9] = int32(h9)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// feInvert sets out = z^-1.
|
||||
func feInvert(out, z *fieldElement) {
|
||||
var t0, t1, t2, t3 fieldElement
|
||||
var i int
|
||||
|
||||
feSquare(&t0, z)
|
||||
for i = 1; i < 1; i++ {
|
||||
feSquare(&t0, &t0)
|
||||
}
|
||||
feSquare(&t1, &t0)
|
||||
for i = 1; i < 2; i++ {
|
||||
feSquare(&t1, &t1)
|
||||
}
|
||||
feMul(&t1, z, &t1)
|
||||
feMul(&t0, &t0, &t1)
|
||||
feSquare(&t2, &t0)
|
||||
for i = 1; i < 1; i++ {
|
||||
feSquare(&t2, &t2)
|
||||
}
|
||||
feMul(&t1, &t1, &t2)
|
||||
feSquare(&t2, &t1)
|
||||
for i = 1; i < 5; i++ {
|
||||
feSquare(&t2, &t2)
|
||||
}
|
||||
feMul(&t1, &t2, &t1)
|
||||
feSquare(&t2, &t1)
|
||||
for i = 1; i < 10; i++ {
|
||||
feSquare(&t2, &t2)
|
||||
}
|
||||
feMul(&t2, &t2, &t1)
|
||||
feSquare(&t3, &t2)
|
||||
for i = 1; i < 20; i++ {
|
||||
feSquare(&t3, &t3)
|
||||
}
|
||||
feMul(&t2, &t3, &t2)
|
||||
feSquare(&t2, &t2)
|
||||
for i = 1; i < 10; i++ {
|
||||
feSquare(&t2, &t2)
|
||||
}
|
||||
feMul(&t1, &t2, &t1)
|
||||
feSquare(&t2, &t1)
|
||||
for i = 1; i < 50; i++ {
|
||||
feSquare(&t2, &t2)
|
||||
}
|
||||
feMul(&t2, &t2, &t1)
|
||||
feSquare(&t3, &t2)
|
||||
for i = 1; i < 100; i++ {
|
||||
feSquare(&t3, &t3)
|
||||
}
|
||||
feMul(&t2, &t3, &t2)
|
||||
feSquare(&t2, &t2)
|
||||
for i = 1; i < 50; i++ {
|
||||
feSquare(&t2, &t2)
|
||||
}
|
||||
feMul(&t1, &t2, &t1)
|
||||
feSquare(&t1, &t1)
|
||||
for i = 1; i < 5; i++ {
|
||||
feSquare(&t1, &t1)
|
||||
}
|
||||
feMul(out, &t1, &t0)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func scalarMultGeneric(out, in, base *[32]byte) {
|
||||
var e [32]byte
|
||||
|
||||
copy(e[:], in[:])
|
||||
e[0] &= 248
|
||||
e[31] &= 127
|
||||
e[31] |= 64
|
||||
|
||||
var x1, x2, z2, x3, z3, tmp0, tmp1 fieldElement
|
||||
feFromBytes(&x1, base)
|
||||
feOne(&x2)
|
||||
feCopy(&x3, &x1)
|
||||
feOne(&z3)
|
||||
|
||||
swap := int32(0)
|
||||
for pos := 254; pos >= 0; pos-- {
|
||||
b := e[pos/8] >> uint(pos&7)
|
||||
b &= 1
|
||||
swap ^= int32(b)
|
||||
feCSwap(&x2, &x3, swap)
|
||||
feCSwap(&z2, &z3, swap)
|
||||
swap = int32(b)
|
||||
|
||||
feSub(&tmp0, &x3, &z3)
|
||||
feSub(&tmp1, &x2, &z2)
|
||||
feAdd(&x2, &x2, &z2)
|
||||
feAdd(&z2, &x3, &z3)
|
||||
feMul(&z3, &tmp0, &x2)
|
||||
feMul(&z2, &z2, &tmp1)
|
||||
feSquare(&tmp0, &tmp1)
|
||||
feSquare(&tmp1, &x2)
|
||||
feAdd(&x3, &z3, &z2)
|
||||
feSub(&z2, &z3, &z2)
|
||||
feMul(&x2, &tmp1, &tmp0)
|
||||
feSub(&tmp1, &tmp1, &tmp0)
|
||||
feSquare(&z2, &z2)
|
||||
feMul121666(&z3, &tmp1)
|
||||
feSquare(&x3, &x3)
|
||||
feAdd(&tmp0, &tmp0, &z3)
|
||||
feMul(&z3, &x1, &z2)
|
||||
feMul(&z2, &tmp1, &tmp0)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
feCSwap(&x2, &x3, swap)
|
||||
feCSwap(&z2, &z3, swap)
|
||||
|
||||
feInvert(&z2, &z2)
|
||||
feMul(&x2, &x2, &z2)
|
||||
feToBytes(out, &x2)
|
||||
}
|
11
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_noasm.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
11
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_noasm.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
|
@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
|
|||
// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
// +build !amd64 gccgo appengine purego
|
||||
|
||||
package curve25519
|
||||
|
||||
func scalarMult(out, in, base *[32]byte) {
|
||||
scalarMultGeneric(out, in, base)
|
||||
}
|
23
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/doc.go
generated
vendored
23
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/doc.go
generated
vendored
|
@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
|
|||
// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
// Package curve25519 provides an implementation of scalar multiplication on
|
||||
// the elliptic curve known as curve25519. See https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html
|
||||
package curve25519 // import "golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519"
|
||||
|
||||
// basePoint is the x coordinate of the generator of the curve.
|
||||
var basePoint = [32]byte{9, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}
|
||||
|
||||
// ScalarMult sets dst to the product in*base where dst and base are the x
|
||||
// coordinates of group points and all values are in little-endian form.
|
||||
func ScalarMult(dst, in, base *[32]byte) {
|
||||
scalarMult(dst, in, base)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ScalarBaseMult sets dst to the product in*base where dst and base are the x
|
||||
// coordinates of group points, base is the standard generator and all values
|
||||
// are in little-endian form.
|
||||
func ScalarBaseMult(dst, in *[32]byte) {
|
||||
ScalarMult(dst, in, &basePoint)
|
||||
}
|
73
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/freeze_amd64.s
generated
vendored
73
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/freeze_amd64.s
generated
vendored
|
@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
|
|||
// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
// This code was translated into a form compatible with 6a from the public
|
||||
// domain sources in SUPERCOP: https://bench.cr.yp.to/supercop.html
|
||||
|
||||
// +build amd64,!gccgo,!appengine
|
||||
|
||||
#include "const_amd64.h"
|
||||
|
||||
// func freeze(inout *[5]uint64)
|
||||
TEXT ·freeze(SB),7,$0-8
|
||||
MOVQ inout+0(FP), DI
|
||||
|
||||
MOVQ 0(DI),SI
|
||||
MOVQ 8(DI),DX
|
||||
MOVQ 16(DI),CX
|
||||
MOVQ 24(DI),R8
|
||||
MOVQ 32(DI),R9
|
||||
MOVQ $REDMASK51,AX
|
||||
MOVQ AX,R10
|
||||
SUBQ $18,R10
|
||||
MOVQ $3,R11
|
||||
REDUCELOOP:
|
||||
MOVQ SI,R12
|
||||
SHRQ $51,R12
|
||||
ANDQ AX,SI
|
||||
ADDQ R12,DX
|
||||
MOVQ DX,R12
|
||||
SHRQ $51,R12
|
||||
ANDQ AX,DX
|
||||
ADDQ R12,CX
|
||||
MOVQ CX,R12
|
||||
SHRQ $51,R12
|
||||
ANDQ AX,CX
|
||||
ADDQ R12,R8
|
||||
MOVQ R8,R12
|
||||
SHRQ $51,R12
|
||||
ANDQ AX,R8
|
||||
ADDQ R12,R9
|
||||
MOVQ R9,R12
|
||||
SHRQ $51,R12
|
||||
ANDQ AX,R9
|
||||
IMUL3Q $19,R12,R12
|
||||
ADDQ R12,SI
|
||||
SUBQ $1,R11
|
||||
JA REDUCELOOP
|
||||
MOVQ $1,R12
|
||||
CMPQ R10,SI
|
||||
CMOVQLT R11,R12
|
||||
CMPQ AX,DX
|
||||
CMOVQNE R11,R12
|
||||
CMPQ AX,CX
|
||||
CMOVQNE R11,R12
|
||||
CMPQ AX,R8
|
||||
CMOVQNE R11,R12
|
||||
CMPQ AX,R9
|
||||
CMOVQNE R11,R12
|
||||
NEGQ R12
|
||||
ANDQ R12,AX
|
||||
ANDQ R12,R10
|
||||
SUBQ R10,SI
|
||||
SUBQ AX,DX
|
||||
SUBQ AX,CX
|
||||
SUBQ AX,R8
|
||||
SUBQ AX,R9
|
||||
MOVQ SI,0(DI)
|
||||
MOVQ DX,8(DI)
|
||||
MOVQ CX,16(DI)
|
||||
MOVQ R8,24(DI)
|
||||
MOVQ R9,32(DI)
|
||||
RET
|
169
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/mul_amd64.s
generated
vendored
169
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/mul_amd64.s
generated
vendored
|
@ -1,169 +0,0 @@
|
|||
// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
// This code was translated into a form compatible with 6a from the public
|
||||
// domain sources in SUPERCOP: https://bench.cr.yp.to/supercop.html
|
||||
|
||||
// +build amd64,!gccgo,!appengine
|
||||
|
||||
#include "const_amd64.h"
|
||||
|
||||
// func mul(dest, a, b *[5]uint64)
|
||||
TEXT ·mul(SB),0,$16-24
|
||||
MOVQ dest+0(FP), DI
|
||||
MOVQ a+8(FP), SI
|
||||
MOVQ b+16(FP), DX
|
||||
|
||||
MOVQ DX,CX
|
||||
MOVQ 24(SI),DX
|
||||
IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX
|
||||
MOVQ AX,0(SP)
|
||||
MULQ 16(CX)
|
||||
MOVQ AX,R8
|
||||
MOVQ DX,R9
|
||||
MOVQ 32(SI),DX
|
||||
IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX
|
||||
MOVQ AX,8(SP)
|
||||
MULQ 8(CX)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R8
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R9
|
||||
MOVQ 0(SI),AX
|
||||
MULQ 0(CX)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R8
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R9
|
||||
MOVQ 0(SI),AX
|
||||
MULQ 8(CX)
|
||||
MOVQ AX,R10
|
||||
MOVQ DX,R11
|
||||
MOVQ 0(SI),AX
|
||||
MULQ 16(CX)
|
||||
MOVQ AX,R12
|
||||
MOVQ DX,R13
|
||||
MOVQ 0(SI),AX
|
||||
MULQ 24(CX)
|
||||
MOVQ AX,R14
|
||||
MOVQ DX,R15
|
||||
MOVQ 0(SI),AX
|
||||
MULQ 32(CX)
|
||||
MOVQ AX,BX
|
||||
MOVQ DX,BP
|
||||
MOVQ 8(SI),AX
|
||||
MULQ 0(CX)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R10
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R11
|
||||
MOVQ 8(SI),AX
|
||||
MULQ 8(CX)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R12
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R13
|
||||
MOVQ 8(SI),AX
|
||||
MULQ 16(CX)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R14
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R15
|
||||
MOVQ 8(SI),AX
|
||||
MULQ 24(CX)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,BX
|
||||
ADCQ DX,BP
|
||||
MOVQ 8(SI),DX
|
||||
IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX
|
||||
MULQ 32(CX)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R8
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R9
|
||||
MOVQ 16(SI),AX
|
||||
MULQ 0(CX)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R12
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R13
|
||||
MOVQ 16(SI),AX
|
||||
MULQ 8(CX)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R14
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R15
|
||||
MOVQ 16(SI),AX
|
||||
MULQ 16(CX)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,BX
|
||||
ADCQ DX,BP
|
||||
MOVQ 16(SI),DX
|
||||
IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX
|
||||
MULQ 24(CX)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R8
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R9
|
||||
MOVQ 16(SI),DX
|
||||
IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX
|
||||
MULQ 32(CX)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R10
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R11
|
||||
MOVQ 24(SI),AX
|
||||
MULQ 0(CX)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R14
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R15
|
||||
MOVQ 24(SI),AX
|
||||
MULQ 8(CX)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,BX
|
||||
ADCQ DX,BP
|
||||
MOVQ 0(SP),AX
|
||||
MULQ 24(CX)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R10
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R11
|
||||
MOVQ 0(SP),AX
|
||||
MULQ 32(CX)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R12
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R13
|
||||
MOVQ 32(SI),AX
|
||||
MULQ 0(CX)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,BX
|
||||
ADCQ DX,BP
|
||||
MOVQ 8(SP),AX
|
||||
MULQ 16(CX)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R10
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R11
|
||||
MOVQ 8(SP),AX
|
||||
MULQ 24(CX)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R12
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R13
|
||||
MOVQ 8(SP),AX
|
||||
MULQ 32(CX)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R14
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R15
|
||||
MOVQ $REDMASK51,SI
|
||||
SHLQ $13,R8,R9
|
||||
ANDQ SI,R8
|
||||
SHLQ $13,R10,R11
|
||||
ANDQ SI,R10
|
||||
ADDQ R9,R10
|
||||
SHLQ $13,R12,R13
|
||||
ANDQ SI,R12
|
||||
ADDQ R11,R12
|
||||
SHLQ $13,R14,R15
|
||||
ANDQ SI,R14
|
||||
ADDQ R13,R14
|
||||
SHLQ $13,BX,BP
|
||||
ANDQ SI,BX
|
||||
ADDQ R15,BX
|
||||
IMUL3Q $19,BP,DX
|
||||
ADDQ DX,R8
|
||||
MOVQ R8,DX
|
||||
SHRQ $51,DX
|
||||
ADDQ R10,DX
|
||||
MOVQ DX,CX
|
||||
SHRQ $51,DX
|
||||
ANDQ SI,R8
|
||||
ADDQ R12,DX
|
||||
MOVQ DX,R9
|
||||
SHRQ $51,DX
|
||||
ANDQ SI,CX
|
||||
ADDQ R14,DX
|
||||
MOVQ DX,AX
|
||||
SHRQ $51,DX
|
||||
ANDQ SI,R9
|
||||
ADDQ BX,DX
|
||||
MOVQ DX,R10
|
||||
SHRQ $51,DX
|
||||
ANDQ SI,AX
|
||||
IMUL3Q $19,DX,DX
|
||||
ADDQ DX,R8
|
||||
ANDQ SI,R10
|
||||
MOVQ R8,0(DI)
|
||||
MOVQ CX,8(DI)
|
||||
MOVQ R9,16(DI)
|
||||
MOVQ AX,24(DI)
|
||||
MOVQ R10,32(DI)
|
||||
RET
|
132
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/square_amd64.s
generated
vendored
132
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/square_amd64.s
generated
vendored
|
@ -1,132 +0,0 @@
|
|||
// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
// This code was translated into a form compatible with 6a from the public
|
||||
// domain sources in SUPERCOP: https://bench.cr.yp.to/supercop.html
|
||||
|
||||
// +build amd64,!gccgo,!appengine
|
||||
|
||||
#include "const_amd64.h"
|
||||
|
||||
// func square(out, in *[5]uint64)
|
||||
TEXT ·square(SB),7,$0-16
|
||||
MOVQ out+0(FP), DI
|
||||
MOVQ in+8(FP), SI
|
||||
|
||||
MOVQ 0(SI),AX
|
||||
MULQ 0(SI)
|
||||
MOVQ AX,CX
|
||||
MOVQ DX,R8
|
||||
MOVQ 0(SI),AX
|
||||
SHLQ $1,AX
|
||||
MULQ 8(SI)
|
||||
MOVQ AX,R9
|
||||
MOVQ DX,R10
|
||||
MOVQ 0(SI),AX
|
||||
SHLQ $1,AX
|
||||
MULQ 16(SI)
|
||||
MOVQ AX,R11
|
||||
MOVQ DX,R12
|
||||
MOVQ 0(SI),AX
|
||||
SHLQ $1,AX
|
||||
MULQ 24(SI)
|
||||
MOVQ AX,R13
|
||||
MOVQ DX,R14
|
||||
MOVQ 0(SI),AX
|
||||
SHLQ $1,AX
|
||||
MULQ 32(SI)
|
||||
MOVQ AX,R15
|
||||
MOVQ DX,BX
|
||||
MOVQ 8(SI),AX
|
||||
MULQ 8(SI)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R11
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R12
|
||||
MOVQ 8(SI),AX
|
||||
SHLQ $1,AX
|
||||
MULQ 16(SI)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R13
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R14
|
||||
MOVQ 8(SI),AX
|
||||
SHLQ $1,AX
|
||||
MULQ 24(SI)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R15
|
||||
ADCQ DX,BX
|
||||
MOVQ 8(SI),DX
|
||||
IMUL3Q $38,DX,AX
|
||||
MULQ 32(SI)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,CX
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R8
|
||||
MOVQ 16(SI),AX
|
||||
MULQ 16(SI)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R15
|
||||
ADCQ DX,BX
|
||||
MOVQ 16(SI),DX
|
||||
IMUL3Q $38,DX,AX
|
||||
MULQ 24(SI)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,CX
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R8
|
||||
MOVQ 16(SI),DX
|
||||
IMUL3Q $38,DX,AX
|
||||
MULQ 32(SI)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R9
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R10
|
||||
MOVQ 24(SI),DX
|
||||
IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX
|
||||
MULQ 24(SI)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R9
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R10
|
||||
MOVQ 24(SI),DX
|
||||
IMUL3Q $38,DX,AX
|
||||
MULQ 32(SI)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R11
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R12
|
||||
MOVQ 32(SI),DX
|
||||
IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX
|
||||
MULQ 32(SI)
|
||||
ADDQ AX,R13
|
||||
ADCQ DX,R14
|
||||
MOVQ $REDMASK51,SI
|
||||
SHLQ $13,CX,R8
|
||||
ANDQ SI,CX
|
||||
SHLQ $13,R9,R10
|
||||
ANDQ SI,R9
|
||||
ADDQ R8,R9
|
||||
SHLQ $13,R11,R12
|
||||
ANDQ SI,R11
|
||||
ADDQ R10,R11
|
||||
SHLQ $13,R13,R14
|
||||
ANDQ SI,R13
|
||||
ADDQ R12,R13
|
||||
SHLQ $13,R15,BX
|
||||
ANDQ SI,R15
|
||||
ADDQ R14,R15
|
||||
IMUL3Q $19,BX,DX
|
||||
ADDQ DX,CX
|
||||
MOVQ CX,DX
|
||||
SHRQ $51,DX
|
||||
ADDQ R9,DX
|
||||
ANDQ SI,CX
|
||||
MOVQ DX,R8
|
||||
SHRQ $51,DX
|
||||
ADDQ R11,DX
|
||||
ANDQ SI,R8
|
||||
MOVQ DX,R9
|
||||
SHRQ $51,DX
|
||||
ADDQ R13,DX
|
||||
ANDQ SI,R9
|
||||
MOVQ DX,AX
|
||||
SHRQ $51,DX
|
||||
ADDQ R15,DX
|
||||
ANDQ SI,AX
|
||||
MOVQ DX,R10
|
||||
SHRQ $51,DX
|
||||
IMUL3Q $19,DX,DX
|
||||
ADDQ DX,CX
|
||||
ANDQ SI,R10
|
||||
MOVQ CX,0(DI)
|
||||
MOVQ R8,8(DI)
|
||||
MOVQ R9,16(DI)
|
||||
MOVQ AX,24(DI)
|
||||
MOVQ R10,32(DI)
|
||||
RET
|
668
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/asm_ppc64le.s
generated
vendored
668
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/asm_ppc64le.s
generated
vendored
|
@ -1,668 +0,0 @@
|
|||
// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
// Based on CRYPTOGAMS code with the following comment:
|
||||
// # ====================================================================
|
||||
// # Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
|
||||
// # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
|
||||
// # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
|
||||
// # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
|
||||
// # ====================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
// Original code can be found at the link below:
|
||||
// https://github.com/dot-asm/cryptogams/commit/a60f5b50ed908e91e5c39ca79126a4a876d5d8ff
|
||||
|
||||
// There are some differences between CRYPTOGAMS code and this one. The round
|
||||
// loop for "_int" isn't the same as the original. Some adjustments were
|
||||
// necessary because there are less vector registers available. For example, some
|
||||
// X variables (r12, r13, r14, and r15) share the same register used by the
|
||||
// counter. The original code uses ctr to name the counter. Here we use CNT
|
||||
// because golang uses CTR as the counter register name.
|
||||
|
||||
// +build ppc64le,!gccgo,!appengine
|
||||
|
||||
#include "textflag.h"
|
||||
|
||||
#define OUT R3
|
||||
#define INP R4
|
||||
#define LEN R5
|
||||
#define KEY R6
|
||||
#define CNT R7
|
||||
|
||||
#define TEMP R8
|
||||
|
||||
#define X0 R11
|
||||
#define X1 R12
|
||||
#define X2 R14
|
||||
#define X3 R15
|
||||
#define X4 R16
|
||||
#define X5 R17
|
||||
#define X6 R18
|
||||
#define X7 R19
|
||||
#define X8 R20
|
||||
#define X9 R21
|
||||
#define X10 R22
|
||||
#define X11 R23
|
||||
#define X12 R24
|
||||
#define X13 R25
|
||||
#define X14 R26
|
||||
#define X15 R27
|
||||
|
||||
#define CON0 X0
|
||||
#define CON1 X1
|
||||
#define CON2 X2
|
||||
#define CON3 X3
|
||||
|
||||
#define KEY0 X4
|
||||
#define KEY1 X5
|
||||
#define KEY2 X6
|
||||
#define KEY3 X7
|
||||
#define KEY4 X8
|
||||
#define KEY5 X9
|
||||
#define KEY6 X10
|
||||
#define KEY7 X11
|
||||
|
||||
#define CNT0 X12
|
||||
#define CNT1 X13
|
||||
#define CNT2 X14
|
||||
#define CNT3 X15
|
||||
|
||||
#define TMP0 R9
|
||||
#define TMP1 R10
|
||||
#define TMP2 R28
|
||||
#define TMP3 R29
|
||||
|
||||
#define CONSTS R8
|
||||
|
||||
#define A0 V0
|
||||
#define B0 V1
|
||||
#define C0 V2
|
||||
#define D0 V3
|
||||
#define A1 V4
|
||||
#define B1 V5
|
||||
#define C1 V6
|
||||
#define D1 V7
|
||||
#define A2 V8
|
||||
#define B2 V9
|
||||
#define C2 V10
|
||||
#define D2 V11
|
||||
#define T0 V12
|
||||
#define T1 V13
|
||||
#define T2 V14
|
||||
|
||||
#define K0 V15
|
||||
#define K1 V16
|
||||
#define K2 V17
|
||||
#define K3 V18
|
||||
#define K4 V19
|
||||
#define K5 V20
|
||||
|
||||
#define FOUR V21
|
||||
#define SIXTEEN V22
|
||||
#define TWENTY4 V23
|
||||
#define TWENTY V24
|
||||
#define TWELVE V25
|
||||
#define TWENTY5 V26
|
||||
#define SEVEN V27
|
||||
|
||||
#define INPPERM V28
|
||||
#define OUTPERM V29
|
||||
#define OUTMASK V30
|
||||
|
||||
#define DD0 V31
|
||||
#define DD1 SEVEN
|
||||
#define DD2 T0
|
||||
#define DD3 T1
|
||||
#define DD4 T2
|
||||
|
||||
DATA ·consts+0x00(SB)/8, $0x3320646e61707865
|
||||
DATA ·consts+0x08(SB)/8, $0x6b20657479622d32
|
||||
DATA ·consts+0x10(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000001
|
||||
DATA ·consts+0x18(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000000
|
||||
DATA ·consts+0x20(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000004
|
||||
DATA ·consts+0x28(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000000
|
||||
DATA ·consts+0x30(SB)/8, $0x0a0b08090e0f0c0d
|
||||
DATA ·consts+0x38(SB)/8, $0x0203000106070405
|
||||
DATA ·consts+0x40(SB)/8, $0x090a0b080d0e0f0c
|
||||
DATA ·consts+0x48(SB)/8, $0x0102030005060704
|
||||
GLOBL ·consts(SB), RODATA, $80
|
||||
|
||||
//func chaCha20_ctr32_vmx(out, inp *byte, len int, key *[32]byte, counter *[16]byte)
|
||||
TEXT ·chaCha20_ctr32_vmx(SB),NOSPLIT|NOFRAME,$0
|
||||
// Load the arguments inside the registers
|
||||
MOVD out+0(FP), OUT
|
||||
MOVD inp+8(FP), INP
|
||||
MOVD len+16(FP), LEN
|
||||
MOVD key+24(FP), KEY
|
||||
MOVD counter+32(FP), CNT
|
||||
|
||||
MOVD $·consts(SB), CONSTS // point to consts addr
|
||||
|
||||
MOVD $16, X0
|
||||
MOVD $32, X1
|
||||
MOVD $48, X2
|
||||
MOVD $64, X3
|
||||
MOVD $31, X4
|
||||
MOVD $15, X5
|
||||
|
||||
// Load key
|
||||
LVX (KEY)(R0), K1
|
||||
LVSR (KEY)(R0), T0
|
||||
LVX (KEY)(X0), K2
|
||||
LVX (KEY)(X4), DD0
|
||||
|
||||
// Load counter
|
||||
LVX (CNT)(R0), K3
|
||||
LVSR (CNT)(R0), T1
|
||||
LVX (CNT)(X5), DD1
|
||||
|
||||
// Load constants
|
||||
LVX (CONSTS)(R0), K0
|
||||
LVX (CONSTS)(X0), K5
|
||||
LVX (CONSTS)(X1), FOUR
|
||||
LVX (CONSTS)(X2), SIXTEEN
|
||||
LVX (CONSTS)(X3), TWENTY4
|
||||
|
||||
// Align key and counter
|
||||
VPERM K2, K1, T0, K1
|
||||
VPERM DD0, K2, T0, K2
|
||||
VPERM DD1, K3, T1, K3
|
||||
|
||||
// Load counter to GPR
|
||||
MOVWZ 0(CNT), CNT0
|
||||
MOVWZ 4(CNT), CNT1
|
||||
MOVWZ 8(CNT), CNT2
|
||||
MOVWZ 12(CNT), CNT3
|
||||
|
||||
// Adjust vectors for the initial state
|
||||
VADDUWM K3, K5, K3
|
||||
VADDUWM K3, K5, K4
|
||||
VADDUWM K4, K5, K5
|
||||
|
||||
// Synthesized constants
|
||||
VSPLTISW $-12, TWENTY
|
||||
VSPLTISW $12, TWELVE
|
||||
VSPLTISW $-7, TWENTY5
|
||||
|
||||
VXOR T0, T0, T0
|
||||
VSPLTISW $-1, OUTMASK
|
||||
LVSR (INP)(R0), INPPERM
|
||||
LVSL (OUT)(R0), OUTPERM
|
||||
VPERM OUTMASK, T0, OUTPERM, OUTMASK
|
||||
|
||||
loop_outer_vmx:
|
||||
// Load constant
|
||||
MOVD $0x61707865, CON0
|
||||
MOVD $0x3320646e, CON1
|
||||
MOVD $0x79622d32, CON2
|
||||
MOVD $0x6b206574, CON3
|
||||
|
||||
VOR K0, K0, A0
|
||||
VOR K0, K0, A1
|
||||
VOR K0, K0, A2
|
||||
VOR K1, K1, B0
|
||||
|
||||
MOVD $10, TEMP
|
||||
|
||||
// Load key to GPR
|
||||
MOVWZ 0(KEY), X4
|
||||
MOVWZ 4(KEY), X5
|
||||
MOVWZ 8(KEY), X6
|
||||
MOVWZ 12(KEY), X7
|
||||
VOR K1, K1, B1
|
||||
VOR K1, K1, B2
|
||||
MOVWZ 16(KEY), X8
|
||||
MOVWZ 0(CNT), X12
|
||||
MOVWZ 20(KEY), X9
|
||||
MOVWZ 4(CNT), X13
|
||||
VOR K2, K2, C0
|
||||
VOR K2, K2, C1
|
||||
MOVWZ 24(KEY), X10
|
||||
MOVWZ 8(CNT), X14
|
||||
VOR K2, K2, C2
|
||||
VOR K3, K3, D0
|
||||
MOVWZ 28(KEY), X11
|
||||
MOVWZ 12(CNT), X15
|
||||
VOR K4, K4, D1
|
||||
VOR K5, K5, D2
|
||||
|
||||
MOVD X4, TMP0
|
||||
MOVD X5, TMP1
|
||||
MOVD X6, TMP2
|
||||
MOVD X7, TMP3
|
||||
VSPLTISW $7, SEVEN
|
||||
|
||||
MOVD TEMP, CTR
|
||||
|
||||
loop_vmx:
|
||||
// CRYPTOGAMS uses a macro to create a loop using perl. This isn't possible
|
||||
// using assembly macros. Therefore, the macro expansion result was used
|
||||
// in order to maintain the algorithm efficiency.
|
||||
// This loop generates three keystream blocks using VMX instructions and,
|
||||
// in parallel, one keystream block using scalar instructions.
|
||||
ADD X4, X0, X0
|
||||
ADD X5, X1, X1
|
||||
VADDUWM A0, B0, A0
|
||||
VADDUWM A1, B1, A1
|
||||
ADD X6, X2, X2
|
||||
ADD X7, X3, X3
|
||||
VADDUWM A2, B2, A2
|
||||
VXOR D0, A0, D0
|
||||
XOR X0, X12, X12
|
||||
XOR X1, X13, X13
|
||||
VXOR D1, A1, D1
|
||||
VXOR D2, A2, D2
|
||||
XOR X2, X14, X14
|
||||
XOR X3, X15, X15
|
||||
VPERM D0, D0, SIXTEEN, D0
|
||||
VPERM D1, D1, SIXTEEN, D1
|
||||
ROTLW $16, X12, X12
|
||||
ROTLW $16, X13, X13
|
||||
VPERM D2, D2, SIXTEEN, D2
|
||||
VADDUWM C0, D0, C0
|
||||
ROTLW $16, X14, X14
|
||||
ROTLW $16, X15, X15
|
||||
VADDUWM C1, D1, C1
|
||||
VADDUWM C2, D2, C2
|
||||
ADD X12, X8, X8
|
||||
ADD X13, X9, X9
|
||||
VXOR B0, C0, T0
|
||||
VXOR B1, C1, T1
|
||||
ADD X14, X10, X10
|
||||
ADD X15, X11, X11
|
||||
VXOR B2, C2, T2
|
||||
VRLW T0, TWELVE, B0
|
||||
XOR X8, X4, X4
|
||||
XOR X9, X5, X5
|
||||
VRLW T1, TWELVE, B1
|
||||
VRLW T2, TWELVE, B2
|
||||
XOR X10, X6, X6
|
||||
XOR X11, X7, X7
|
||||
VADDUWM A0, B0, A0
|
||||
VADDUWM A1, B1, A1
|
||||
ROTLW $12, X4, X4
|
||||
ROTLW $12, X5, X5
|
||||
VADDUWM A2, B2, A2
|
||||
VXOR D0, A0, D0
|
||||
ROTLW $12, X6, X6
|
||||
ROTLW $12, X7, X7
|
||||
VXOR D1, A1, D1
|
||||
VXOR D2, A2, D2
|
||||
ADD X4, X0, X0
|
||||
ADD X5, X1, X1
|
||||
VPERM D0, D0, TWENTY4, D0
|
||||
VPERM D1, D1, TWENTY4, D1
|
||||
ADD X6, X2, X2
|
||||
ADD X7, X3, X3
|
||||
VPERM D2, D2, TWENTY4, D2
|
||||
VADDUWM C0, D0, C0
|
||||
XOR X0, X12, X12
|
||||
XOR X1, X13, X13
|
||||
VADDUWM C1, D1, C1
|
||||
VADDUWM C2, D2, C2
|
||||
XOR X2, X14, X14
|
||||
XOR X3, X15, X15
|
||||
VXOR B0, C0, T0
|
||||
VXOR B1, C1, T1
|
||||
ROTLW $8, X12, X12
|
||||
ROTLW $8, X13, X13
|
||||
VXOR B2, C2, T2
|
||||
VRLW T0, SEVEN, B0
|
||||
ROTLW $8, X14, X14
|
||||
ROTLW $8, X15, X15
|
||||
VRLW T1, SEVEN, B1
|
||||
VRLW T2, SEVEN, B2
|
||||
ADD X12, X8, X8
|
||||
ADD X13, X9, X9
|
||||
VSLDOI $8, C0, C0, C0
|
||||
VSLDOI $8, C1, C1, C1
|
||||
ADD X14, X10, X10
|
||||
ADD X15, X11, X11
|
||||
VSLDOI $8, C2, C2, C2
|
||||
VSLDOI $12, B0, B0, B0
|
||||
XOR X8, X4, X4
|
||||
XOR X9, X5, X5
|
||||
VSLDOI $12, B1, B1, B1
|
||||
VSLDOI $12, B2, B2, B2
|
||||
XOR X10, X6, X6
|
||||
XOR X11, X7, X7
|
||||
VSLDOI $4, D0, D0, D0
|
||||
VSLDOI $4, D1, D1, D1
|
||||
ROTLW $7, X4, X4
|
||||
ROTLW $7, X5, X5
|
||||
VSLDOI $4, D2, D2, D2
|
||||
VADDUWM A0, B0, A0
|
||||
ROTLW $7, X6, X6
|
||||
ROTLW $7, X7, X7
|
||||
VADDUWM A1, B1, A1
|
||||
VADDUWM A2, B2, A2
|
||||
ADD X5, X0, X0
|
||||
ADD X6, X1, X1
|
||||
VXOR D0, A0, D0
|
||||
VXOR D1, A1, D1
|
||||
ADD X7, X2, X2
|
||||
ADD X4, X3, X3
|
||||
VXOR D2, A2, D2
|
||||
VPERM D0, D0, SIXTEEN, D0
|
||||
XOR X0, X15, X15
|
||||
XOR X1, X12, X12
|
||||
VPERM D1, D1, SIXTEEN, D1
|
||||
VPERM D2, D2, SIXTEEN, D2
|
||||
XOR X2, X13, X13
|
||||
XOR X3, X14, X14
|
||||
VADDUWM C0, D0, C0
|
||||
VADDUWM C1, D1, C1
|
||||
ROTLW $16, X15, X15
|
||||
ROTLW $16, X12, X12
|
||||
VADDUWM C2, D2, C2
|
||||
VXOR B0, C0, T0
|
||||
ROTLW $16, X13, X13
|
||||
ROTLW $16, X14, X14
|
||||
VXOR B1, C1, T1
|
||||
VXOR B2, C2, T2
|
||||
ADD X15, X10, X10
|
||||
ADD X12, X11, X11
|
||||
VRLW T0, TWELVE, B0
|
||||
VRLW T1, TWELVE, B1
|
||||
ADD X13, X8, X8
|
||||
ADD X14, X9, X9
|
||||
VRLW T2, TWELVE, B2
|
||||
VADDUWM A0, B0, A0
|
||||
XOR X10, X5, X5
|
||||
XOR X11, X6, X6
|
||||
VADDUWM A1, B1, A1
|
||||
VADDUWM A2, B2, A2
|
||||
XOR X8, X7, X7
|
||||
XOR X9, X4, X4
|
||||
VXOR D0, A0, D0
|
||||
VXOR D1, A1, D1
|
||||
ROTLW $12, X5, X5
|
||||
ROTLW $12, X6, X6
|
||||
VXOR D2, A2, D2
|
||||
VPERM D0, D0, TWENTY4, D0
|
||||
ROTLW $12, X7, X7
|
||||
ROTLW $12, X4, X4
|
||||
VPERM D1, D1, TWENTY4, D1
|
||||
VPERM D2, D2, TWENTY4, D2
|
||||
ADD X5, X0, X0
|
||||
ADD X6, X1, X1
|
||||
VADDUWM C0, D0, C0
|
||||
VADDUWM C1, D1, C1
|
||||
ADD X7, X2, X2
|
||||
ADD X4, X3, X3
|
||||
VADDUWM C2, D2, C2
|
||||
VXOR B0, C0, T0
|
||||
XOR X0, X15, X15
|
||||
XOR X1, X12, X12
|
||||
VXOR B1, C1, T1
|
||||
VXOR B2, C2, T2
|
||||
XOR X2, X13, X13
|
||||
XOR X3, X14, X14
|
||||
VRLW T0, SEVEN, B0
|
||||
VRLW T1, SEVEN, B1
|
||||
ROTLW $8, X15, X15
|
||||
ROTLW $8, X12, X12
|
||||
VRLW T2, SEVEN, B2
|
||||
VSLDOI $8, C0, C0, C0
|
||||
ROTLW $8, X13, X13
|
||||
ROTLW $8, X14, X14
|
||||
VSLDOI $8, C1, C1, C1
|
||||
VSLDOI $8, C2, C2, C2
|
||||
ADD X15, X10, X10
|
||||
ADD X12, X11, X11
|
||||
VSLDOI $4, B0, B0, B0
|
||||
VSLDOI $4, B1, B1, B1
|
||||
ADD X13, X8, X8
|
||||
ADD X14, X9, X9
|
||||
VSLDOI $4, B2, B2, B2
|
||||
VSLDOI $12, D0, D0, D0
|
||||
XOR X10, X5, X5
|
||||
XOR X11, X6, X6
|
||||
VSLDOI $12, D1, D1, D1
|
||||
VSLDOI $12, D2, D2, D2
|
||||
XOR X8, X7, X7
|
||||
XOR X9, X4, X4
|
||||
ROTLW $7, X5, X5
|
||||
ROTLW $7, X6, X6
|
||||
ROTLW $7, X7, X7
|
||||
ROTLW $7, X4, X4
|
||||
BC 0x10, 0, loop_vmx
|
||||
|
||||
SUB $256, LEN, LEN
|
||||
|
||||
// Accumulate key block
|
||||
ADD $0x61707865, X0, X0
|
||||
ADD $0x3320646e, X1, X1
|
||||
ADD $0x79622d32, X2, X2
|
||||
ADD $0x6b206574, X3, X3
|
||||
ADD TMP0, X4, X4
|
||||
ADD TMP1, X5, X5
|
||||
ADD TMP2, X6, X6
|
||||
ADD TMP3, X7, X7
|
||||
MOVWZ 16(KEY), TMP0
|
||||
MOVWZ 20(KEY), TMP1
|
||||
MOVWZ 24(KEY), TMP2
|
||||
MOVWZ 28(KEY), TMP3
|
||||
ADD TMP0, X8, X8
|
||||
ADD TMP1, X9, X9
|
||||
ADD TMP2, X10, X10
|
||||
ADD TMP3, X11, X11
|
||||
|
||||
MOVWZ 12(CNT), TMP0
|
||||
MOVWZ 8(CNT), TMP1
|
||||
MOVWZ 4(CNT), TMP2
|
||||
MOVWZ 0(CNT), TEMP
|
||||
ADD TMP0, X15, X15
|
||||
ADD TMP1, X14, X14
|
||||
ADD TMP2, X13, X13
|
||||
ADD TEMP, X12, X12
|
||||
|
||||
// Accumulate key block
|
||||
VADDUWM A0, K0, A0
|
||||
VADDUWM A1, K0, A1
|
||||
VADDUWM A2, K0, A2
|
||||
VADDUWM B0, K1, B0
|
||||
VADDUWM B1, K1, B1
|
||||
VADDUWM B2, K1, B2
|
||||
VADDUWM C0, K2, C0
|
||||
VADDUWM C1, K2, C1
|
||||
VADDUWM C2, K2, C2
|
||||
VADDUWM D0, K3, D0
|
||||
VADDUWM D1, K4, D1
|
||||
VADDUWM D2, K5, D2
|
||||
|
||||
// Increment counter
|
||||
ADD $4, TEMP, TEMP
|
||||
MOVW TEMP, 0(CNT)
|
||||
|
||||
VADDUWM K3, FOUR, K3
|
||||
VADDUWM K4, FOUR, K4
|
||||
VADDUWM K5, FOUR, K5
|
||||
|
||||
// XOR the input slice (INP) with the keystream, which is stored in GPRs (X0-X3).
|
||||
|
||||
// Load input (aligned or not)
|
||||
MOVWZ 0(INP), TMP0
|
||||
MOVWZ 4(INP), TMP1
|
||||
MOVWZ 8(INP), TMP2
|
||||
MOVWZ 12(INP), TMP3
|
||||
|
||||
// XOR with input
|
||||
XOR TMP0, X0, X0
|
||||
XOR TMP1, X1, X1
|
||||
XOR TMP2, X2, X2
|
||||
XOR TMP3, X3, X3
|
||||
MOVWZ 16(INP), TMP0
|
||||
MOVWZ 20(INP), TMP1
|
||||
MOVWZ 24(INP), TMP2
|
||||
MOVWZ 28(INP), TMP3
|
||||
XOR TMP0, X4, X4
|
||||
XOR TMP1, X5, X5
|
||||
XOR TMP2, X6, X6
|
||||
XOR TMP3, X7, X7
|
||||
MOVWZ 32(INP), TMP0
|
||||
MOVWZ 36(INP), TMP1
|
||||
MOVWZ 40(INP), TMP2
|
||||
MOVWZ 44(INP), TMP3
|
||||
XOR TMP0, X8, X8
|
||||
XOR TMP1, X9, X9
|
||||
XOR TMP2, X10, X10
|
||||
XOR TMP3, X11, X11
|
||||
MOVWZ 48(INP), TMP0
|
||||
MOVWZ 52(INP), TMP1
|
||||
MOVWZ 56(INP), TMP2
|
||||
MOVWZ 60(INP), TMP3
|
||||
XOR TMP0, X12, X12
|
||||
XOR TMP1, X13, X13
|
||||
XOR TMP2, X14, X14
|
||||
XOR TMP3, X15, X15
|
||||
|
||||
// Store output (aligned or not)
|
||||
MOVW X0, 0(OUT)
|
||||
MOVW X1, 4(OUT)
|
||||
MOVW X2, 8(OUT)
|
||||
MOVW X3, 12(OUT)
|
||||
|
||||
ADD $64, INP, INP // INP points to the end of the slice for the alignment code below
|
||||
|
||||
MOVW X4, 16(OUT)
|
||||
MOVD $16, TMP0
|
||||
MOVW X5, 20(OUT)
|
||||
MOVD $32, TMP1
|
||||
MOVW X6, 24(OUT)
|
||||
MOVD $48, TMP2
|
||||
MOVW X7, 28(OUT)
|
||||
MOVD $64, TMP3
|
||||
MOVW X8, 32(OUT)
|
||||
MOVW X9, 36(OUT)
|
||||
MOVW X10, 40(OUT)
|
||||
MOVW X11, 44(OUT)
|
||||
MOVW X12, 48(OUT)
|
||||
MOVW X13, 52(OUT)
|
||||
MOVW X14, 56(OUT)
|
||||
MOVW X15, 60(OUT)
|
||||
ADD $64, OUT, OUT
|
||||
|
||||
// Load input
|
||||
LVX (INP)(R0), DD0
|
||||
LVX (INP)(TMP0), DD1
|
||||
LVX (INP)(TMP1), DD2
|
||||
LVX (INP)(TMP2), DD3
|
||||
LVX (INP)(TMP3), DD4
|
||||
ADD $64, INP, INP
|
||||
|
||||
VPERM DD1, DD0, INPPERM, DD0 // Align input
|
||||
VPERM DD2, DD1, INPPERM, DD1
|
||||
VPERM DD3, DD2, INPPERM, DD2
|
||||
VPERM DD4, DD3, INPPERM, DD3
|
||||
VXOR A0, DD0, A0 // XOR with input
|
||||
VXOR B0, DD1, B0
|
||||
LVX (INP)(TMP0), DD1 // Keep loading input
|
||||
VXOR C0, DD2, C0
|
||||
LVX (INP)(TMP1), DD2
|
||||
VXOR D0, DD3, D0
|
||||
LVX (INP)(TMP2), DD3
|
||||
LVX (INP)(TMP3), DD0
|
||||
ADD $64, INP, INP
|
||||
MOVD $63, TMP3 // 63 is not a typo
|
||||
VPERM A0, A0, OUTPERM, A0
|
||||
VPERM B0, B0, OUTPERM, B0
|
||||
VPERM C0, C0, OUTPERM, C0
|
||||
VPERM D0, D0, OUTPERM, D0
|
||||
|
||||
VPERM DD1, DD4, INPPERM, DD4 // Align input
|
||||
VPERM DD2, DD1, INPPERM, DD1
|
||||
VPERM DD3, DD2, INPPERM, DD2
|
||||
VPERM DD0, DD3, INPPERM, DD3
|
||||
VXOR A1, DD4, A1
|
||||
VXOR B1, DD1, B1
|
||||
LVX (INP)(TMP0), DD1 // Keep loading
|
||||
VXOR C1, DD2, C1
|
||||
LVX (INP)(TMP1), DD2
|
||||
VXOR D1, DD3, D1
|
||||
LVX (INP)(TMP2), DD3
|
||||
|
||||
// Note that the LVX address is always rounded down to the nearest 16-byte
|
||||
// boundary, and that it always points to at most 15 bytes beyond the end of
|
||||
// the slice, so we cannot cross a page boundary.
|
||||
LVX (INP)(TMP3), DD4 // Redundant in aligned case.
|
||||
ADD $64, INP, INP
|
||||
VPERM A1, A1, OUTPERM, A1 // Pre-misalign output
|
||||
VPERM B1, B1, OUTPERM, B1
|
||||
VPERM C1, C1, OUTPERM, C1
|
||||
VPERM D1, D1, OUTPERM, D1
|
||||
|
||||
VPERM DD1, DD0, INPPERM, DD0 // Align Input
|
||||
VPERM DD2, DD1, INPPERM, DD1
|
||||
VPERM DD3, DD2, INPPERM, DD2
|
||||
VPERM DD4, DD3, INPPERM, DD3
|
||||
VXOR A2, DD0, A2
|
||||
VXOR B2, DD1, B2
|
||||
VXOR C2, DD2, C2
|
||||
VXOR D2, DD3, D2
|
||||
VPERM A2, A2, OUTPERM, A2
|
||||
VPERM B2, B2, OUTPERM, B2
|
||||
VPERM C2, C2, OUTPERM, C2
|
||||
VPERM D2, D2, OUTPERM, D2
|
||||
|
||||
ANDCC $15, OUT, X1 // Is out aligned?
|
||||
MOVD OUT, X0
|
||||
|
||||
VSEL A0, B0, OUTMASK, DD0 // Collect pre-misaligned output
|
||||
VSEL B0, C0, OUTMASK, DD1
|
||||
VSEL C0, D0, OUTMASK, DD2
|
||||
VSEL D0, A1, OUTMASK, DD3
|
||||
VSEL A1, B1, OUTMASK, B0
|
||||
VSEL B1, C1, OUTMASK, C0
|
||||
VSEL C1, D1, OUTMASK, D0
|
||||
VSEL D1, A2, OUTMASK, A1
|
||||
VSEL A2, B2, OUTMASK, B1
|
||||
VSEL B2, C2, OUTMASK, C1
|
||||
VSEL C2, D2, OUTMASK, D1
|
||||
|
||||
STVX DD0, (OUT+TMP0)
|
||||
STVX DD1, (OUT+TMP1)
|
||||
STVX DD2, (OUT+TMP2)
|
||||
ADD $64, OUT, OUT
|
||||
STVX DD3, (OUT+R0)
|
||||
STVX B0, (OUT+TMP0)
|
||||
STVX C0, (OUT+TMP1)
|
||||
STVX D0, (OUT+TMP2)
|
||||
ADD $64, OUT, OUT
|
||||
STVX A1, (OUT+R0)
|
||||
STVX B1, (OUT+TMP0)
|
||||
STVX C1, (OUT+TMP1)
|
||||
STVX D1, (OUT+TMP2)
|
||||
ADD $64, OUT, OUT
|
||||
|
||||
BEQ aligned_vmx
|
||||
|
||||
SUB X1, OUT, X2 // in misaligned case edges
|
||||
MOVD $0, X3 // are written byte-by-byte
|
||||
|
||||
unaligned_tail_vmx:
|
||||
STVEBX D2, (X2+X3)
|
||||
ADD $1, X3, X3
|
||||
CMPW X3, X1
|
||||
BNE unaligned_tail_vmx
|
||||
SUB X1, X0, X2
|
||||
|
||||
unaligned_head_vmx:
|
||||
STVEBX A0, (X2+X1)
|
||||
CMPW X1, $15
|
||||
ADD $1, X1, X1
|
||||
BNE unaligned_head_vmx
|
||||
|
||||
CMPU LEN, $255 // done with 256-byte block yet?
|
||||
BGT loop_outer_vmx
|
||||
|
||||
JMP done_vmx
|
||||
|
||||
aligned_vmx:
|
||||
STVX A0, (X0+R0)
|
||||
CMPU LEN, $255 // done with 256-byte block yet?
|
||||
BGT loop_outer_vmx
|
||||
|
||||
done_vmx:
|
||||
RET
|
31
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_arm64.go
generated
vendored
31
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_arm64.go
generated
vendored
|
@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
|
|||
// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
// +build go1.11
|
||||
// +build !gccgo
|
||||
|
||||
package chacha20
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
haveAsm = true
|
||||
bufSize = 256
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
//go:noescape
|
||||
func xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src []byte, key *[8]uint32, nonce *[3]uint32, counter *uint32)
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *Cipher) xorKeyStreamAsm(dst, src []byte) {
|
||||
|
||||
if len(src) >= bufSize {
|
||||
xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src, &c.key, &c.nonce, &c.counter)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if len(src)%bufSize != 0 {
|
||||
i := len(src) - len(src)%bufSize
|
||||
c.buf = [bufSize]byte{}
|
||||
copy(c.buf[:], src[i:])
|
||||
xorKeyStreamVX(c.buf[:], c.buf[:], &c.key, &c.nonce, &c.counter)
|
||||
c.len = bufSize - copy(dst[i:], c.buf[:len(src)%bufSize])
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
264
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_generic.go
generated
vendored
264
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_generic.go
generated
vendored
|
@ -1,264 +0,0 @@
|
|||
// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
// Package ChaCha20 implements the core ChaCha20 function as specified
|
||||
// in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7539#section-2.3.
|
||||
package chacha20
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"crypto/cipher"
|
||||
"encoding/binary"
|
||||
|
||||
"golang.org/x/crypto/internal/subtle"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// assert that *Cipher implements cipher.Stream
|
||||
var _ cipher.Stream = (*Cipher)(nil)
|
||||
|
||||
// Cipher is a stateful instance of ChaCha20 using a particular key
|
||||
// and nonce. A *Cipher implements the cipher.Stream interface.
|
||||
type Cipher struct {
|
||||
key [8]uint32
|
||||
counter uint32 // incremented after each block
|
||||
nonce [3]uint32
|
||||
buf [bufSize]byte // buffer for unused keystream bytes
|
||||
len int // number of unused keystream bytes at end of buf
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// New creates a new ChaCha20 stream cipher with the given key and nonce.
|
||||
// The initial counter value is set to 0.
|
||||
func New(key [8]uint32, nonce [3]uint32) *Cipher {
|
||||
return &Cipher{key: key, nonce: nonce}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ChaCha20 constants spelling "expand 32-byte k"
|
||||
const (
|
||||
j0 uint32 = 0x61707865
|
||||
j1 uint32 = 0x3320646e
|
||||
j2 uint32 = 0x79622d32
|
||||
j3 uint32 = 0x6b206574
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func quarterRound(a, b, c, d uint32) (uint32, uint32, uint32, uint32) {
|
||||
a += b
|
||||
d ^= a
|
||||
d = (d << 16) | (d >> 16)
|
||||
c += d
|
||||
b ^= c
|
||||
b = (b << 12) | (b >> 20)
|
||||
a += b
|
||||
d ^= a
|
||||
d = (d << 8) | (d >> 24)
|
||||
c += d
|
||||
b ^= c
|
||||
b = (b << 7) | (b >> 25)
|
||||
return a, b, c, d
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// XORKeyStream XORs each byte in the given slice with a byte from the
|
||||
// cipher's key stream. Dst and src must overlap entirely or not at all.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// If len(dst) < len(src), XORKeyStream will panic. It is acceptable
|
||||
// to pass a dst bigger than src, and in that case, XORKeyStream will
|
||||
// only update dst[:len(src)] and will not touch the rest of dst.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Multiple calls to XORKeyStream behave as if the concatenation of
|
||||
// the src buffers was passed in a single run. That is, Cipher
|
||||
// maintains state and does not reset at each XORKeyStream call.
|
||||
func (s *Cipher) XORKeyStream(dst, src []byte) {
|
||||
if len(dst) < len(src) {
|
||||
panic("chacha20: output smaller than input")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if subtle.InexactOverlap(dst[:len(src)], src) {
|
||||
panic("chacha20: invalid buffer overlap")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// xor src with buffered keystream first
|
||||
if s.len != 0 {
|
||||
buf := s.buf[len(s.buf)-s.len:]
|
||||
if len(src) < len(buf) {
|
||||
buf = buf[:len(src)]
|
||||
}
|
||||
td, ts := dst[:len(buf)], src[:len(buf)] // BCE hint
|
||||
for i, b := range buf {
|
||||
td[i] = ts[i] ^ b
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.len -= len(buf)
|
||||
if s.len != 0 {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.buf = [len(s.buf)]byte{} // zero the empty buffer
|
||||
src = src[len(buf):]
|
||||
dst = dst[len(buf):]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if len(src) == 0 {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if haveAsm {
|
||||
if uint64(len(src))+uint64(s.counter)*64 > (1<<38)-64 {
|
||||
panic("chacha20: counter overflow")
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.xorKeyStreamAsm(dst, src)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// set up a 64-byte buffer to pad out the final block if needed
|
||||
// (hoisted out of the main loop to avoid spills)
|
||||
rem := len(src) % 64 // length of final block
|
||||
fin := len(src) - rem // index of final block
|
||||
if rem > 0 {
|
||||
copy(s.buf[len(s.buf)-64:], src[fin:])
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// pre-calculate most of the first round
|
||||
s1, s5, s9, s13 := quarterRound(j1, s.key[1], s.key[5], s.nonce[0])
|
||||
s2, s6, s10, s14 := quarterRound(j2, s.key[2], s.key[6], s.nonce[1])
|
||||
s3, s7, s11, s15 := quarterRound(j3, s.key[3], s.key[7], s.nonce[2])
|
||||
|
||||
n := len(src)
|
||||
src, dst = src[:n:n], dst[:n:n] // BCE hint
|
||||
for i := 0; i < n; i += 64 {
|
||||
// calculate the remainder of the first round
|
||||
s0, s4, s8, s12 := quarterRound(j0, s.key[0], s.key[4], s.counter)
|
||||
|
||||
// execute the second round
|
||||
x0, x5, x10, x15 := quarterRound(s0, s5, s10, s15)
|
||||
x1, x6, x11, x12 := quarterRound(s1, s6, s11, s12)
|
||||
x2, x7, x8, x13 := quarterRound(s2, s7, s8, s13)
|
||||
x3, x4, x9, x14 := quarterRound(s3, s4, s9, s14)
|
||||
|
||||
// execute the remaining 18 rounds
|
||||
for i := 0; i < 9; i++ {
|
||||
x0, x4, x8, x12 = quarterRound(x0, x4, x8, x12)
|
||||
x1, x5, x9, x13 = quarterRound(x1, x5, x9, x13)
|
||||
x2, x6, x10, x14 = quarterRound(x2, x6, x10, x14)
|
||||
x3, x7, x11, x15 = quarterRound(x3, x7, x11, x15)
|
||||
|
||||
x0, x5, x10, x15 = quarterRound(x0, x5, x10, x15)
|
||||
x1, x6, x11, x12 = quarterRound(x1, x6, x11, x12)
|
||||
x2, x7, x8, x13 = quarterRound(x2, x7, x8, x13)
|
||||
x3, x4, x9, x14 = quarterRound(x3, x4, x9, x14)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
x0 += j0
|
||||
x1 += j1
|
||||
x2 += j2
|
||||
x3 += j3
|
||||
|
||||
x4 += s.key[0]
|
||||
x5 += s.key[1]
|
||||
x6 += s.key[2]
|
||||
x7 += s.key[3]
|
||||
x8 += s.key[4]
|
||||
x9 += s.key[5]
|
||||
x10 += s.key[6]
|
||||
x11 += s.key[7]
|
||||
|
||||
x12 += s.counter
|
||||
x13 += s.nonce[0]
|
||||
x14 += s.nonce[1]
|
||||
x15 += s.nonce[2]
|
||||
|
||||
// increment the counter
|
||||
s.counter += 1
|
||||
if s.counter == 0 {
|
||||
panic("chacha20: counter overflow")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// pad to 64 bytes if needed
|
||||
in, out := src[i:], dst[i:]
|
||||
if i == fin {
|
||||
// src[fin:] has already been copied into s.buf before
|
||||
// the main loop
|
||||
in, out = s.buf[len(s.buf)-64:], s.buf[len(s.buf)-64:]
|
||||
}
|
||||
in, out = in[:64], out[:64] // BCE hint
|
||||
|
||||
// XOR the key stream with the source and write out the result
|
||||
xor(out[0:], in[0:], x0)
|
||||
xor(out[4:], in[4:], x1)
|
||||
xor(out[8:], in[8:], x2)
|
||||
xor(out[12:], in[12:], x3)
|
||||
xor(out[16:], in[16:], x4)
|
||||
xor(out[20:], in[20:], x5)
|
||||
xor(out[24:], in[24:], x6)
|
||||
xor(out[28:], in[28:], x7)
|
||||
xor(out[32:], in[32:], x8)
|
||||
xor(out[36:], in[36:], x9)
|
||||
xor(out[40:], in[40:], x10)
|
||||
xor(out[44:], in[44:], x11)
|
||||
xor(out[48:], in[48:], x12)
|
||||
xor(out[52:], in[52:], x13)
|
||||
xor(out[56:], in[56:], x14)
|
||||
xor(out[60:], in[60:], x15)
|
||||
}
|
||||
// copy any trailing bytes out of the buffer and into dst
|
||||
if rem != 0 {
|
||||
s.len = 64 - rem
|
||||
copy(dst[fin:], s.buf[len(s.buf)-64:])
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Advance discards bytes in the key stream until the next 64 byte block
|
||||
// boundary is reached and updates the counter accordingly. If the key
|
||||
// stream is already at a block boundary no bytes will be discarded and
|
||||
// the counter will be unchanged.
|
||||
func (s *Cipher) Advance() {
|
||||
s.len -= s.len % 64
|
||||
if s.len == 0 {
|
||||
s.buf = [len(s.buf)]byte{}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// XORKeyStream crypts bytes from in to out using the given key and counters.
|
||||
// In and out must overlap entirely or not at all. Counter contains the raw
|
||||
// ChaCha20 counter bytes (i.e. block counter followed by nonce).
|
||||
func XORKeyStream(out, in []byte, counter *[16]byte, key *[32]byte) {
|
||||
s := Cipher{
|
||||
key: [8]uint32{
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[0:4]),
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[4:8]),
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[8:12]),
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[12:16]),
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[16:20]),
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[20:24]),
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[24:28]),
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[28:32]),
|
||||
},
|
||||
nonce: [3]uint32{
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(counter[4:8]),
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(counter[8:12]),
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(counter[12:16]),
|
||||
},
|
||||
counter: binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(counter[0:4]),
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.XORKeyStream(out, in)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// HChaCha20 uses the ChaCha20 core to generate a derived key from a key and a
|
||||
// nonce. It should only be used as part of the XChaCha20 construction.
|
||||
func HChaCha20(key *[8]uint32, nonce *[4]uint32) [8]uint32 {
|
||||
x0, x1, x2, x3 := j0, j1, j2, j3
|
||||
x4, x5, x6, x7 := key[0], key[1], key[2], key[3]
|
||||
x8, x9, x10, x11 := key[4], key[5], key[6], key[7]
|
||||
x12, x13, x14, x15 := nonce[0], nonce[1], nonce[2], nonce[3]
|
||||
|
||||
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
|
||||
x0, x4, x8, x12 = quarterRound(x0, x4, x8, x12)
|
||||
x1, x5, x9, x13 = quarterRound(x1, x5, x9, x13)
|
||||
x2, x6, x10, x14 = quarterRound(x2, x6, x10, x14)
|
||||
x3, x7, x11, x15 = quarterRound(x3, x7, x11, x15)
|
||||
|
||||
x0, x5, x10, x15 = quarterRound(x0, x5, x10, x15)
|
||||
x1, x6, x11, x12 = quarterRound(x1, x6, x11, x12)
|
||||
x2, x7, x8, x13 = quarterRound(x2, x7, x8, x13)
|
||||
x3, x4, x9, x14 = quarterRound(x3, x4, x9, x14)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var out [8]uint32
|
||||
out[0], out[1], out[2], out[3] = x0, x1, x2, x3
|
||||
out[4], out[5], out[6], out[7] = x12, x13, x14, x15
|
||||
return out
|
||||
}
|
16
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_noasm.go
generated
vendored
16
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_noasm.go
generated
vendored
|
@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
|
|||
// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
// +build !ppc64le,!arm64,!s390x arm64,!go1.11 gccgo appengine
|
||||
|
||||
package chacha20
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
bufSize = 64
|
||||
haveAsm = false
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func (*Cipher) xorKeyStreamAsm(dst, src []byte) {
|
||||
panic("not implemented")
|
||||
}
|
52
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_ppc64le.go
generated
vendored
52
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_ppc64le.go
generated
vendored
|
@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
|
|||
// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
// +build ppc64le,!gccgo,!appengine
|
||||
|
||||
package chacha20
|
||||
|
||||
import "encoding/binary"
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
bufSize = 256
|
||||
haveAsm = true
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
//go:noescape
|
||||
func chaCha20_ctr32_vmx(out, inp *byte, len int, key *[8]uint32, counter *uint32)
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *Cipher) xorKeyStreamAsm(dst, src []byte) {
|
||||
if len(src) >= bufSize {
|
||||
chaCha20_ctr32_vmx(&dst[0], &src[0], len(src)-len(src)%bufSize, &c.key, &c.counter)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(src)%bufSize != 0 {
|
||||
chaCha20_ctr32_vmx(&c.buf[0], &c.buf[0], bufSize, &c.key, &c.counter)
|
||||
start := len(src) - len(src)%bufSize
|
||||
ts, td, tb := src[start:], dst[start:], c.buf[:]
|
||||
// Unroll loop to XOR 32 bytes per iteration.
|
||||
for i := 0; i < len(ts)-32; i += 32 {
|
||||
td, tb = td[:len(ts)], tb[:len(ts)] // bounds check elimination
|
||||
s0 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(ts[0:8])
|
||||
s1 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(ts[8:16])
|
||||
s2 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(ts[16:24])
|
||||
s3 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(ts[24:32])
|
||||
b0 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(tb[0:8])
|
||||
b1 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(tb[8:16])
|
||||
b2 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(tb[16:24])
|
||||
b3 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(tb[24:32])
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(td[0:8], s0^b0)
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(td[8:16], s1^b1)
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(td[16:24], s2^b2)
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(td[24:32], s3^b3)
|
||||
ts, td, tb = ts[32:], td[32:], tb[32:]
|
||||
}
|
||||
td, tb = td[:len(ts)], tb[:len(ts)] // bounds check elimination
|
||||
for i, v := range ts {
|
||||
td[i] = tb[i] ^ v
|
||||
}
|
||||
c.len = bufSize - (len(src) % bufSize)
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
29
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_s390x.go
generated
vendored
29
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_s390x.go
generated
vendored
|
@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
|
|||
// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
// +build s390x,!gccgo,!appengine
|
||||
|
||||
package chacha20
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"golang.org/x/sys/cpu"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
var haveAsm = cpu.S390X.HasVX
|
||||
|
||||
const bufSize = 256
|
||||
|
||||
// xorKeyStreamVX is an assembly implementation of XORKeyStream. It must only
|
||||
// be called when the vector facility is available.
|
||||
// Implementation in asm_s390x.s.
|
||||
//go:noescape
|
||||
func xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src []byte, key *[8]uint32, nonce *[3]uint32, counter *uint32, buf *[256]byte, len *int)
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *Cipher) xorKeyStreamAsm(dst, src []byte) {
|
||||
xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src, &c.key, &c.nonce, &c.counter, &c.buf, &c.len)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// EXRL targets, DO NOT CALL!
|
||||
func mvcSrcToBuf()
|
||||
func mvcBufToDst()
|
4
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/elgamal/elgamal.go
generated
vendored
4
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/elgamal/elgamal.go
generated
vendored
|
@ -76,7 +76,9 @@ func Encrypt(random io.Reader, pub *PublicKey, msg []byte) (c1, c2 *big.Int, err
|
|||
// Bleichenbacher, Advances in Cryptology (Crypto '98),
|
||||
func Decrypt(priv *PrivateKey, c1, c2 *big.Int) (msg []byte, err error) {
|
||||
s := new(big.Int).Exp(c1, priv.X, priv.P)
|
||||
s.ModInverse(s, priv.P)
|
||||
if s.ModInverse(s, priv.P) == nil {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("elgamal: invalid private key")
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.Mul(s, c2)
|
||||
s.Mod(s, priv.P)
|
||||
em := s.Bytes()
|
||||
|
|
6
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/encrypted_key.go
generated
vendored
6
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/encrypted_key.go
generated
vendored
|
@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
|
|||
package packet
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"crypto"
|
||||
"crypto/rsa"
|
||||
"encoding/binary"
|
||||
"io"
|
||||
|
@ -78,8 +79,9 @@ func (e *EncryptedKey) Decrypt(priv *PrivateKey, config *Config) error {
|
|||
// padding oracle attacks.
|
||||
switch priv.PubKeyAlgo {
|
||||
case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSAEncryptOnly:
|
||||
k := priv.PrivateKey.(*rsa.PrivateKey)
|
||||
b, err = rsa.DecryptPKCS1v15(config.Random(), k, padToKeySize(&k.PublicKey, e.encryptedMPI1.bytes))
|
||||
// Supports both *rsa.PrivateKey and crypto.Decrypter
|
||||
k := priv.PrivateKey.(crypto.Decrypter)
|
||||
b, err = k.Decrypt(config.Random(), padToKeySize(k.Public().(*rsa.PublicKey), e.encryptedMPI1.bytes), nil)
|
||||
case PubKeyAlgoElGamal:
|
||||
c1 := new(big.Int).SetBytes(e.encryptedMPI1.bytes)
|
||||
c2 := new(big.Int).SetBytes(e.encryptedMPI2.bytes)
|
||||
|
|
2
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/private_key.go
generated
vendored
2
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/private_key.go
generated
vendored
|
@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ type PrivateKey struct {
|
|||
encryptedData []byte
|
||||
cipher CipherFunction
|
||||
s2k func(out, in []byte)
|
||||
PrivateKey interface{} // An *{rsa|dsa|ecdsa}.PrivateKey or a crypto.Signer.
|
||||
PrivateKey interface{} // An *{rsa|dsa|ecdsa}.PrivateKey or crypto.Signer/crypto.Decrypter (Decryptor RSA only).
|
||||
sha1Checksum bool
|
||||
iv []byte
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
39
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/bits_compat.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
39
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/bits_compat.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
|
@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
|
|||
// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
// +build !go1.13
|
||||
|
||||
package poly1305
|
||||
|
||||
// Generic fallbacks for the math/bits intrinsics, copied from
|
||||
// src/math/bits/bits.go. They were added in Go 1.12, but Add64 and Sum64 had
|
||||
// variable time fallbacks until Go 1.13.
|
||||
|
||||
func bitsAdd64(x, y, carry uint64) (sum, carryOut uint64) {
|
||||
sum = x + y + carry
|
||||
carryOut = ((x & y) | ((x | y) &^ sum)) >> 63
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func bitsSub64(x, y, borrow uint64) (diff, borrowOut uint64) {
|
||||
diff = x - y - borrow
|
||||
borrowOut = ((^x & y) | (^(x ^ y) & diff)) >> 63
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func bitsMul64(x, y uint64) (hi, lo uint64) {
|
||||
const mask32 = 1<<32 - 1
|
||||
x0 := x & mask32
|
||||
x1 := x >> 32
|
||||
y0 := y & mask32
|
||||
y1 := y >> 32
|
||||
w0 := x0 * y0
|
||||
t := x1*y0 + w0>>32
|
||||
w1 := t & mask32
|
||||
w2 := t >> 32
|
||||
w1 += x0 * y1
|
||||
hi = x1*y1 + w2 + w1>>32
|
||||
lo = x * y
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
21
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/bits_go1.13.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
21
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/bits_go1.13.go
generated
vendored
Normal file
|
@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
|
|||
// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
// +build go1.13
|
||||
|
||||
package poly1305
|
||||
|
||||
import "math/bits"
|
||||
|
||||
func bitsAdd64(x, y, carry uint64) (sum, carryOut uint64) {
|
||||
return bits.Add64(x, y, carry)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func bitsSub64(x, y, borrow uint64) (diff, borrowOut uint64) {
|
||||
return bits.Sub64(x, y, borrow)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func bitsMul64(x, y uint64) (hi, lo uint64) {
|
||||
return bits.Mul64(x, y)
|
||||
}
|
10
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/poly1305.go
generated
vendored
10
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/poly1305.go
generated
vendored
|
@ -22,8 +22,14 @@ import "crypto/subtle"
|
|||
// TagSize is the size, in bytes, of a poly1305 authenticator.
|
||||
const TagSize = 16
|
||||
|
||||
// Verify returns true if mac is a valid authenticator for m with the given
|
||||
// key.
|
||||
// Sum generates an authenticator for msg using a one-time key and puts the
|
||||
// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same
|
||||
// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will.
|
||||
func Sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) {
|
||||
sum(out, m, key)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Verify returns true if mac is a valid authenticator for m with the given key.
|
||||
func Verify(mac *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) bool {
|
||||
var tmp [16]byte
|
||||
Sum(&tmp, m, key)
|
||||
|
|
56
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_amd64.go
generated
vendored
56
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_amd64.go
generated
vendored
|
@ -7,62 +7,52 @@
|
|||
package poly1305
|
||||
|
||||
//go:noescape
|
||||
func initialize(state *[7]uint64, key *[32]byte)
|
||||
func update(state *macState, msg []byte)
|
||||
|
||||
//go:noescape
|
||||
func update(state *[7]uint64, msg []byte)
|
||||
|
||||
//go:noescape
|
||||
func finalize(tag *[TagSize]byte, state *[7]uint64)
|
||||
|
||||
// Sum generates an authenticator for m using a one-time key and puts the
|
||||
// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same
|
||||
// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will.
|
||||
func Sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) {
|
||||
func sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) {
|
||||
h := newMAC(key)
|
||||
h.Write(m)
|
||||
h.Sum(out)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func newMAC(key *[32]byte) (h mac) {
|
||||
initialize(&h.state, key)
|
||||
initialize(key, &h.r, &h.s)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type mac struct {
|
||||
state [7]uint64 // := uint64{ h0, h1, h2, r0, r1, pad0, pad1 }
|
||||
// mac is a wrapper for macGeneric that redirects calls that would have gone to
|
||||
// updateGeneric to update.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Its Write and Sum methods are otherwise identical to the macGeneric ones, but
|
||||
// using function pointers would carry a major performance cost.
|
||||
type mac struct{ macGeneric }
|
||||
|
||||
buffer [TagSize]byte
|
||||
offset int
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (h *mac) Write(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
|
||||
n = len(p)
|
||||
func (h *mac) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
|
||||
nn := len(p)
|
||||
if h.offset > 0 {
|
||||
remaining := TagSize - h.offset
|
||||
if n < remaining {
|
||||
h.offset += copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p)
|
||||
return n, nil
|
||||
n := copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p)
|
||||
if h.offset+n < TagSize {
|
||||
h.offset += n
|
||||
return nn, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p[:remaining])
|
||||
p = p[remaining:]
|
||||
p = p[n:]
|
||||
h.offset = 0
|
||||
update(&h.state, h.buffer[:])
|
||||
update(&h.macState, h.buffer[:])
|
||||
}
|
||||
if nn := len(p) - (len(p) % TagSize); nn > 0 {
|
||||
update(&h.state, p[:nn])
|
||||
p = p[nn:]
|
||||
if n := len(p) - (len(p) % TagSize); n > 0 {
|
||||
update(&h.macState, p[:n])
|
||||
p = p[n:]
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(p) > 0 {
|
||||
h.offset += copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return n, nil
|
||||
return nn, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (h *mac) Sum(out *[16]byte) {
|
||||
state := h.state
|
||||
state := h.macState
|
||||
if h.offset > 0 {
|
||||
update(&state, h.buffer[:h.offset])
|
||||
}
|
||||
finalize(out, &state)
|
||||
finalize(out, &state.h, &state.s)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
40
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_amd64.s
generated
vendored
40
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_amd64.s
generated
vendored
|
@ -54,10 +54,6 @@
|
|||
ADCQ t3, h1; \
|
||||
ADCQ $0, h2
|
||||
|
||||
DATA ·poly1305Mask<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFF
|
||||
DATA ·poly1305Mask<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFC
|
||||
GLOBL ·poly1305Mask<>(SB), RODATA, $16
|
||||
|
||||
// func update(state *[7]uint64, msg []byte)
|
||||
TEXT ·update(SB), $0-32
|
||||
MOVQ state+0(FP), DI
|
||||
|
@ -110,39 +106,3 @@ done:
|
|||
MOVQ R9, 8(DI)
|
||||
MOVQ R10, 16(DI)
|
||||
RET
|
||||
|
||||
// func initialize(state *[7]uint64, key *[32]byte)
|
||||
TEXT ·initialize(SB), $0-16
|
||||
MOVQ state+0(FP), DI
|
||||
MOVQ key+8(FP), SI
|
||||
|
||||
// state[0...7] is initialized with zero
|
||||
MOVOU 0(SI), X0
|
||||
MOVOU 16(SI), X1
|
||||
MOVOU ·poly1305Mask<>(SB), X2
|
||||
PAND X2, X0
|
||||
MOVOU X0, 24(DI)
|
||||
MOVOU X1, 40(DI)
|
||||
RET
|
||||
|
||||
// func finalize(tag *[TagSize]byte, state *[7]uint64)
|
||||
TEXT ·finalize(SB), $0-16
|
||||
MOVQ tag+0(FP), DI
|
||||
MOVQ state+8(FP), SI
|
||||
|
||||
MOVQ 0(SI), AX
|
||||
MOVQ 8(SI), BX
|
||||
MOVQ 16(SI), CX
|
||||
MOVQ AX, R8
|
||||
MOVQ BX, R9
|
||||
SUBQ $0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFB, AX
|
||||
SBBQ $0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF, BX
|
||||
SBBQ $3, CX
|
||||
CMOVQCS R8, AX
|
||||
CMOVQCS R9, BX
|
||||
ADDQ 40(SI), AX
|
||||
ADCQ 48(SI), BX
|
||||
|
||||
MOVQ AX, 0(DI)
|
||||
MOVQ BX, 8(DI)
|
||||
RET
|
||||
|
|
7
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_arm.go
generated
vendored
7
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_arm.go
generated
vendored
|
@ -6,14 +6,11 @@
|
|||
|
||||
package poly1305
|
||||
|
||||
// This function is implemented in sum_arm.s
|
||||
// poly1305_auth_armv6 is implemented in sum_arm.s
|
||||
//go:noescape
|
||||
func poly1305_auth_armv6(out *[16]byte, m *byte, mlen uint32, key *[32]byte)
|
||||
|
||||
// Sum generates an authenticator for m using a one-time key and puts the
|
||||
// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same
|
||||
// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will.
|
||||
func Sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) {
|
||||
func sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) {
|
||||
var mPtr *byte
|
||||
if len(m) > 0 {
|
||||
mPtr = &m[0]
|
||||
|
|
369
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_generic.go
generated
vendored
369
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_generic.go
generated
vendored
|
@ -2,18 +2,29 @@
|
|||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
// This file provides the generic implementation of Sum and MAC. Other files
|
||||
// might provide optimized assembly implementations of some of this code.
|
||||
|
||||
package poly1305
|
||||
|
||||
import "encoding/binary"
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
msgBlock = uint32(1 << 24)
|
||||
finalBlock = uint32(0)
|
||||
)
|
||||
// Poly1305 [RFC 7539] is a relatively simple algorithm: the authentication tag
|
||||
// for a 64 bytes message is approximately
|
||||
//
|
||||
// s + m[0:16] * r⁴ + m[16:32] * r³ + m[32:48] * r² + m[48:64] * r mod 2¹³⁰ - 5
|
||||
//
|
||||
// for some secret r and s. It can be computed sequentially like
|
||||
//
|
||||
// for len(msg) > 0:
|
||||
// h += read(msg, 16)
|
||||
// h *= r
|
||||
// h %= 2¹³⁰ - 5
|
||||
// return h + s
|
||||
//
|
||||
// All the complexity is about doing performant constant-time math on numbers
|
||||
// larger than any available numeric type.
|
||||
|
||||
// sumGeneric generates an authenticator for msg using a one-time key and
|
||||
// puts the 16-byte result into out. This is the generic implementation of
|
||||
// Sum and should be called if no assembly implementation is available.
|
||||
func sumGeneric(out *[TagSize]byte, msg []byte, key *[32]byte) {
|
||||
h := newMACGeneric(key)
|
||||
h.Write(msg)
|
||||
|
@ -21,152 +32,276 @@ func sumGeneric(out *[TagSize]byte, msg []byte, key *[32]byte) {
|
|||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func newMACGeneric(key *[32]byte) (h macGeneric) {
|
||||
h.r[0] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[0:]) & 0x3ffffff
|
||||
h.r[1] = (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[3:]) >> 2) & 0x3ffff03
|
||||
h.r[2] = (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[6:]) >> 4) & 0x3ffc0ff
|
||||
h.r[3] = (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[9:]) >> 6) & 0x3f03fff
|
||||
h.r[4] = (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[12:]) >> 8) & 0x00fffff
|
||||
|
||||
h.s[0] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[16:])
|
||||
h.s[1] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[20:])
|
||||
h.s[2] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[24:])
|
||||
h.s[3] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[28:])
|
||||
initialize(key, &h.r, &h.s)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// macState holds numbers in saturated 64-bit little-endian limbs. That is,
|
||||
// the value of [x0, x1, x2] is x[0] + x[1] * 2⁶⁴ + x[2] * 2¹²⁸.
|
||||
type macState struct {
|
||||
// h is the main accumulator. It is to be interpreted modulo 2¹³⁰ - 5, but
|
||||
// can grow larger during and after rounds.
|
||||
h [3]uint64
|
||||
// r and s are the private key components.
|
||||
r [2]uint64
|
||||
s [2]uint64
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type macGeneric struct {
|
||||
h, r [5]uint32
|
||||
s [4]uint32
|
||||
macState
|
||||
|
||||
buffer [TagSize]byte
|
||||
offset int
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (h *macGeneric) Write(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
|
||||
n = len(p)
|
||||
// Write splits the incoming message into TagSize chunks, and passes them to
|
||||
// update. It buffers incomplete chunks.
|
||||
func (h *macGeneric) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
|
||||
nn := len(p)
|
||||
if h.offset > 0 {
|
||||
remaining := TagSize - h.offset
|
||||
if n < remaining {
|
||||
h.offset += copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p)
|
||||
return n, nil
|
||||
n := copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p)
|
||||
if h.offset+n < TagSize {
|
||||
h.offset += n
|
||||
return nn, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p[:remaining])
|
||||
p = p[remaining:]
|
||||
p = p[n:]
|
||||
h.offset = 0
|
||||
updateGeneric(h.buffer[:], msgBlock, &(h.h), &(h.r))
|
||||
updateGeneric(&h.macState, h.buffer[:])
|
||||
}
|
||||
if nn := len(p) - (len(p) % TagSize); nn > 0 {
|
||||
updateGeneric(p, msgBlock, &(h.h), &(h.r))
|
||||
p = p[nn:]
|
||||
if n := len(p) - (len(p) % TagSize); n > 0 {
|
||||
updateGeneric(&h.macState, p[:n])
|
||||
p = p[n:]
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(p) > 0 {
|
||||
h.offset += copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return n, nil
|
||||
return nn, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (h *macGeneric) Sum(out *[16]byte) {
|
||||
H, R := h.h, h.r
|
||||
// Sum flushes the last incomplete chunk from the buffer, if any, and generates
|
||||
// the MAC output. It does not modify its state, in order to allow for multiple
|
||||
// calls to Sum, even if no Write is allowed after Sum.
|
||||
func (h *macGeneric) Sum(out *[TagSize]byte) {
|
||||
state := h.macState
|
||||
if h.offset > 0 {
|
||||
var buffer [TagSize]byte
|
||||
copy(buffer[:], h.buffer[:h.offset])
|
||||
buffer[h.offset] = 1 // invariant: h.offset < TagSize
|
||||
updateGeneric(buffer[:], finalBlock, &H, &R)
|
||||
updateGeneric(&state, h.buffer[:h.offset])
|
||||
}
|
||||
finalizeGeneric(out, &H, &(h.s))
|
||||
finalize(out, &state.h, &state.s)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func updateGeneric(msg []byte, flag uint32, h, r *[5]uint32) {
|
||||
h0, h1, h2, h3, h4 := h[0], h[1], h[2], h[3], h[4]
|
||||
r0, r1, r2, r3, r4 := uint64(r[0]), uint64(r[1]), uint64(r[2]), uint64(r[3]), uint64(r[4])
|
||||
R1, R2, R3, R4 := r1*5, r2*5, r3*5, r4*5
|
||||
// [rMask0, rMask1] is the specified Poly1305 clamping mask in little-endian. It
|
||||
// clears some bits of the secret coefficient to make it possible to implement
|
||||
// multiplication more efficiently.
|
||||
const (
|
||||
rMask0 = 0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFF
|
||||
rMask1 = 0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFC
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
for len(msg) >= TagSize {
|
||||
// h += msg
|
||||
h0 += binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(msg[0:]) & 0x3ffffff
|
||||
h1 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(msg[3:]) >> 2) & 0x3ffffff
|
||||
h2 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(msg[6:]) >> 4) & 0x3ffffff
|
||||
h3 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(msg[9:]) >> 6) & 0x3ffffff
|
||||
h4 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(msg[12:]) >> 8) | flag
|
||||
func initialize(key *[32]byte, r, s *[2]uint64) {
|
||||
r[0] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(key[0:8]) & rMask0
|
||||
r[1] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(key[8:16]) & rMask1
|
||||
s[0] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(key[16:24])
|
||||
s[1] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(key[24:32])
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// h *= r
|
||||
d0 := (uint64(h0) * r0) + (uint64(h1) * R4) + (uint64(h2) * R3) + (uint64(h3) * R2) + (uint64(h4) * R1)
|
||||
d1 := (d0 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r1) + (uint64(h1) * r0) + (uint64(h2) * R4) + (uint64(h3) * R3) + (uint64(h4) * R2)
|
||||
d2 := (d1 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r2) + (uint64(h1) * r1) + (uint64(h2) * r0) + (uint64(h3) * R4) + (uint64(h4) * R3)
|
||||
d3 := (d2 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r3) + (uint64(h1) * r2) + (uint64(h2) * r1) + (uint64(h3) * r0) + (uint64(h4) * R4)
|
||||
d4 := (d3 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r4) + (uint64(h1) * r3) + (uint64(h2) * r2) + (uint64(h3) * r1) + (uint64(h4) * r0)
|
||||
// uint128 holds a 128-bit number as two 64-bit limbs, for use with the
|
||||
// bits.Mul64 and bits.Add64 intrinsics.
|
||||
type uint128 struct {
|
||||
lo, hi uint64
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// h %= p
|
||||
h0 = uint32(d0) & 0x3ffffff
|
||||
h1 = uint32(d1) & 0x3ffffff
|
||||
h2 = uint32(d2) & 0x3ffffff
|
||||
h3 = uint32(d3) & 0x3ffffff
|
||||
h4 = uint32(d4) & 0x3ffffff
|
||||
func mul64(a, b uint64) uint128 {
|
||||
hi, lo := bitsMul64(a, b)
|
||||
return uint128{lo, hi}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
h0 += uint32(d4>>26) * 5
|
||||
h1 += h0 >> 26
|
||||
h0 = h0 & 0x3ffffff
|
||||
func add128(a, b uint128) uint128 {
|
||||
lo, c := bitsAdd64(a.lo, b.lo, 0)
|
||||
hi, c := bitsAdd64(a.hi, b.hi, c)
|
||||
if c != 0 {
|
||||
panic("poly1305: unexpected overflow")
|
||||
}
|
||||
return uint128{lo, hi}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
msg = msg[TagSize:]
|
||||
func shiftRightBy2(a uint128) uint128 {
|
||||
a.lo = a.lo>>2 | (a.hi&3)<<62
|
||||
a.hi = a.hi >> 2
|
||||
return a
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// updateGeneric absorbs msg into the state.h accumulator. For each chunk m of
|
||||
// 128 bits of message, it computes
|
||||
//
|
||||
// h₊ = (h + m) * r mod 2¹³⁰ - 5
|
||||
//
|
||||
// If the msg length is not a multiple of TagSize, it assumes the last
|
||||
// incomplete chunk is the final one.
|
||||
func updateGeneric(state *macState, msg []byte) {
|
||||
h0, h1, h2 := state.h[0], state.h[1], state.h[2]
|
||||
r0, r1 := state.r[0], state.r[1]
|
||||
|
||||
for len(msg) > 0 {
|
||||
var c uint64
|
||||
|
||||
// For the first step, h + m, we use a chain of bits.Add64 intrinsics.
|
||||
// The resulting value of h might exceed 2¹³⁰ - 5, but will be partially
|
||||
// reduced at the end of the multiplication below.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The spec requires us to set a bit just above the message size, not to
|
||||
// hide leading zeroes. For full chunks, that's 1 << 128, so we can just
|
||||
// add 1 to the most significant (2¹²⁸) limb, h2.
|
||||
if len(msg) >= TagSize {
|
||||
h0, c = bitsAdd64(h0, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(msg[0:8]), 0)
|
||||
h1, c = bitsAdd64(h1, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(msg[8:16]), c)
|
||||
h2 += c + 1
|
||||
|
||||
msg = msg[TagSize:]
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
var buf [TagSize]byte
|
||||
copy(buf[:], msg)
|
||||
buf[len(msg)] = 1
|
||||
|
||||
h0, c = bitsAdd64(h0, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(buf[0:8]), 0)
|
||||
h1, c = bitsAdd64(h1, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(buf[8:16]), c)
|
||||
h2 += c
|
||||
|
||||
msg = nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Multiplication of big number limbs is similar to elementary school
|
||||
// columnar multiplication. Instead of digits, there are 64-bit limbs.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// We are multiplying a 3 limbs number, h, by a 2 limbs number, r.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// h2 h1 h0 x
|
||||
// r1 r0 =
|
||||
// ----------------
|
||||
// h2r0 h1r0 h0r0 <-- individual 128-bit products
|
||||
// + h2r1 h1r1 h0r1
|
||||
// ------------------------
|
||||
// m3 m2 m1 m0 <-- result in 128-bit overlapping limbs
|
||||
// ------------------------
|
||||
// m3.hi m2.hi m1.hi m0.hi <-- carry propagation
|
||||
// + m3.lo m2.lo m1.lo m0.lo
|
||||
// -------------------------------
|
||||
// t4 t3 t2 t1 t0 <-- final result in 64-bit limbs
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The main difference from pen-and-paper multiplication is that we do
|
||||
// carry propagation in a separate step, as if we wrote two digit sums
|
||||
// at first (the 128-bit limbs), and then carried the tens all at once.
|
||||
|
||||
h0r0 := mul64(h0, r0)
|
||||
h1r0 := mul64(h1, r0)
|
||||
h2r0 := mul64(h2, r0)
|
||||
h0r1 := mul64(h0, r1)
|
||||
h1r1 := mul64(h1, r1)
|
||||
h2r1 := mul64(h2, r1)
|
||||
|
||||
// Since h2 is known to be at most 7 (5 + 1 + 1), and r0 and r1 have their
|
||||
// top 4 bits cleared by rMask{0,1}, we know that their product is not going
|
||||
// to overflow 64 bits, so we can ignore the high part of the products.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// This also means that the product doesn't have a fifth limb (t4).
|
||||
if h2r0.hi != 0 {
|
||||
panic("poly1305: unexpected overflow")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if h2r1.hi != 0 {
|
||||
panic("poly1305: unexpected overflow")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
m0 := h0r0
|
||||
m1 := add128(h1r0, h0r1) // These two additions don't overflow thanks again
|
||||
m2 := add128(h2r0, h1r1) // to the 4 masked bits at the top of r0 and r1.
|
||||
m3 := h2r1
|
||||
|
||||
t0 := m0.lo
|
||||
t1, c := bitsAdd64(m1.lo, m0.hi, 0)
|
||||
t2, c := bitsAdd64(m2.lo, m1.hi, c)
|
||||
t3, _ := bitsAdd64(m3.lo, m2.hi, c)
|
||||
|
||||
// Now we have the result as 4 64-bit limbs, and we need to reduce it
|
||||
// modulo 2¹³⁰ - 5. The special shape of this Crandall prime lets us do
|
||||
// a cheap partial reduction according to the reduction identity
|
||||
//
|
||||
// c * 2¹³⁰ + n = c * 5 + n mod 2¹³⁰ - 5
|
||||
//
|
||||
// because 2¹³⁰ = 5 mod 2¹³⁰ - 5. Partial reduction since the result is
|
||||
// likely to be larger than 2¹³⁰ - 5, but still small enough to fit the
|
||||
// assumptions we make about h in the rest of the code.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// See also https://speakerdeck.com/gtank/engineering-prime-numbers?slide=23
|
||||
|
||||
// We split the final result at the 2¹³⁰ mark into h and cc, the carry.
|
||||
// Note that the carry bits are effectively shifted left by 2, in other
|
||||
// words, cc = c * 4 for the c in the reduction identity.
|
||||
h0, h1, h2 = t0, t1, t2&maskLow2Bits
|
||||
cc := uint128{t2 & maskNotLow2Bits, t3}
|
||||
|
||||
// To add c * 5 to h, we first add cc = c * 4, and then add (cc >> 2) = c.
|
||||
|
||||
h0, c = bitsAdd64(h0, cc.lo, 0)
|
||||
h1, c = bitsAdd64(h1, cc.hi, c)
|
||||
h2 += c
|
||||
|
||||
cc = shiftRightBy2(cc)
|
||||
|
||||
h0, c = bitsAdd64(h0, cc.lo, 0)
|
||||
h1, c = bitsAdd64(h1, cc.hi, c)
|
||||
h2 += c
|
||||
|
||||
// h2 is at most 3 + 1 + 1 = 5, making the whole of h at most
|
||||
//
|
||||
// 5 * 2¹²⁸ + (2¹²⁸ - 1) = 6 * 2¹²⁸ - 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
h[0], h[1], h[2], h[3], h[4] = h0, h1, h2, h3, h4
|
||||
state.h[0], state.h[1], state.h[2] = h0, h1, h2
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func finalizeGeneric(out *[TagSize]byte, h *[5]uint32, s *[4]uint32) {
|
||||
h0, h1, h2, h3, h4 := h[0], h[1], h[2], h[3], h[4]
|
||||
const (
|
||||
maskLow2Bits uint64 = 0x0000000000000003
|
||||
maskNotLow2Bits uint64 = ^maskLow2Bits
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// h %= p reduction
|
||||
h2 += h1 >> 26
|
||||
h1 &= 0x3ffffff
|
||||
h3 += h2 >> 26
|
||||
h2 &= 0x3ffffff
|
||||
h4 += h3 >> 26
|
||||
h3 &= 0x3ffffff
|
||||
h0 += 5 * (h4 >> 26)
|
||||
h4 &= 0x3ffffff
|
||||
h1 += h0 >> 26
|
||||
h0 &= 0x3ffffff
|
||||
// select64 returns x if v == 1 and y if v == 0, in constant time.
|
||||
func select64(v, x, y uint64) uint64 { return ^(v-1)&x | (v-1)&y }
|
||||
|
||||
// h - p
|
||||
t0 := h0 + 5
|
||||
t1 := h1 + (t0 >> 26)
|
||||
t2 := h2 + (t1 >> 26)
|
||||
t3 := h3 + (t2 >> 26)
|
||||
t4 := h4 + (t3 >> 26) - (1 << 26)
|
||||
t0 &= 0x3ffffff
|
||||
t1 &= 0x3ffffff
|
||||
t2 &= 0x3ffffff
|
||||
t3 &= 0x3ffffff
|
||||
// [p0, p1, p2] is 2¹³⁰ - 5 in little endian order.
|
||||
const (
|
||||
p0 = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFB
|
||||
p1 = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
|
||||
p2 = 0x0000000000000003
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// select h if h < p else h - p
|
||||
t_mask := (t4 >> 31) - 1
|
||||
h_mask := ^t_mask
|
||||
h0 = (h0 & h_mask) | (t0 & t_mask)
|
||||
h1 = (h1 & h_mask) | (t1 & t_mask)
|
||||
h2 = (h2 & h_mask) | (t2 & t_mask)
|
||||
h3 = (h3 & h_mask) | (t3 & t_mask)
|
||||
h4 = (h4 & h_mask) | (t4 & t_mask)
|
||||
// finalize completes the modular reduction of h and computes
|
||||
//
|
||||
// out = h + s mod 2¹²⁸
|
||||
//
|
||||
func finalize(out *[TagSize]byte, h *[3]uint64, s *[2]uint64) {
|
||||
h0, h1, h2 := h[0], h[1], h[2]
|
||||
|
||||
// h %= 2^128
|
||||
h0 |= h1 << 26
|
||||
h1 = ((h1 >> 6) | (h2 << 20))
|
||||
h2 = ((h2 >> 12) | (h3 << 14))
|
||||
h3 = ((h3 >> 18) | (h4 << 8))
|
||||
// After the partial reduction in updateGeneric, h might be more than
|
||||
// 2¹³⁰ - 5, but will be less than 2 * (2¹³⁰ - 5). To complete the reduction
|
||||
// in constant time, we compute t = h - (2¹³⁰ - 5), and select h as the
|
||||
// result if the subtraction underflows, and t otherwise.
|
||||
|
||||
// s: the s part of the key
|
||||
// tag = (h + s) % (2^128)
|
||||
t := uint64(h0) + uint64(s[0])
|
||||
h0 = uint32(t)
|
||||
t = uint64(h1) + uint64(s[1]) + (t >> 32)
|
||||
h1 = uint32(t)
|
||||
t = uint64(h2) + uint64(s[2]) + (t >> 32)
|
||||
h2 = uint32(t)
|
||||
t = uint64(h3) + uint64(s[3]) + (t >> 32)
|
||||
h3 = uint32(t)
|
||||
hMinusP0, b := bitsSub64(h0, p0, 0)
|
||||
hMinusP1, b := bitsSub64(h1, p1, b)
|
||||
_, b = bitsSub64(h2, p2, b)
|
||||
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[0:], h0)
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[4:], h1)
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[8:], h2)
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[12:], h3)
|
||||
// h = h if h < p else h - p
|
||||
h0 = select64(b, h0, hMinusP0)
|
||||
h1 = select64(b, h1, hMinusP1)
|
||||
|
||||
// Finally, we compute the last Poly1305 step
|
||||
//
|
||||
// tag = h + s mod 2¹²⁸
|
||||
//
|
||||
// by just doing a wide addition with the 128 low bits of h and discarding
|
||||
// the overflow.
|
||||
h0, c := bitsAdd64(h0, s[0], 0)
|
||||
h1, _ = bitsAdd64(h1, s[1], c)
|
||||
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(out[0:8], h0)
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(out[8:16], h1)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
5
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_noasm.go
generated
vendored
5
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_noasm.go
generated
vendored
|
@ -6,10 +6,7 @@
|
|||
|
||||
package poly1305
|
||||
|
||||
// Sum generates an authenticator for msg using a one-time key and puts the
|
||||
// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same
|
||||
// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will.
|
||||
func Sum(out *[TagSize]byte, msg []byte, key *[32]byte) {
|
||||
func sum(out *[TagSize]byte, msg []byte, key *[32]byte) {
|
||||
h := newMAC(key)
|
||||
h.Write(msg)
|
||||
h.Sum(out)
|
||||
|
|
56
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_ppc64le.go
generated
vendored
56
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_ppc64le.go
generated
vendored
|
@ -7,62 +7,52 @@
|
|||
package poly1305
|
||||
|
||||
//go:noescape
|
||||
func initialize(state *[7]uint64, key *[32]byte)
|
||||
func update(state *macState, msg []byte)
|
||||
|
||||
//go:noescape
|
||||
func update(state *[7]uint64, msg []byte)
|
||||
|
||||
//go:noescape
|
||||
func finalize(tag *[TagSize]byte, state *[7]uint64)
|
||||
|
||||
// Sum generates an authenticator for m using a one-time key and puts the
|
||||
// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same
|
||||
// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will.
|
||||
func Sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) {
|
||||
func sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) {
|
||||
h := newMAC(key)
|
||||
h.Write(m)
|
||||
h.Sum(out)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func newMAC(key *[32]byte) (h mac) {
|
||||
initialize(&h.state, key)
|
||||
initialize(key, &h.r, &h.s)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type mac struct {
|
||||
state [7]uint64 // := uint64{ h0, h1, h2, r0, r1, pad0, pad1 }
|
||||
// mac is a wrapper for macGeneric that redirects calls that would have gone to
|
||||
// updateGeneric to update.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Its Write and Sum methods are otherwise identical to the macGeneric ones, but
|
||||
// using function pointers would carry a major performance cost.
|
||||
type mac struct{ macGeneric }
|
||||
|
||||
buffer [TagSize]byte
|
||||
offset int
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (h *mac) Write(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
|
||||
n = len(p)
|
||||
func (h *mac) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
|
||||
nn := len(p)
|
||||
if h.offset > 0 {
|
||||
remaining := TagSize - h.offset
|
||||
if n < remaining {
|
||||
h.offset += copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p)
|
||||
return n, nil
|
||||
n := copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p)
|
||||
if h.offset+n < TagSize {
|
||||
h.offset += n
|
||||
return nn, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p[:remaining])
|
||||
p = p[remaining:]
|
||||
p = p[n:]
|
||||
h.offset = 0
|
||||
update(&h.state, h.buffer[:])
|
||||
update(&h.macState, h.buffer[:])
|
||||
}
|
||||
if nn := len(p) - (len(p) % TagSize); nn > 0 {
|
||||
update(&h.state, p[:nn])
|
||||
p = p[nn:]
|
||||
if n := len(p) - (len(p) % TagSize); n > 0 {
|
||||
update(&h.macState, p[:n])
|
||||
p = p[n:]
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(p) > 0 {
|
||||
h.offset += copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return n, nil
|
||||
return nn, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (h *mac) Sum(out *[16]byte) {
|
||||
state := h.state
|
||||
state := h.macState
|
||||
if h.offset > 0 {
|
||||
update(&state, h.buffer[:h.offset])
|
||||
}
|
||||
finalize(out, &state)
|
||||
finalize(out, &state.h, &state.s)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
66
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_ppc64le.s
generated
vendored
66
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_ppc64le.s
generated
vendored
|
@ -58,7 +58,6 @@ DATA ·poly1305Mask<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFC
|
|||
GLOBL ·poly1305Mask<>(SB), RODATA, $16
|
||||
|
||||
// func update(state *[7]uint64, msg []byte)
|
||||
|
||||
TEXT ·update(SB), $0-32
|
||||
MOVD state+0(FP), R3
|
||||
MOVD msg_base+8(FP), R4
|
||||
|
@ -180,68 +179,3 @@ done:
|
|||
MOVD R9, 8(R3)
|
||||
MOVD R10, 16(R3)
|
||||
RET
|
||||
|
||||
// func initialize(state *[7]uint64, key *[32]byte)
|
||||
TEXT ·initialize(SB), $0-16
|
||||
MOVD state+0(FP), R3
|
||||
MOVD key+8(FP), R4
|
||||
|
||||
// state[0...7] is initialized with zero
|
||||
// Load key
|
||||
MOVD 0(R4), R5
|
||||
MOVD 8(R4), R6
|
||||
MOVD 16(R4), R7
|
||||
MOVD 24(R4), R8
|
||||
|
||||
// Address of key mask
|
||||
MOVD $·poly1305Mask<>(SB), R9
|
||||
|
||||
// Save original key in state
|
||||
MOVD R7, 40(R3)
|
||||
MOVD R8, 48(R3)
|
||||
|
||||
// Get mask
|
||||
MOVD (R9), R7
|
||||
MOVD 8(R9), R8
|
||||
|
||||
// And with key
|
||||
AND R5, R7, R5
|
||||
AND R6, R8, R6
|
||||
|
||||
// Save masked key in state
|
||||
MOVD R5, 24(R3)
|
||||
MOVD R6, 32(R3)
|
||||
RET
|
||||
|
||||
// func finalize(tag *[TagSize]byte, state *[7]uint64)
|
||||
TEXT ·finalize(SB), $0-16
|
||||
MOVD tag+0(FP), R3
|
||||
MOVD state+8(FP), R4
|
||||
|
||||
// Get h0, h1, h2 from state
|
||||
MOVD 0(R4), R5
|
||||
MOVD 8(R4), R6
|
||||
MOVD 16(R4), R7
|
||||
|
||||
// Save h0, h1
|
||||
MOVD R5, R8
|
||||
MOVD R6, R9
|
||||
MOVD $3, R20
|
||||
MOVD $-1, R21
|
||||
SUBC $-5, R5
|
||||
SUBE R21, R6
|
||||
SUBE R20, R7
|
||||
MOVD $0, R21
|
||||
SUBZE R21
|
||||
|
||||
// Check for carry
|
||||
CMP $0, R21
|
||||
ISEL $2, R5, R8, R5
|
||||
ISEL $2, R6, R9, R6
|
||||
MOVD 40(R4), R8
|
||||
MOVD 48(R4), R9
|
||||
ADDC R8, R5
|
||||
ADDE R9, R6
|
||||
MOVD R5, 0(R3)
|
||||
MOVD R6, 8(R3)
|
||||
RET
|
||||
|
|
5
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_s390x.go
generated
vendored
5
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_s390x.go
generated
vendored
|
@ -22,10 +22,7 @@ func poly1305vx(out *[16]byte, m *byte, mlen uint64, key *[32]byte)
|
|||
//go:noescape
|
||||
func poly1305vmsl(out *[16]byte, m *byte, mlen uint64, key *[32]byte)
|
||||
|
||||
// Sum generates an authenticator for m using a one-time key and puts the
|
||||
// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same
|
||||
// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will.
|
||||
func Sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) {
|
||||
func sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) {
|
||||
if cpu.S390X.HasVX {
|
||||
var mPtr *byte
|
||||
if len(m) > 0 {
|
||||
|
|
51
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go
generated
vendored
51
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go
generated
vendored
|
@ -16,9 +16,8 @@ import (
|
|||
"hash"
|
||||
"io"
|
||||
"io/ioutil"
|
||||
"math/bits"
|
||||
|
||||
"golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20"
|
||||
"golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20"
|
||||
"golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -642,8 +641,8 @@ const chacha20Poly1305ID = "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com"
|
|||
// the methods here also implement padding, which RFC4253 Section 6
|
||||
// also requires of stream ciphers.
|
||||
type chacha20Poly1305Cipher struct {
|
||||
lengthKey [8]uint32
|
||||
contentKey [8]uint32
|
||||
lengthKey [32]byte
|
||||
contentKey [32]byte
|
||||
buf []byte
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -656,21 +655,21 @@ func newChaCha20Cipher(key, unusedIV, unusedMACKey []byte, unusedAlgs directionA
|
|||
buf: make([]byte, 256),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for i := range c.contentKey {
|
||||
c.contentKey[i] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[i*4 : (i+1)*4])
|
||||
}
|
||||
for i := range c.lengthKey {
|
||||
c.lengthKey[i] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[(i+8)*4 : (i+9)*4])
|
||||
}
|
||||
copy(c.contentKey[:], key[:32])
|
||||
copy(c.lengthKey[:], key[32:])
|
||||
return c, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *chacha20Poly1305Cipher) readCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
nonce := [3]uint32{0, 0, bits.ReverseBytes32(seqNum)}
|
||||
s := chacha20.New(c.contentKey, nonce)
|
||||
var polyKey [32]byte
|
||||
nonce := make([]byte, 12)
|
||||
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(nonce[8:], seqNum)
|
||||
s, err := chacha20.NewUnauthenticatedCipher(c.contentKey[:], nonce)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
var polyKey, discardBuf [32]byte
|
||||
s.XORKeyStream(polyKey[:], polyKey[:])
|
||||
s.Advance() // skip next 32 bytes
|
||||
s.XORKeyStream(discardBuf[:], discardBuf[:]) // skip the next 32 bytes
|
||||
|
||||
encryptedLength := c.buf[:4]
|
||||
if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, encryptedLength); err != nil {
|
||||
|
@ -678,7 +677,11 @@ func (c *chacha20Poly1305Cipher) readCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([
|
|||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var lenBytes [4]byte
|
||||
chacha20.New(c.lengthKey, nonce).XORKeyStream(lenBytes[:], encryptedLength)
|
||||
ls, err := chacha20.NewUnauthenticatedCipher(c.lengthKey[:], nonce)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
ls.XORKeyStream(lenBytes[:], encryptedLength)
|
||||
|
||||
length := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(lenBytes[:])
|
||||
if length > maxPacket {
|
||||
|
@ -724,11 +727,15 @@ func (c *chacha20Poly1305Cipher) readCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([
|
|||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *chacha20Poly1305Cipher) writeCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, payload []byte) error {
|
||||
nonce := [3]uint32{0, 0, bits.ReverseBytes32(seqNum)}
|
||||
s := chacha20.New(c.contentKey, nonce)
|
||||
var polyKey [32]byte
|
||||
nonce := make([]byte, 12)
|
||||
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(nonce[8:], seqNum)
|
||||
s, err := chacha20.NewUnauthenticatedCipher(c.contentKey[:], nonce)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
var polyKey, discardBuf [32]byte
|
||||
s.XORKeyStream(polyKey[:], polyKey[:])
|
||||
s.Advance() // skip next 32 bytes
|
||||
s.XORKeyStream(discardBuf[:], discardBuf[:]) // skip the next 32 bytes
|
||||
|
||||
// There is no blocksize, so fall back to multiple of 8 byte
|
||||
// padding, as described in RFC 4253, Sec 6.
|
||||
|
@ -748,7 +755,11 @@ func (c *chacha20Poly1305Cipher) writeCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, r
|
|||
}
|
||||
|
||||
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(c.buf, uint32(1+len(payload)+padding))
|
||||
chacha20.New(c.lengthKey, nonce).XORKeyStream(c.buf, c.buf[:4])
|
||||
ls, err := chacha20.NewUnauthenticatedCipher(c.lengthKey[:], nonce)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
ls.XORKeyStream(c.buf, c.buf[:4])
|
||||
c.buf[4] = byte(padding)
|
||||
copy(c.buf[5:], payload)
|
||||
packetEnd := 5 + len(payload) + padding
|
||||
|
|
2
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/kex.go
generated
vendored
2
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/kex.go
generated
vendored
|
@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ func (group *dhGroup) Server(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handsha
|
|||
HostKey: hostKeyBytes,
|
||||
Signature: sig,
|
||||
Hash: crypto.SHA1,
|
||||
}, nil
|
||||
}, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ecdh performs Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange as
|
||||
|
|
4
vendor/modules.txt
vendored
4
vendor/modules.txt
vendored
|
@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ go.mongodb.org/mongo-driver/bson/bsonrw
|
|||
go.mongodb.org/mongo-driver/bson/bsontype
|
||||
go.mongodb.org/mongo-driver/bson/primitive
|
||||
go.mongodb.org/mongo-driver/x/bsonx/bsoncore
|
||||
# golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20190927123631-a832865fa7ad
|
||||
# golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20191117063200-497ca9f6d64f
|
||||
golang.org/x/crypto/acme
|
||||
golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert
|
||||
golang.org/x/crypto/argon2
|
||||
|
@ -444,10 +444,10 @@ golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt
|
|||
golang.org/x/crypto/blake2b
|
||||
golang.org/x/crypto/blowfish
|
||||
golang.org/x/crypto/cast5
|
||||
golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20
|
||||
golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519
|
||||
golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519
|
||||
golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519/internal/edwards25519
|
||||
golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20
|
||||
golang.org/x/crypto/internal/subtle
|
||||
golang.org/x/crypto/md4
|
||||
golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp
|
||||
|
|
Loading…
Reference in a new issue